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Abstract
Great progress for the rights of tongzhi (sexually and gender-nonconforming
people) has occurred in Taiwan in the past two decades, culminating in the legalization of
same-sex marriage in 2019. However, it is still not uncommon for parents to take their
tongzhi son or daughter to see a spirit medium or psychiatrist in an attempt to ‘cure’ them
of their same-sex attraction. In Confucian ideology, which is central to the culture of
Taiwan, a filial son or daughter is one who marries heterosexually and produces progeny
to continue the family line. Tongzhi who do not do so are therefore violating this
traditional view of filial piety. In the face of these challenges, tongzhi members of the
Daoist Brilliant Light Temple have created fictive kin relations that provide them with
emotional and social support. They have become adopted sons and daughters of the
Rabbit God (who is the deification of a man who desired another man), and through their
devotion and obedience they are being filial to their spiritual father. The members also
use the religious concepts of reincarnation and karmic destiny to explain the familial
connections they feel with each other. This thesis also examines how Master Lu of
Brilliant Light Temple and Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei have supported tongzhi
individuals and tongzhi rights. In addition to exploring the intersection of East Asian
religions and tongzhi experiences—a topic rarely addressed in the literature—this thesis
also makes a new connection between tongzhi and Buddhist and Daoist clergy. Because
they do not marry and bear progeny, celibate religious figures have historically fallen
outside of Confucian norms in China’s history, and contentious attitudes towards clergy
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continue to the present in Taiwan. Tongzhi’s creation of fictive kin networks for support,
and their reinterpretation of filial piety, mirrors longer traditions among celibate monks,
nuns, and priests who have reconfigured familial obligations in the course of following
their religious calling.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 My Project
It was a case of heartbreak that first brought Evan, a 30-year-old butcher in
Taipei, to a small Daoist temple in a neighboring city. However, this temple would
provide a system of support during times of conflict with his family. In my interview with
Evan he told me that when he was 19 years old and in his second year of university, his
parents, grandparents, and other members of his extended family took him to see a
psychiatrist in Taipei to try and ‘cure’ him of his desire for other men.1 The psychiatrist
tried to explain to Evan’s family that he was not sick, and that being attracted to people of
the same gender is not an illness. Evan’s family had already taken him to various temples
to see mediums who tried to rid him of his desires. They put so much pressure on the
psychiatrist that the doctor eventually prescribed Evan a concentration improving
medication just to appease his parents so that they would let Evan leave the hospital.
Evan continued to experience conflict with his family because they wouldn’t accept his
sexuality—and it reached a point where he became suicidal.
Evan’s experience is not unique. Family is a major source of conflict for those
who do not conform to heteronormative sexual and gender identities in Taiwan. It is the
conception of the family in traditional Chinese thought—and the fundamental concept of
filial piety—that leads to this conflict and struggle for parents and other relatives to
1

Initial interview on October 11, 2020; follow-up interview on October 31, 2020.
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accept a family member who has same-sex desires. The family, and not the individual, is
the irreducible unit; family is the base of society in East Asian countries like Taiwan that
have a culture shaped by Confucian ideology (Chou 2000; Park and Chesla 2007). Within
the family, filial piety is a central value. Being filial means obeying and looking after
one’s parents and grandparents, and it also includes the imperative to marry and continue
the family line. As I will describe in Chapter 3, this was an expectation Evan’s parents
had: they wanted him to marry (a woman) and have children. In the traditional sense,
Evan is not filial. However, as I will argue in this thesis, he and others have reinterpreted
the fundamental concept of filial piety.
One must be careful not to assume all queer communities around the world share
the same history, struggles, and conceptions of identity. This is why throughout my thesis
I will use the term that is most popular contemporary word used in Taiwan by same-sex
attracted people, those who are transgender (kuaxingbie), and others who are sexually and
gender nonconforming. That word is tongzhi, which means ‘comrade’ (I will discuss the
history and politics of this term in more detail in Chapter 2). However, much of my thesis
will focus on male tongzhi. This is a result of 1) reviewing the scholarship on the history
of same-sex love in the Chinese-speaking world, much of which focuses on male samesex love because of the records that exist; and 2) the people I interviewed.
In my thesis I will focus on what makes Taiwan’s tongzhi identity and history
unique and different from the Euro-North American LGBTQ community. I do this by
examining how same-sex love was described and discussed throughout China’s history,
how previously fluid conceptions of sexuality gave way to more fixed identities at the
turn of the 20th century, and finally I examine the terminology used in Chinese-speaking
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societies today. I will also explore the ways in which the weight of family values and
obligations has created a culturally distinct set of challenges for tongzhi in Taiwan. In the
course of navigating familial responsibilities, tongzhi (and non-tongzhi) have formed
fictive kin relations that provide them with support. In doing so they are also
reinterpreting notions of filial piety. In their creation of fictive kinship and their
reinterpretation of filial piety, they are not unlike celibate religious clergy in Taiwan who
have also forsaken their familial obligations. My research also addresses a gap in the
literature, as little scholarship has been done on the intersection of tongzhi and East Asian
religions such as Buddhism and Daoism.2
1.2 Arrangement of the Thesis
Chapter 2 examines the history of same-sex love in China and Taiwan, from
ancient times up to the present day in Taiwan. The earliest records attest to the fluidity of
sexuality in Chinese society, and this fluidity can be seen again in contemporary times
with the use of the term tongzhi. I begin by reviewing historical scholarship on same-sex
love in China, demonstrating that in many periods of Chinese history same-sex love was
widely practiced and accepted (Hinsch 1990; Vitiello 1992; Wu 2004). I draw on this
scholarship to argue that in same-sex acts, it was the difference in social standing and
power that was more important than each participant’s gender. The idea that the man who
took the active, inserter role and the subordinate insertee shared the same social category
(what could be described as homosexual today) did not exist in traditional Chinese
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The one example I found was Huinan Yang’s (2005) study of the ‘Child-Brahman
Abode’ (tong fanjing she), which he describes as the first tongzhi Buddhist group in
Taiwan. Yang deployed an online survey, and found that one of the main issues that this
group was concerned with was whether or not same-sex love violates Buddhist precepts,
and if all beings have an equal standing of attaining enlightenment.
3

thought (Chou 2000). In the dynastic period in China, men manifested sexuality
differently, depending on their stage in life, with adolescents taking the passive sexual
role and adult men taking the active role (Hinsch 1990). I draw on Foucault’s second
volume of The History of Sexuality when discussing this fluidity, as well as when I
examine how in China love for the same sex and for the other sex were not seen as two
exclusive choices or radically different types of behavior. In large part, because of the
Confucian emphasis on family responsibility, men were still expected to marry women
and sex within marriage served the procreative purpose of producing heirs. While what
we would call ‘bisexuality’ today prevailed over exclusive same-sex love in much of
China’s history, I argue that using words such as ‘homosexual’ or ‘bisexual’ is
problematic, as the concept of sexual orientation did not exist and the men who engaged
in same-sex love did not identify with a particular sexual identity or essence.
Throughout Chapter 2 I also examine the terminology used to describe and label
same-sex love throughout China’s history, as well as in contemporary Chinese-speaking
societies such as Taiwan. I move from the time of Imperial China (during which there
was no medical or scientific term equivalent to ‘homosexuality’) to the turn of the 20th
century, at which time Chinese intellectuals and elites turned away from Confucian and
neo-Confucian cosmological understandings of gender and sexuality, and turned instead
to the natural sciences, importing, translating, and reinterpreting Western sexology to
explain all matters of sexuality, including same-sex love. I demonstrate how the ideas
around same-sex desire linked sexuality to procreation, and ‘heterosexualized’ the
Confucian marital-reproductive institution while pathologizing same-sex love as a
byproduct (Chou 2000; Dikötter 1995)
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I then turn to the contemporary era, briefly examining the trajectory that tongzhi
rights have taken in Taiwan from the 1990s to the present day. I also examine the
terminology used by same-sex attracted communities in Chinese-speaking societies
(China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) today. I conclude Chapter 2 by arguing that the term
tongzhi is more appropriate for these communities than the Western terms gay, lesbian,
queer, and ‘LGBTQ’. I explain that this is because of the different history of same-sex
love in the Chinese-speaking world, and because tongzhi is more fluid in that it can refer
to any form of sexuality that has been marginalized by hegemonic heterosexuality.
Chapter 3 analyzes how religious practitioners and worshippers navigate the
pressures of family responsibility and use religious frameworks to reinterpret kinship and
the traditional Confucian concept of filial piety. This chapter describes how the family is
the most basic and significant social institution in Chinese societies, and that within
familial relationships the concept of filial piety is of central value. Filial piety means to
respect and be obedient to one’s parents, elders, and ancestors; this includes having
children and continuing the family line. Drawing on scholarship as well as my own
ethnographic work, I argue that this expectation of marrying heterosexually and having
progeny makes it challenging for parents in Taiwan to fully accept and support tongzhi.
The largest challenge for most tongzhi is not discrimination from the state, job
discrimination, or religious oppression—but the family, especially the parents (Chou
2000).
Scholars whose research has focused on tongzhi have demonstrated that the
family-kin relation can be used to integrate a tongzhi family member’s partner into the
family, and alternately that the same Chinese kinship system can also be used to create a
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sense of an imagined community for tongzhi (Anderson 1983; Chou 2000; Wong and
Zhang 2001). In relation to these discussions, I argue that both tongzhi and non-tongzhi
members of a Daoist temple (‘Brilliant Light Temple’) in Taiwan have used religious
beliefs and ritual to create fictive kin relations that provide them with emotional and
social support. I draw on ethnographic fieldwork to demonstrate how some members
have become adopted children of a deity (the Rabbit God) who cares about their wellbeing and specifically intervenes in their romantic lives. I will also demonstrate how
members use other religious beliefs—namely reincarnation—to explain the familial
connection they feel with each other at the temple.
Scholars in the field of China and Taiwan studies have argued that filial piety can
be reinterpreted. I draw on this scholarship to argue that these members are attempting to
be filial through their devout dedication to the god that has adopted them as children. In
doing so they are also mirroring the practices of celibate religious figures who, since they
too do not have progeny, have long been outside of Confucian norms in the history of
China and Taiwan. I will explain how celibate clergy have reinterpreted the notion of
filial piety through their religious activities.
Chapter 4 is a pragmatic-poetic analysis of statements made by Taiwanese
Buddhist scholar-nun Shih Chao Hwei at a public hearing in support of same-sex
marriage.3 I translate and analyze four excerpts from Shih’s speech, choosing parts of her
speech that were quoted by media outlets and discussed online by people in Taiwan and
Hong Kong. Since Shih is responding to arguments made by quasi-Christian
3

For Chinese names and terms I use the pinyin system of romanization for Mandarin
Chinese. However, I have kept some people and places’ names in the romanization
system they use (for example Shih Chao Hwei and Chou Wah-Shan, whose names are in
the Wade-Gilles system, and Tong-Kwang Lighthouse Presbyterian Church in Taipei).
6

organizations and NGOs that publicly rallied against same-sex marriage, I examine the
recent scholarship examining these groups. I demonstrate that many of these
organizations drew on the traditional Chinese cultural notions of family and filial piety to
try and sway public opinion in Taiwan against the legalization of same-sex marriage. I
demonstrate that Shih critiques her opponents’ ideas of what constitutes a family, and she
does so by questioning the procreative purpose of marriage. I also demonstrate how Shih
challenges and dismisses her opponents’ logic, through the use of argumentative
strategies such as rhetorical questions as well as repetition and rapid pacing. I continue
some of the points I made in Chapter 3, arguing that Shih’s support for tongzhi and her
fight against those who oppose same-sex marriage draws from her own personal
experience as a woman who is not having children and is therefore unfilial according to
traditional Chinese beliefs.
1.3 Reflexivity
In many ways I am an outsider to the community that I have engaged with and
researched in this thesis. I am not from Taiwan, and—unlike some of the people I spoke
with—I am heterosexual. Therefore, my life experiences have differed from many of the
people I interviewed. I also have to acknowledge that I have a lot of privilege—being a
white, cis-gender man who is a Canadian citizen, university educated, and currently
studying at an American university. However, despite the many differences, there are
some points of shared experience. Like those I spoke to for my research, I grew up in a
religious household and practiced religion well into my early adult years. Furthermore, I
also grappled with my religious beliefs and sexuality as a young adult. It was these
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experiences—as well as my experience as an immigrant—that have shaped my interests
and led me to this project.
I was born in South Africa, and ever since I can remember, every Sunday my
family and I would go to church. My and my siblings’ lives were infused with Christian
values passed down from church, our parents, and school. When I was 13 years old, my
family left South Africa and moved to Hamilton, Canada. This had a huge impact on my
life. I experienced culture shock—I recognized that my family and I came from a
different cultural background, and I saw these differences between us and my new
Canadian classmates, teachers, and others. My family continued going to church, finding
a Baptist church that was less formal than the Methodist one we had grown up attending,
and one which I would describe as being fairly moderate in its outlook. After moving
from Ontario to the Vancouver region in 2004, my family found another church
(belonging to the Alliance denomination). Youth group was a welcome avenue for
making friends, since, having moved halfway through Grade 10, I struggled to forge deep
connections in my new high school. When I started university I began to seriously
question my faith. Frustrated with church politics—and recognizing through my literature
studies that the Bible can’t be separated from its sociohistorical setting—I decided in the
summer before my third year of university that I was no longer Christian. However, I still
had a lot of questions about religion in general. I set out to study the religions of the
world and read their scriptures, and ending up double majoring, adding Religious Studies
to my English Literature degree.
It was around this time that I began my first real relationship and—after years of
being told by the church to ‘wait until marriage’—I had to figure out my own sexuality
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and how I was comfortable acting in a relationship. I found all of this quite
overwhelming—I was no longer Christian, but felt the weight of all the doctrine I had
grown up learning, and still felt the pull of the Church. Christianity had provided me with
many of the values I had, and I had to decide which I still wanted to keep, and which I
wanted to reinterpret. I still had a lot of Christian friends from youth group and young
adult groups in the church, and occasionally went to church when I came home from
campus to visit my parents. Though I was no longer Christian, I still felt guilt and shame
about being sexually active, knowing that my Christian friends, the church, and my
parents to some extent would not fully approve of the actions I was taking with my
girlfriend at the time. I realized that religion and sexuality were powerful forces in my
life, and this was reflected in my studies: many of my papers—whether in my literature
classes or religious studies—focused on religion, or sexuality, or their intersection. I will
never fully understand what many of the people I spoke to in Taiwan have experienced,
being LGBTQ (or tongzhi). But navigating my own sexuality—even if it was just
heterosexuality—was still a challenge for me, because of my religious beliefs.
In 2014, when I was studying journalism and applying for a fellowship to produce
my own radio series, I drew on these previous experiences to come up with a project.
After speaking with one of my younger sister’s friends, who is lesbian and comes from a
conservative Hindu family, I decided to focus on telling the stories of LGBTQ people
who are people of color (and/or immigrants) in Metro Vancouver (see G. Fisher, Pride
and Prejudice, 2014). I found producing this series to be very intellectually stimulating
and fascinating. Some years later, when I decided I wanted to go into graduate studies, I
knew I wanted to focus on religion in Taiwan, and so I began thinking of issues related to
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religion that would be stimulating and productive to explore. I followed with interest
when, in May 2017, the Constitutional Court first said that same-sex marriage is a
constitutional right, giving Taiwan’s government two years to change the marriage law. It
was further interesting to see Christian groups speak out against this change—since this
is not a major religion in the country. I questioned what leaders and followers of
Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religion—which are practiced by far more people in
Taiwan—had to say on the issue. This is what led to my thesis project.
From a young age I have been thinking about identity and belonging, because of
my experiences emigrating from South Africa to Canada. I wrestled with issues of
religion and sexuality in my personal life as a young adult, and though I will never fully
understand what it means to be LGBTQ or tongzhi, I have tried to use my experiences
and struggles to try and relate to the people I contacted and interviewed for this project.
Over the time that I’ve been in graduate school I’ve learned that one of my own sisters
identifies as queer, which has given me an even more personal motivation to relate to the
experiences of others who are not cis-gender and heterosexual like me.
1.4 Methodology, or, Virtual Ethnography in the Time of Covid
While stating one’s positionality is important for anthropologists, so is
recognizing that the ethnographer is not a neutral observer. The whole process of
ethnographic work—formulating and asking interview questions, interpreting and writing
up data—is affected by one’s position and background. In my previous career as a
journalist, I tried to be aware of asymmetrical power dynamics, and how my background
could potentially bias the way I approached stories and sources. Like anthropologists,
journalists are also very concerned about the subconscious biases they are bringing into
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their work—however, instead of stating our positionality in our work we tend to strive for
‘balance’ and ‘objectivity’. While studying journalism my colleagues, instructors and I
discussed this approach at length, and we recognized that it is inherently flawed and
largely impossible to achieve (can we ever be truly objective?). Yet, perhaps for a lack of
another method, it is my understanding that most reporters take this approach. We try to
be aware of any biases we have, be fair and measured in our approach to all the sources
we speak to, ‘see the story from all sides’, and be careful about inserting our voice into
our story (unless one is a columnist, and typically columnists are no longer allowed to
write straight news for that reason). As a university educated Caucasian, cis-gender
heterosexual man, I have a certain amount of privilege, and my experiences and
perspectives differed from many of the people I interviewed. I tried to be aware of this in
my journalism work.
My training in anthropology through the graduate program at the University of
South Carolina has taught me to continue and strive for further reflexivity in my work as
an anthropologist. Before embarking on my research, I also completed the Collaborative
Institutional Training Initiative (CITI), which covers important aspects of working with
human subjects—such as informed consent and how to properly safeguard and protect
data gathered during fieldwork. The American Anthropological Association also provides
a useful ethical guideline for ethnographers to follow. As stated in the Association’s
Principles of Professional Responsibility, anthropology is a wholly social enterprise, one
that always involves others—such as research participants, colleagues, students, funders
and so forth. Therefore, “anthropologists must be sensitive to the power differentials,
constraints, interests and expectations characteristic of all relationships” (AAA 2012). As
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per these principles, I need to be transparent regarding the purpose, methods, and
outcomes of my work. The principles point out that, like informed consent, transparency
is an ongoing process that involves the making of principled decisions prior to beginning
the research as well as encouraging participation, engagement, and open debate
throughout its course (AAA 2012). These guidelines also state that I have an ethical
obligation to consider the potential impact of my research and its dissemination.
I followed these guidelines while doing research over the summer, fall, and winter
months of 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic meant that it was not possible to conduct
ethnographic fieldwork in Taiwan in the summer between my first and second year of the
Masters program. The University of South Carolina and the U.S. government
recommended that people avoid non-essential travel outside (and even within) the
country, and on March 18, 2020, the government of Taiwan decided to close its borders
to all foreign visitors (Everington 2020). Therefore, I had to conduct all of my interviews
virtually, using video-calling technology. This was not without its challenges. I reached
out to people I wanted to interview by emailing them or sending messages through
various social media channels. I began by contacting the core individuals and groups
discussed in my prospectus. However, even though I had already established contact with
some, I struggled to reconnect and arrange interviews over the summer. I began searching
more broadly for people, religious groups, and tongzhi organizations that could fit my
research focus. However, I continued to be met with silence—or, after a promising reply,
contact would fall away. I sent follow-up messages, and even stayed up to the later hours
to phone one of the organizations I really wanted to speak to. I am not entirely sure why
my attempts were unsuccessful, though I have several conjectures based on my own
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knowledge of Taiwan as well as speaking to experts in Taiwan studies. First, though
same-sex marriage was legalized in Taiwan in 2019, my research topic looking into
issues of sexuality is still a sensitive one. And, as described above, I am an outsider.
Also, I was not able to be present in Taiwan to make face-to-face connections. This
relates to the concept of guanxi in Chinese-speaking societies: Guanxi (shared
reciprocity) is the term used to refer to building a network of mutually beneficial
relationships which can be used for personal or business means. Perhaps some of those I
reached out to did not see the potential for guanxi to develop since I was not actually in
Taiwan, and after talking virtually it would be uncertain if and when we’d ever meet in
person. Finally, if one factors in the pandemic, speaking to a graduate student on the
other side of the world during such a strange time may not have been a big priority for
some, understandably.
By the end of the summer I finally started to have some success in setting up
interviews. I asked participants what form of video calling was most convenient for them
to use, and it so happened that I used Skype for all of my interviews. These interviews
were semi-structured; I had prepared some questions to ask (in Mandarin), but also let the
conversation flow and asked follow-up questions accordingly. At the beginning of each
interview I explained my project, and followed the process of informed consent as well as
other guidelines established by the University of South Carolina’s Institutional Review
Board. I asked each participant what name they would be most comfortable with me
using in this thesis. It is common for some in Taiwan to have an English name, and some
of my participants asked that I use their English name and not their Chinese one in my
research. I also asked if I could record the interview, since I am not completely fluent in
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Mandarin, and recording it would allow me to listen again and also translate and
transcribe thoroughly. Each interview lasted around 2 hours. I recognize that I have a
limited number of interviews. Rather than being truly quantifiable, they support the
existing scholarship that describes the challenges of family for tongzhi. However, it does
also provide insight into how tongzhi in religious communities have dealt with the weight
of familial obligations.
Lloyd, a member of the Daoist Brilliant Light Temple (see Chapter 3), helped me
a lot in setting up interviews with other members of the temple following my first
interview with the temple’s head priest. After that initial interview, Lloyd added me to
WhatsApp and we used that to discuss other potential interviewees. While for my
interview with Christian tongzhi woman Xiao’en (see Chapters 2 and 4) I asked all of the
questions in Mandarin and she answered in Mandarin, my interviews with members of
Brilliant Light Temple were a bit different. Lloyd was present for all of them, and helped
facilitate and translate. He told me he took up this role because of his English abilities
(which he said was superior to that of other members of the temple; he has also had
considerable experience traveling and studying abroad). I still asked the majority of my
questions in Mandarin, but if something wasn’t clear Lloyd would ask me in English for
more information, and then ask the question to the interviewee in Mandarin. The
interviewee would respond in Mandarin, and then Lloyd would give me a summary of
what was said. Given my Mandarin ability, this was very helpful—as it allowed me to
know in real-time what was being said, and ask follow-up questions accordingly.
However, in translating and transcribing from my recordings I also noticed that Lloyd
would sometimes expand on some of the answers given by the interviewees. Evan, one of
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the tongzhi members of the temple, who was quite soft-spoken, often looked at Lloyd
while answering my questions—and the two of them would sometimes discuss things
(and have a few laughs) before Lloyd would summarize things to me. At times Evan felt
more comfortable answering directly to Lloyd. I later learned that Lloyd had sat down
and asked him questions about his life before our interview together, which is how Lloyd
was able to expand on some of the answers Evan gave. In the interview I had with Olivia,
a straight woman who is also a member of the temple, she also sometimes turned to
Lloyd when formulating her answers. They also teased each other at numerous times
during the interview. Lloyd told me later that they are quite close: they both do a lot of
work for the temple, and have the shared interest in investing.
For my interview with Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei, I asked a Taiwanese
graduate student (Sunny Tsai) to help interpret, since Shih asked that the interview be
conducted in Mandarin, and because the interview only occurred late in my project
(February 12, 2021). I formulated the questions in Mandarin, which Sunny looked over
and checked for errors, and then during the interview with Shih I asked the questions in
Chinese and Sunny translated the nun’s responses into English.
Finding a suitable time for interviews was sometimes a challenge because of the
time difference between South Carolina and Taiwan (Taiwan was 12 hours ahead in the
fall, and 13 hours ahead during winter). I sometimes also had sound and technology
challenges. During some of my interviews with members of the Daoist Brilliant Light
Temple (see Chapter 3), participants were set up in a room where other members and
priests were passing through. This made it quite noisy at times, and, over Skype, it could
be challenging to hear everything. There were sometimes other technological issues that
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also affected my hearing of what was being said. In these cases I had to ask for
information to be repeated, and to wait for issues to be resolved. I was, however,
prepared for the fact that multiple people would possibly be involved in the interview.
Literature on metacommunicative norms in Taiwan that I had consulted had shown this to
be the case. For example, in their study comparing American and Taiwanese mothers’
beliefs about childrearing and self-esteem, Miller et al. (2002) found that the most
successful interviewing approach with Taiwanese mothers was framing the interview as
more of a conversation. They began with some initial topics to put the participants at
ease, accommodating multiple speakers and the domestic work they were all doing
(cooking; harvesting green onions in the courtyard), and also allowing participants to
control the topics of conversation (227).
1.5 The Political Economy of Taiwan
In this section I will explore the political economy of Taiwan, explaining how
family is a crucial social institution within this economy, and how it is often the family
that is more antagonistic towards those who are tongzhi than the state. This is not to say
that the state has never been antagonistic; the tongzhi community in Taiwan faced
repeated harassment from police in the 1990s, which I will address at the end of this
section. First, however, I will give a brief historical overview of Taiwan and explain the
history that has led there to being the Republic of China (ROC; commonly called
Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC; commonly called China). In doing so
I will explain what has led to Taiwan being a vibrant democracy today; a democracy that
in May of 2019 made Taiwan the first country in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage.
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Taiwan is a relatively young democracy: the first free elections following 38years of martial law were held in 1996 (Morris 2004). However, given its shared history
with the mainland, Taiwan is also home to many traditional Chinese beliefs and practices.
In terms of Chinese religious traditions (Buddhism, Daoism, and folk/popular religion),
Taiwan is in many way a place of religious innovation and the source of information on
these religions, given that they were allowed more free reign in Taiwan than they were on
the mainland. The different trajectories of Taiwan and China have also resulted in very
different experiences for tongzhi on either side of the Strait, which I will touch upon as
well.
1.5.1 Taiwan and China: The Imperial Period in China and Immigration to Taiwan
China, or officially the People’s Republic of China, has been a one-party state
since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 (Wright 2001). However, dynasties ruled
China for most of its history, from the Shang dynasty beginning in 1600 BCE (the first
dynasty for which there is archaeological evidence) to the last Qing Dynasty, which
ended in 1912 (Pletcher 2010, 15). Confucianism—a system of philosophical and ethical
teachings—originated in the social and political upheaval that took place during the Zhou
dynasty (1046-256 BCE), which followed the Shang (15). Confucianism developed from
the teachings of Confucius and his followers (of which Mencius was the most
prominent), and became China’s official state ideology in the second century BCE
(Wright 2001, 21). I will discuss Confucianism further below. In these early periods of
Chinese history, records attest to a long historical tradition of same-sex love dating back
to the Zhou dynasty. In many periods of China’s history, same-sex love was widely
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accepted and influenced political institutions and social conventions (Hinsch 1990; Van
Gulik 1961; Vitiello 2011). I will explore this history in Chapter 2.
During these early dynasties, the neighboring island of Taiwan barely figured in
the Chinese imagination. Taiwan, which is 13,837 square miles in size (about a quarter of
the size of Florida), is separated from the southeastern coast of China by the rough and
shallow Taiwan Straits, which are about 81 to 137 miles wide (Morris 2004, 7). Fang Hao
(1994) writes that Chinese Nationalists have long used vague references to the Land of
the Eastern Barbarians or the Ryukyu Islands in the History of the Later Han Dynasty
(25-220 CE) or the History of the Three Kingdoms (mid-200s CE) in an effort to prove
Taiwan has always been part of the Chinese “motherland” (quoted in Morris 2004).
However, even in 1600, Taiwan was still on the outer edge of Chinese consciousness
(Wills 1999 85). In the 1600s there was no permanent Chinese settlement on Taiwan, but
there were a number of Chinese and Japanese traders, pirates and fishermen that traveled
to the island (85). At that time, the island was only vaguely referred to in the records of
the officials who administered and patrolled the South China coast (85). When the Dutch
colonized Taiwan in 1622-24 they estimated that there were 1,000 to 1,500 Chinese on
the coast of Taiwan (87). Most of Taiwan’s inhabitants at that time were indigenous
peoples, descended from Austronesian peoples whose first settlements on the island date
back at least 15,000 years (Morris 2004, 7; Stainton 1999, 28-9). Their descendants make
up the approximately 560,000 indigenous people (2.37 percent of the total population) on
Taiwan today, with 16 distinct Indigenous Peoples that are officially recognized by the
government (Adawai 2020, 324).
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In the next century, the Chinese population on Taiwan grew and the island would
come under more attention from the mainland. Ming loyalist and pirate Zheng
Chenggong (also known as Koxinga) sailed with his fleet to Taiwan in 1661, ousting the
Dutch to make the island the base of his movement to overthrow the Qing dynasty
(Morris 2004, 8-9). Zheng therefore established the first Chinese administration of
Taiwan, “ironically, a regime formed in rebellion against China’s ruling Qing,” historian
Andrew Morris notes (9). Zheng’s son and grandson ruled for 21 years, during which
time there were waves of steady immigration to Taiwan, primarily from the southern
Fujian and Guangdong provinces in China (Morris 2004, 9; Jones 2003, 12). In 1683, as
Taiwan was in the throes of a famine, an imperial force from the mainland defeated the
Zhengs (who were Ming loyalists opposed to the Qing) and integrated the island into the
Qing empire as a prefecture of Fujian province (Morris 2004, 10). Taiwan was upgraded
to a full province in 1885 (12).
1.5.2 Japanese Influence on Taiwan
The Qing dynasty’s rule of Taiwan came to close when, by the end of 1895,
Japan’s military annexed the island—the first colony in Japan’s imperialistic expansion
(12-13). This would have a lasting effect, differentiating Taiwan from China, which
would undergo revolution and the start of a communist government at the beginning of
the 20th century. The official doctrines of Japanese colonialism were assimilation and
equal treatment under one imperial view, however officials also resorted to force to put
down various rebellions against the occupying power (14). The Japanese colonial
administration portrayed itself as a strong, stern, but benevolent force working for the
betterment of the people in Taiwan, and they continued a number of modernization
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projects that had begun under the Qing dynasty (Morris 2004, 14). These included
building railroads and modern roads, expanding postal and telegraph networks, founding
modern hospitals, establishing police institutions, introducing modern banking and
currency measures, standardizing weights and measures, and also entering Taiwan in the
Greenwich time system (14). While the Japanese government initially took a laissez-faire
approach towards the religions being practiced in Taiwan, they later began to more
vigorously regulate religious institutions and practices, and finally do away with native
religions altogether (Jones 2004, 19). This was part of the larger ‘Japanization
movement’ in which colonial officials pushed for more widespread use of the Japanese
language, as well as the enforcement of Japanese-style dress (Morris 2004, 17). The
Japanese ruled Taiwan up until their defeat at the end of the Second World War, at which
time the Allied forces handed the island to the Republic of China (ROC) government that
was ruling mainland China at the time.
Today, there is still a surprising amount of nostalgia for the Japanese colonial era.
During my first trip to Taiwan in 2011 to teach English for the summer, I had a couple of
conversations with middle-aged Taiwanese in which they spoke about the Japanese
occupation, and they pointed out that the Japanese had built much of their roads and other
infrastructure such as dams. One of these conversations, with a parent of one of my
students, took place while standing on a dam built by the Japanese in the rural outskirts of
Tainan. Some of this nostalgia for the Japanese era is because the colonial government
was perceived to be less antagonistic to the local Taiwanese population than the mainland
Chinese government was during the first period after their arrival (more on this below)
(Moskowitz 2011, 3). The influence of Japanese popular culture on Taiwan today can
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also be seen in behaviors and in various media. The sound of Japanese enka largely
influenced the melancholy nature of Mandopop (Mandarin-language pop music), and the
sorrowful tone of Japanese literature has also had a significant impact on Taiwan’s
literary scene (4). These themes have also spread to Taiwan’s movie and television
industry (4). There is also a prevailing love of all things ‘cute’ (ke’ai) in Taiwan, which
may be a direct import of Japanese concept of kawaii (4). The influence of Japan—from
the time that they occupied Taiwan to the influence of popular culture today—has had a
profound role in shaping Taiwan’s current identity.
In addition to the ongoing influence of Japanese popular culture, a Taiwanese
person today is also just as likely to engage with culture from neighboring South Korea
(K-Pop and K-dramas), mainland China (Mandopop, movies, and TV), as well as
Western music and U.S. television and movies. During my first trip to Taiwan in 2011,
my elementary-age students had no problem recognizing and singing along to the hit
song ‘Baby’ by (my fellow Canadian) Justin Bieber. In that trip and in later trips (2016
and 2019), I connected with Taiwanese young adults when talking about American TV
shows and music we mutually enjoy (as well as some Japanese anime that I am also
familiar with).
1.5.3 From Martial Law to Democracy
When the Second World War ended, China was consumed again by civil war—as
it had been in the years following the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912 and the
establishment of the Republic of China (ROC), led by the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang
or KMT). Chiang Kai-shek, the general who has been leading the ROC since 1925,
waged a violent war against the Chinese Communist Party (CPP). When those in Taiwan
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heard that the Second World War was over and the Japanese were leaving, they were
elated (Phillips 1999, 281). However, the ROC government decided to govern the new
Taiwan Province under joint party-government-military administration. GovernorGeneral Chen Yi was given the ability to use a broad mixture of civilian and military
powers that was starkly reminiscent of the early Japanese governors (282). The
Nationalists stripped Taiwan of materials to use to win the civil war on the mainland
against the Chinese Communist Party, and unemployment and inflation set in on the
island (Morris 2004, 20). The Taiwanese began to criticize the KMT, comparing them
unfavorably to the Japanese colonial regime, but had to do so quietly because if not they
were regarded as “disloyal subversives” who were planning Communist rebellion against
the ROC (21). However, the Chinese Communist Party eventually defeated the
Nationalists on the mainland. In 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the new
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the remnants of Chiang’s government and
discouraged military set sail in defeat for Taiwan; their former province was now home to
the entire ROC regime. The KMT violently suppressed dissidents (often elites who were
regarded as a threat to the regime) in Taiwan, and enacted a period of martial law that
lasted 38 years. For the next two decades after their arrival in Taiwan, Generalissimo
Chiang and the KMT were dedicated to the goal of retaking the Chinese mainland
(Morris 2004, 24). During this time the United States continued to regard Chiang’s ROC
regime as the rightful government of China, with Americans referring to the ROC on
Taiwan as “Free China” (23). U.S. $4 billion from American taxpayers was poured into
Chiang’s regime from 1951-1965 (24).
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KMT rule in Taiwan after 1950 marked the beginning of a long transformation at
this time into a “soft authoritarian regime” (24). Chiang and the KMT were determined
that the economic collapse that spelled their doom in China would not be repeated in
Taiwan (24). Fair and effective land reforms were instituted, rural lower middle classes
set up small-scale factories, and heavy export production was encouraged and subsidized
by the U.S. government (24-5). These strategies, combined with high household savings
rates and a highly successful education system, produced an economic boom so dramatic
that it became described worldwide as the “Taiwan miracle” (25). By the time Chiang
Kai-shek died in 1975, most of the rest of the world no longer viewed the ROC as the
rightful government of China. In the 1970s Mao and the People’s Republic of China had
begun to successfully convince an increasing number of nations to recognize the PRC as
the true government of China. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger strategically shifted
towards serious dialogue with Communist China in an effort to isolate the Soviet Union
(Morris 2004, 26). In 1972, a year after the United Nations General Assembly voted to
award China’s UN seat to the PRC, Nixon ended the special relationship that the U.S. had
with the ROC in hopes of garnering PRC support to end the war in Vietnam (26). In early
1979 the United States officially began recognizing Mao’s China (Wright 2001, 162).
Following Chiang’s death, his son Chiang Ching-kuo, who had lived in Taiwan
longer than he had in China, took control of the ROC and set out to make a number of
changes. He ended martial law and chose as his successor Lee Teng-hui, a Japanese- and
American-educated agricultural economist (Morris 2004, 27). Lee’s 12-year reign saw
Taiwan transformed into a free democracy (27). The first direct presidential elections—
billed as the first in 5,000 years of Chinese history—were held in 1996 and won by Lee
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(28). I will discuss more of these democratic changes below. In 2000 the DPP won for the
first time (under Chen Shui-bian, who led for two terms), and then in the elections in
2008 and 2012 the KMT under Ma Ying-jeou took the presidency. Taiwan elected its
first female president in 2016 (Tsai Ing-wen), marking a return to the DPP, with Tsai
winning a second term in January 2020.
In the PRC, in the 1990s the Chinese Communist Party stepped up its rhetoric of
the goal of reunifying the Chinese nation by extending its control to Taiwan (Morris
2004, 29). The PRC’s main strategy has been to isolate Taiwan diplomatically on the
world stage, blocking any attempts by Taiwan to re-enter the UN, and using its massive
economic clout to prevent any international recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state
(29). It is for this reason that Taiwan’s diplomatic representatives and Olympic teams are
recognized only as representatives of “Chinese Taipei”, and that visa-granting offices
overseas are referred to not as embassies or consulates but as Taipei Economic and
Cultural Offices (TECO). Only 17 countries (such as the Holy See and several small
African and Caribbean countries) official recognize Taiwan’s government. Under the
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), first passed by U.S. Congress in 1979, the U.S. considers
Taiwan’s status undetermined, but any attempt by China to coerce Taiwan into
unification is seen as a grave threat to American security (Horton 2019).
1.5.4 Commonalities and Differences Between Taiwan and China
In this section I will continue to examine some of the differences between Taiwan
and China, but also describe how they have many shared cultural norms, given the history
of emigration of Chinese to Taiwan starting from the 1600s as described above. While it
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would be impossible to list all of these similarities, I will describe those that have the
most salience for my study: Confucian norms and life for tongzhi today.
1.5.4.1 Similarities and Differences in Cultural Ideas
Confucian philosophy is central to the cultures of Taiwan and other East Asian
nations, particularly when it comes to understandings of family and society. Embedded
within Confucian values are five principal relationships through which each person
defines a sense of duty, responsibility, and identity (Chou 2000; Park and Chesla 2007).
They are ruler and subject (or government and citizen), parent and child, husband and
wife, older sibling and younger sibling, and friend and friend (Park and Chesla 2007,
303). In familial relations, respect of parents and grandparents has supreme value, with
near total obedience given to parents by the rest of the family (304). The value of duty
and responsibility can also vary within these hierarchies. In the husband-wife
relationship, if children are involved, the role of mother should take precedence over the
role of wife, with the parent-child relationship being more important (304, 307). With
regard to siblings, the oldest sibling usually acts as the surrogate of parents in their
absence (304). Family is the base of society: among the five basic human relationships,
three are family relationships (305). Within family relationships, filial piety is a central
value (Chou 2000, 253). Being filial to one’s family members, particularly to one’s
parents, includes the imperative to marry and continue the family line, as well as taking
care of the elderly in the family (253).
For this reason, the social services safety net that exists in North America and
much of Europe is largely absent in Taiwan. Instead, the government has long relied on
families to provide a basic safety net, looking after their family members including those
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who are elderly, disabled, and poor. This has even been written into law: Care for
children, frail older people, and disabled people is defined as a family responsibility in
Taiwan’s Civic Code, which places legal responsibility for care on lineal family members
(Yeandle et al. 2013, 29). Under Taiwan’s Welfare of Older People Act 2009, adult
children can be penalized for neglect, abuse, or leaving an elderly resident in a nursing
home without paying the fees for their care (Wang et al. 2013, 90). The assumption that
family care is available permeates all welfare practices in Taiwan (91). For this reason,
Taiwan has been described in the literature as a familialist (or familistic) welfare state
(Estévez-Abe and Kim 2013; Chou Y. et al. 2013). Familialist welfare states (which
include most East Asian countries) are known for their high rates of multi-generational
households, where household heads cohabit with their parents and children (Estévez-Abe
and Kim 2013, 2). The three characteristics of these states are: 1) Underdevelopment of
social services such as childcare and elderly care; 2) low levels of cash benefits to
working-age citizens such as public insurance and unemployment benefits; and 3)
comparatively low levels of social spending (1). Though social services such as home and
day care, respite or residential care are available in Taiwan, relatively few families use
them—not least because family members are expected to cover, or contribute to their cost
(Yeandle et al. 2013, 29). Those needing care mostly live with their families. For
example, a national survey in 2006 found that 93% of disabled people of all ages lived
with their families, while only 7% used residential services (Chou Y. et al. 2013, 144).
Almost all disabled children under 15 years of age lived with their families (98%), with
their primary carers being their parents (80%) or other relatives (14%) (144). Confucian
thinking—especially Confucian ideas of familial obligations—permeates Taiwan to this
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day, and this can also be seen in how the government views welfare: as a family
responsibility rather than a public matter.
1.5.4.2 Similarities and Differences in Experiences for Tongzhi
In terms of sexuality and same-sex love specifically, the Maoist era (1949-77) in
China enforced a heterosexual, marital model in which sex was only legitimate for
reproductive purposes (Zheng 2015, 41). Family was emphasized as the basic unit of
society, and marriage was stressed as the fulfillment of a social responsibility to produce
children for the Communist state (41). Sex for reasons other that reproduction—including
same-sex acts—were regarded as deviant and were policed by the state (41). During the
Cultural Revolution, same-sex attracted people were classified as “bad elements” under
the “five black categories”, along with landlords, rich peasants, rightists, and
counterrevolutionaries (42). The CCP replaced the Qing criminal code with a new system
of criminal laws during the economic reform period (1978-present), and forced sodomy
and sodomy with a minor continued to be treated as a crime (41) (also see section 2.3).
Since there were no laws against consensual same-sex acts in China, these acts were
often disciplined under the charge of “hooliganism”, a general term that encompassed a
wide range of offenses (41-2). The Maoist era’s model of sex for reproduction was
replaced by a new model in the post-socialist era in which sex for pleasure within
marriage was regarded as important because it maintains marital harmony and thwarts
extramarital affairs (42). These new ideas around sexuality and the state’s loosening
control led to a growth in the number of self-identified gay men who gathered at parks,
street corners, bathhouses, bars, and toilets (42). However, succumbing to the strong
pressure to marry and have children, more than 90 percent of same-sex attracted people
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in China are estimated to choose to marry opposite-sex partners and form heterosexual
families with children (43). State censorship of movie contents has also impeded the
dissemination of knowledge about same-sex attracted people (43). Today in China,
tongzhi face harassment from authorities, social stigma, pressure from their families and
society to ‘cure’ their same-sex attraction and marry heterosexually, and are vulnerable to
contracting AIDS and other STIs because of negative misconceptions about condom use
(Zheng 2015). In her ethnography of tongzhi men in contemporary Dalian, China, Zheng
Tiantian describes how almost all of the men she encountered in her research had either a
girlfriend or a wife, and that some used websites to match with lesbians who were willing
to form fake marriages (Zheng 2015, 152). “To many tongzhi, establishing a heterosexual
family and fathering a child represent not only a performance of masculinity but also a
fulfillment of social and family responsibilities,” Zheng writes (2015, 153). China does
not currently recognize same-sex marriage nor civil unions.
In Taiwan in the 1990s and 2000s the tongzhi community made strides in the
recognition of their rights, and politicians began expressing their support for the
community as well. Yet, tongzhi still faced harassment from authorities: in Taipei there
were repeated police raids on the longstanding gay cruising ground in Taipei known as
Changde Street, as well as a raid of the gay sauna AG in December 1998 (J.C. Ho 2010,
552; Simon 2004, 81). In the early 2000s politicians started to publicly express support
for the tongzhi community. Taipei’s then-mayor Ma Ying-jiou allocated funding for
tongzhi groups to organize a civil rights forum in 2000, and both he and newly elected
president Chen Shui-bian met with tongzhi activists during the event (J.C. Ho 2010, 539;
Simon 2004, 71). The Taipei municipal government also published a “Getting to Know
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Tongzhi Handbook,” with Major Ying-jiou (who would later become the president of
Taiwan) writing the introduction, which apologized for past human rights violations
against tongzhi, including the Changde Street and AG Incidents (which had occurred
when Chen was still mayor) (Simon 2004, 84). Petrus Liu (2007) argues that the recent
liberalism in Taiwan, which afforded the tongzhi community some rights and recognition
in the early 2000s, was shaped by forces involving both the United States and the
People’s Republic of China. He also argues it was born out of the creation of the multiparty system in Taiwan, which first began after martial law was lifted in 1987. The
Kuomingtang (KMT), which had ruled during the time of martial law, came to be
associated with a ‘One China’ policy, while the newly formed opposition Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) represented increased independence from China. Liu argues that
the DPP (whose first president was Chen Shui-bian) saw itself as the liberator of the
‘native’ Taiwanese Han Chinese population (as opposed to the more recently arrived
Mainland Han Chinese population, which fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek and the
KMT government in 1949 (Liu 2007, 519). Liu argues that recognizing tongzhi rights is
an important way for the DPP to distinguish Taiwan from China, and align it with the
U.S., which provides the country with military support:
DPP’s rhetoric of democracy and human rights (renquan liguo), which now under
international pressure must include gay rights, permits Taiwan to create a
desperately needed cultural distinction from the People’s Republic of China
(where human rights continue to be a ‘sensitive’ issue) and its similarities to the
United States (which sees itself as the guardian of democratic values), since DPP
politicians recognize (correctly) that Taiwan will cease to exist without the
popular support of the United States (519).
It would be under the next DPP president—Tsai Ing-wen, who first became president in
2016—that same-sex marriage in Taiwan became legal. Tsai, who has never married, is

29

currently serving her second term. In 2017 the Constitutional Court—the highest court in
the country—ruled that same-sex marriage was a constitutional right, giving the
Taiwanese government a two-year deadline to come up with a framework for
legalization. In May 2019, same-sex marriage was made into law, making Taiwan the
first country in Asia to legalize marriage between people of the same gender.
1.5.5 Political Economy: Closing Thoughts
Despite their shared history and culture, Taiwan today is much more tongzhifriendly than China. In Taiwan tongzhi can serve in the military, there are tongzhi bars,
tongzhi publications, the largest Pride parades in Asia (held in Taipei), and, as of 2019,
same-sex marriage. Over the course of the latter half of the 20th Century, Taiwan went
from an authoritarian regime to a thriving democracy. Tongzhi rights are very much a
part of a larger call for equal rights for all in Taiwan. However, despite these gains,
tongzhi experience is still impacted and mired by cultural traditions, especially those
relating to family and filial piety. It is for this reason that, like in China, some tongzhi in
Taiwan still marry heterosexually. In Queer Kinship and Family Change in Taiwan
(2019), Amy Brainer describes various forms that these kinds of marriages may take,
with combinations including tongzhi hiding their sexual identities, their heterosexual
partner being aware of it, or couplings of men and women tongzhi. Scholars in this field
have argued that the nature of the Chinese family is one of the major obstacles for
tongzhi, rather than state oppression (Brainer 2019; Chou 2000; Simon 2004). In his
chapter exploring the history of the tongzhi community in Taiwan, anthropologist Scott
Simon concludes that even tongzhi-friendly laws “will have little impact on real lives of
individual people if Taiwanese gays and lesbians do not successfully deal with the
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problem of family pressure” (2004, 86). To return to the case of Evan, who I introduced
at the beginning of this chapter: he told me that even though same-sex marriage has been
legalized in Taiwan, his parents still do not fully accept him and are pressuring him to get
married to a woman. I will explore this issue in depth in Chapter 3. First, however, I will
turn to the history of same-sex love in the Chinese-speaking world.
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Chapter 2
A Historical Overview of Tongzhi Identity: A Survey Through
Terminology
I will examine the history of same-sex love and identity in China and Taiwan in
this chapter. I will use the term “same-sex love” because, as I will explain in more detail
below, the terms for homosexuality in Chinese (tongxinglian, or tongxing’ai) are a direct
translation of the Western term that was typically used to pathologize those who were
attracted to individuals of the same gender (Hinsch 1990, 169). These terms are rarely
used today by same-sex attracted people in China and Taiwan because of the pathological
and medical notions of homosexuality they convey (Zheng 2015, 4). Furthermore, when
discussing the history of same-sex love in Chinese history, one cannot really speak of
heterosexuals, bisexuals, or homosexuals, because “the concept of sexual orientation, i.e.,
dividing people by their erotic object choice, did not exist” (Chou 2000, 13).
In this chapter I will examine the history of same-sex love and identity in China
and Taiwan through an overview of the terminology used to describe and label same-sex
eroticism. I will begin by looking at the earliest historical records available describing
same-sex love in China. For many centuries same-sex eroticism was widely accepted and
enjoyed by many. Same-sex love was referred to by poetic metaphors, usually based on
famous stories. I will then move to other periods of China’s imperial history, examining
how new terminology as well as new laws may have indicated a shift in attitudes towards
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same-sex love. When I turn to the early 20th century—a time of great change in which
many intellectuals pushed for modernizing the nation—I devote time to exploring how
Western sexology was imported and reinterpreted by writers in China. Finally, I look at
the range of terminology used in present-day China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
2.1 Acceptance and tolerance: The poetic metaphors of cut-sleeves and half-eaten
peaches
There was a long historical tradition of male same-sex love in China, dating back
to the Zhou Dynasty (1122 to 256 BCE) and even as far back as the Bronze Age (Hinsch
1990, Van Gulik 1961). In many periods of China’s history same-sex love was widely
accepted and even respected, influencing Chinese political institutions, social
conventions, and artistic creation (Hinsch 1990, 4). Historian Bret Hinsch, who wrote the
pioneering Passions of the Cut Sleeve, explains that it is arguably more accurate to speak
of this history as a “male homosexual tradition” because, unlike modern society, the
Chinese viewed male homosexuality and lesbianism as completely different forms of
sexuality (6-7). He also explains that very little documentation survives on lesbian life in
China because Chinese literature was almost always written by men for men (7). He
includes an appendix focusing on these scanty sources (173-8). Another reason why
references to lesbianism in traditional sources are rare was because of the relative
absence of personal freedom women were bestowed (173). If relationships did form, they
would usually escape notice by men uninterested in the affairs of women, Hinsch writes
(174). The scholars who have examined this history of same-sex love in China have
drawn their arguments from records dating from the Zhou Dynasty (1122 to 256 BCE)
through to the early Qing Dynasty (1644 to 1912 CE) (Hinsch 1990; Van Gulik 1961;
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Vitiello 2011). These records include official histories and literature; the official histories
from the ancient period deal with the sexual practices of the uppermost elite, and the
literature from later periods provides insight into the lives of the literati as well as the
lives of young male prostitutes and their patrons (Hinsch 1990, 5-6; Vitiello 2011, 1).
The social and sexual practices specific to China can be understood in terms of
two basic sets of complementary roles: dominant/submissive and active/passive (Hinsch
1990, 8-9). The dominant and submissive roles were derived from the social standing of
each partner, determined mostly by gender, age, and status—factors that were important
for assigning dominant and submissive roles in many social and sexual encounters (9).
Women were generally regarded as socially inferior, which also affected the condition of
men who became identified with the female gender (9). In terms of age, a younger male
was inferior to an older male (9). As for status, family background, education,
employment, wealth, talent, and multiple other factors contributed to a man’s overall
social standing (9). In many cases, the set of dominant/submissive was related to the
separate dichotomy of active/passive: the dominant male was often the active partner
engaging in the penile penetration of the submissive partner (Chou 2000, 26, Hinsch
1990, 10). The difference in social standing and power between the two was more
important than the participants’ sex: “The idea that the (male) inserter and the
subordinate insertee may share the same social-sexual category—homosexual or gay—
simply did not exist in the traditional Chinese mind,” Chou Hua-shan writes (2000, 27,
emphasis in original). Hinsch notes that men often manifested sexuality differently,
depending on their stage in life (1990, 10). He writes that Chinese literature shows a
tendency for boys and adolescents to take the passive sexual role and for adult men to
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take the active role (10). Therefore, a man’s sexual role may change as he grew older
(10). “This acceptance of changing sexual roles gave a certain fluidity to the sexual
development of an individual male while still allowing a sense of hierarchy within each
relationship when hierarchy was desired,” Hinsch writes (10). In addition, Chinese
records also describe many men who experienced both heterosexuality and same-sex love
during their lives (11). Hinsch argues that some men had sexual intercourse with women
not because they desired it, but because they were expected to do so (11). Society’s
expectations often determined the ways in which Chinese men manifested their sexual
desires (11).
This fluidity of male sexuality, and focus on the social and sexual standing of the
active and passive participants in the same-sex act, can be further understood in relation
to Michel Foucault’s The Use of Pleasure (1985). As Foucault writes in his second
volume on The History of Sexuality, the Greeks did not see love for the other sex and for
the same sex as two exclusive choices or radically different types of behavior (187). Men
were expected to be married to “a single lawful wife”, with sexual relations being
devoted to bearing children (144). While one’s husband was expected to be a woman’s
exclusive partner, the husband could have multiple sexual relations outside of marriage:
with boys, prostitutes, men or women slaves (144, 146). Instead of a division between
heterosexuality and same-sex love, the “dividing lines” in sexual relations were that of
activity versus passivity, as well as a lack of moderation versus self-control (enkrateia),
Foucault argues (65, 85, 187-8). Adult free men were those who were the “active actors”,
while as “passive actors” were women, boys, and slaves (47). Being a passive actor was
looked upon negatively, as was not being in control of oneself (85-6). Similarly, there
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was a negative perception of passivity within same-sex relations in imperial China
(Hinsch 1990, 10, 107). In later imperial history, passive sexuality came to be associated
with certain types of cosmetics and feminizing clothing, and wearing them could weaken
a man’s social status (10). Also, there were obscenities that would insult a person by
referring to him as the dominated partner in a same-sex sexual act (Chou 2000, 27).
Passivity was also viewed as feminizing in Greece; preferring other men did not make a
man effeminate, Foucault notes, as long as the man was active in the sexual act and
practiced self-control (Foucault 1985, 85). In contrast, being immoderate and
overindulging in sexual relations with members of either the male or female sex would
make one “feminine” (85). It was this concern over passivity and a lack of restraint that
made the relationship between men and boys an anxious concern for some Greek thinkers
and writers, Foucault argues (187). This was a “privileged” relationship, one that implied
an age difference and a certain difference of status, as compared to relations between two
older adult males or schoolboys that were given less attention (193). Foucault writes that
the young boy had to behave in a way that would not bring him dishonor—something
that would affect his eventual status and place in the city when he grew up—and that the
older partner was expected to also act in a way that didn't bring the younger dishonor
(206). Much attention was given to how the younger partner (who was being actively
pursued and courted by the older suitor) had to be careful not to yield too easily or offer
himself too easily out of weakness, lust, or self-interest (196, 211). Once he had yielded
to his older suitor, then—beyond the customary gifts fitting his status—he could only
accept “honorable” benefits such as training for manhood, social connections for the
future, or a lasting friendship (224). Since the boy himself would one day be a man—
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exercising the powers and responsibilities of a male citizen—many philosophers were
concerned with how one who was previously the object of pleasure could later become
the active participant in the sexual relation (216, 220-1). As in imperial China, there was
a fluidity of male sexuality in ancient Greece—relations other than heterosexuality were
regarded as natural, and within same-sex love a man could perform both the feminizing
passive role and the active role in his lifetime (Foucault 1985; Hinsch 1990).
Heterosexual marriage, however, was still expected for men in both societies.
Foucault writes that for the Greeks, the purpose of sexual intercourse in marriage
was regarded as being for reproduction, while the “domain of pleasures” was located
outside the marital relationship (with boys, prostitutes, male and female slaves) (Foucault
1985, 146-7). Likewise, Hinsch notes a sexual dichotomy between “duty and pleasure” in
much of Chinese history (Hinsch 1990, 19). “Even in the ancient period, we see men
who maintained a heterosexual marriage and a homosexual romance without apparently
seeing any contradiction between the two,” Hinsch writes (19). This was because
traditionally marriage in China is regarded as a transaction between two households
instead of a romantic union joining two individuals (Chou 2000, 23; Hinsch 1990, 19).
Confucianism rejects passionate love between a husband and wife, because it would
distract them from family obligations; however, producing heirs, especially boys, is an
imperative (Chou 2000, 23). Having children was important for all in Chinese society
(Hinsch 1990, 27). For the peasantry, children were needed to help in agricultural life,
and for the elite, children had particular value in uniting families through marriage ties
(26). Although a large emphasis was placed on the procreative purpose of marriage, sex
with prostitutes, sex within the same gender, or a man having several wives and
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concubines were usually tolerated because the male-dominate family system was not
challenged (Chou 2000, 24).
The monographs and studies that have explored same-sex love in Chinese history
have all problematized the notion of heterosexuality and homosexuality. Apart from the
issue of reproduction, little separation was made between heterosexual and homosexual
love in emotional and psychological terms (Wu 2004, 4). The vast majority of elite men
who engaged in same-sex love performed the penetrant role, were married, and had
family responsibilities (6). They were ‘bisexual’ in their sexual appetites, and this
‘bisexuality’ prevailed over exclusive same-sex love in much of China’s history (Hinsch
1990; Wu 2004, 6). However, trying to use words such as ‘heterosexual’, ‘bisexual’, and
‘homosexual’ is problematic, as the concept of sexual orientation (dividing people by the
gender of their erotic object choice) did not exist, and there is no evidence that men who
engaged in same-sex love identified with a particular sexual identity (Chou 2000, 13; Wu
2004, 6). For much of Chinese history, normative sexualities were set along a different
set of criteria that had more to do with life stages than fixed identities. Men had the
freedom to explore different sexual desires, however, they still had to fulfill the
Confucian imperative to marry and continue the family line by having progeny. I will
return to this obligation—of filial piety—in more depth in Chapters 3 and 4.
Classical Chinese also did not have a medical or scientific term that could be
compared to “homosexuality” or “homosexual” (7). Instead, male same-sex love was
discussed using poetic metaphors referring to earlier men or incidents famed for their
association with homosexuality (7). Same-sex love was also often described in terms of
social roles: men who had sexual relationships with the emperors are described as
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“favorites” in early records (7). “Chinese terminology therefore did not emphasize an
innate sexual essence, but concentrated rather on actions, tendencies, and preferences,”
Hinsch argues (7).
One of these poetic terms is yu tao or fen tao, meaning “half-eaten peach” or “part
of a peach that is not eaten” (Hinsch 1990, 20; Vitiello 1992, 347; Zheng 2015, 4). This
term appeared during the Zhou Dynasty in a story about the fickle love Duke Ling of Wei
(534-493 BCE) had for his courtier Mizi Xia (Hinsch 1990, 20). This tale, recorded in the
ancient philosophic work Han Fei Zi, tells of how Mizi Xia was one day strolling with
the ruler in an orchard (20). After biting into a peach and finding it too sweet, he gave the
remaining half to the ruler to enjoy. The ruler was impressed that Mizi Xia neglected his
own appetite and gave him the delicious peach to eat, and thanked him for the sincerity of
his love (20). Hinsch writes that the Mizi Xia and the duke are described according to
social relationship in the story, with Mizi Xia being said to have won favor (chong) with
the duke (21). Chong denotes a hierarchical relationship of regular patronage or favor
bestowed by a superior—and is therefore not remotely equivalent to “homosexuality”;
also gender is not factored into this term either (Hinsch 1990, 21; Vitiello 1992, 347).
The story is significant not only for being the origin of the term yu tao, but also because
Mizi Xia would became the most famous representative of same-sex love from this
period in Chinese history (Hinsch 1990, 20). The name Mizi Xia also became a
catchword for same-sex love in general (20).
Another term is duan xiu, or “passion of the cut sleeve”, which originated during
the Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 200 CE) (Hinsch 1990, 53; Vitiello 1992, 343). This term
came from a famous story describing Emperor Ai and the tenderness he felt for his
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favorite Dong Xian. It is recorded in The Cut Sleeve (Duanxiu Pian), a specialized erotic
anthology consisting of 51 short stories and anecdotes dealing with homoeroticism,
chronologically arranged from the 5th century BCE up to the 19th century CE (Vitiello
1992, 343-4). The collection is named after the following story:
Dong Xian used to sleep with the emperor. Once, he was taking a nap and was
lying on a sleeve of the sovereign’s robe. The sovereign wanted to get up, but
Xian was not yet awake. Thus, not wanting to shake him, the emperor cut off his
own sleeve, and then got up: so great was his love! (quoted in Vitiello 1992, 344).
The story continues to describe how all of Ai’s courtiers “imitated the cut sleeve, also
calling it the chopped sleeve,” in tribute to the love shared between their emperor and
Dong (Hinsch 1990, 53). Hinsch also writes that during the Han Dynasty, historical
records openly discuss how Han emperors had sexual relations with both men and
women—retaining large harems of wives and concubines while also enjoying regular
trysts with their male favorites (35). Poetry, tales, folk songs, and art recounted stories of
same-sex love in the imperial court and among scholars and officials in the Han and later
dynasties. Both The Book of Poetry and the Spring-Autumn Annals—required readings by
Confucius—had homoerotic themes (Zheng 2015, 35). The terms yu tao, fen tao,
duanxiu, and longyang (referring to the male favorite of another famous Chinese ruler)
were used throughout the centuries by the literati to refer to same-sex love (Vitiello 1992,
348).
2.2. Beginning of a shift in attitude: The introduction of ‘chicken lewdness’
During the Tang Dynasty (618 to 907) a new term emerged to describe same-sex
relations: jijian (“sodomy”) (Hinsch 1990, 88). Hinsch writes that this term is the first
recorded derogatory term for a same-sex act in Chinese (88). Jijian literally means
chicken lewdness”, a reference to a belief that domesticated fowls commonly engage in
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intercourse with fowls of the same sex (89). However, Hinsch points out that according to
Qing scholar and philologist Yuan Mei, the original first character of the term (also
pronounced ji) depicted a field above a woman and denoted “a man being like a woman”
(89). This definition, Hinsch writes, clearly implies one man assuming a receptive sexual
role (89). Hinsch argues that the substitution of the “chicken” character in this compound
seems to be more than a careless error, making the unfavorable association between
animal sexuality and same-sex relations (89). It was this incorrect form of jijian that
appears to have gained currency in the Tang and Song periods (618 – 1279). Hinsch, who
writes that sources such as the Hebrew Bible also compared adulterers and prostitutes to
various animals, writes that in Chinese jijian provides a bestial connotation that is
negative enough to justify translating it into English as “sodomy” (89). It is jijian, rather
than the more poetic and favorable terms “half-eaten peach” or “cut sleeve”, that appears
in later Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) laws restricting certain forms of same-sex activity,
which I will discuss below (89). Hinsch points out that jijian (with the ‘chicken’
character ji) came into use at a time when male favorites played a less prominent role in
the official histories of the period (89). He suggests that this decline in political visibility,
along with the rise of a derogatory term for same-sex relations, may indicate a change in
public sentiment towards same-sex love. However, he writes that this is only speculation,
because there is not enough data to be conclusive (89).
Moving into the Song Dynasty (960-1279), male favorites appear to have
experienced a continued decline in their influence on court and government in the Song
period, and the practice of patronage (in which a benevolent emperor showered his
beloved with titles and official payments) was seen as inappropriate for the rising classes
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of merchants and officials (90-1). With the rise in urbanization, the Song elite no longer
had to maintain staffs of retainers to provide cultural and sensual amenities (91-2). Less
wealthy individuals, who were unable to afford looking after a full-time favorite, would
hire prostitutes instead. Evidence shows that male prostitution was widespread
throughout the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and continued throughout the rest of China’s
imperial history (92). However, in the early 12th century authorities created a law to
prohibit male prostitution (93). Hinsch argues that, given the long history of tolerance for
same-sex relations in China, there must have been “a change in the character of Chinese
thought in general” to account for the Song law against male prostitution (95). He writes
that the law may have represented a backlash against the rise in prostitution in this era
(95). Furthermore, written records point to an increasing disapproval of the effeminacy
associated with the passive role in prostitution (though significantly, Hinsch points out,
this intolerance was not directed toward the active patrons of these prostitutes, but only
toward the passive men) (94-5). Another possibility is that some of these changes were
perhaps due to larger transformations taking place in Song intellectual life, including the
revival and reinterpretation of Confucianism in the Neo-Confucian movement, which was
concerned with strict sexual propriety and familial duty (95). Hinsch writes that since
certain Buddhist ideas had a large influence on Neo-Confucian thought, the official
intolerance towards same-sex love may have had its roots in popular Buddhist tracts that
took the concept of sexual sin far more seriously than some clerical Buddhist traditions
(96). However, Hinsch argues that the laws prohibiting prostitution did not seem to be
regularly enforced (94, 97). Authorities were typically reticent to interfere in sexual
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matters, and the diversity among the intellectual and political establishment may have
meant there was no consensus on sensitive issues such as same-sex love (97).
2.3 Restrictions on same-sex love: The Qing laws and prosecution of ‘illicit sexual
intercourse’
The Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) was a time of social and cultural openness,
including in sexual matters, and the literati of this period explored individuality as well as
carnal and worldly satisfaction in their writings (Wu 2004, 3). After Manchu bannermen
defeated the Ming Dynasty, there was a marked reaction against the perceived libertinism
of the Ming, partly as a result of imported Manchu concepts of sexuality and NeoConfucian rhethoric regarding the family order (Hinsch 1990, 162; Wu 2004, 3). Erotic
literature was censored, and officials of the empire and literati were banned from the
entertainment quarters (Wu 2004, 3). A number of laws targeting sodomy (jijian)—
though mostly focusing on rape—were also put into place during the Qing Dynasty (1644
to 1912) (Hinsch 1990, 140-5; Sommer 2002, 68). These laws describe the various
punishments for gangs or individuals who rape boys of certain ages, attempt rape, injure
or murder their rape victims, and those who falsely claim they had been sodomized
(Hinsch 1990, 143-4). Same-sex violence may indeed have been a concern to Qing
officials, as well as the widespread prostitution and forced procurement of male children
that was happening during that time (Dikötter 1995, 138; Hinsch 1990, 140). The Qing
laws banned consensual anal intercourse as well—with a punishment of one month in the
cangue and 100 heavy blows (Hinsch 1990, 144). However, China scholars argue that
these laws, which were incorporated into the larger body of laws prohibiting heterosexual
offenses (under the rubric of ‘illicit sexual intercourse’ or jian), were part of a general
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effort by Qing officials to combat all forms of extramarital sexuality (Dikötter 1995, 139;
Chou 2000, 25; Hinsch 1990, 144; Sommer 2002, 68). Hinsch argues that this explains
why the punishment for consensual sodomy—though harsh from a modern viewpoint—
was among the lightest possible at the time under the Qing legal system (144). Hinsch
also suggests that, given the openness of homosexuality through the Qing Dynasty, it is
doubtful that this particular idealistic article of the law was ever systematically enforced
(144).
The prohibitions against rape also did not take gender into account, but focused
instead on the age of the victim and the extent of violence inflicted (Dikötter 1995, 139;
Sommer 2002). Historian Matthew Sommer, who examines legal cases from this era,
argues that the principal target of these regulations was the marginal man who was seen
as existing outside the mainstream configuration of settled households (2002, 68-70).
These men, who in judicial discourse were described as Buddhist and Daoist clergy, local
toughs, migrants, and single men without prospects, pursued both men and women in
their role as an aggressive penetrator and threat to social order (69, 71-2). This pursuit of
men and women—what would be described in English today as bisexuality—did not
warrant special concern for jurists of the time, Sommer argues: “This bisexual targeting
of lust in and of itself does not appear problematic; jurists employed no special
explanation or commentary. Rather, it was the dangerous male’s utter lack of respect for
all boundaries and rules that threatened social order” (72, emphasis in original). While
same-sex love in China was widely accepted as an option for a man to satisfy his sexual
desire, the practice had to stay within certain boundaries (Vitiello 1992, 361). It could not
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be adopted as a total alternative to heterosexuality, as this would have clashed with the
moral duty of reproduction, which is the first expression of filial piety (362).
However, same-sex love was still widespread during the Qing, remaining a strong
cultural and social force (Wu 2004, 3). By the end of the reign of the Qianlong emperor
(1735-96), Beijing was home to several districts catering to male same-sex love, and boyactors were idealized as objects of exalted beauty (3). In terms of prevalence and social
influence, the most important form of male same-sex love that can be identified during
the Qing Dynasty was that between upper-class men (literati, officials, and merchants)
and boy-actors (dan) (8). Dan also came to refer to these boy-actors’ offstage persona as
catamites, a role which paralleled that of the female courtesan in earlier periods of
Chinese history (8). In the 18th and 19th Centuries, upper-class men not only patronized
dan as male prostitutes, but also developed long-term romantic relationships with them
(8). Though the acting profession was associated negatively with passive sexuality and
prostitution, actors’ active patrons included some of the most respected intellectual and
political figures of the Qing Dynasty (Hinsch 1990, 153). Another form of male same-sex
love that is widely recorded in records and stories from the Qing period is that between
affluent men and their boy servants (Wu 2004, 8). This kind of relationship was very
common throughout the whole of Chinese history (8). Finally, while relationships
between men of equal status certainly existed within all levels of late imperial Chinese
society, references to such relationships are far fewer (8).
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2.4 Modernization during the Republican period (1912-1949): ‘Homosexuality’ as
pathological and deviant
At the beginning of the 20th century various intellectuals and elites began taking
steps to modernize China. These modernizing elites, who felt a deep sense of cultural and
political humiliation following the Sino-Japanese War (1894), looked towards Western
science to rescue China from what they perceived as the inferiority and backwardness of
Chinese culture (Chou 2000, 43-4; Dikötter 1995). These elites shifted away from
Confucian (and neo-Confucian) cosmological understandings of gender and sexuality,
and turned instead to the authority of the natural sciences (Dikötter 1995, 8). Gender
distinctions were no longer thought to be linked to the cosmological foundations of the
universe, and were instead viewed as biologically determined (14). Some reformers
urgently promoted eugenics, and wrote about the dangers that frequent sex, prostitution,
and venereal diseases such as syphilis posed to men and women who were expected to
bear healthy children that would strengthen the nation (114, 130, 133).
2.4.1 Biological determinism and inversion
It was during this time that Western sexology was also imported and reinterpreted
by Chinese writers and reformers. The direct translation of the term “homosexuality”
(tongxinglian or tongxing’ai) emerged in the Chinese language in the 1930s (Zheng 2015,
39). In this section I will occasionally use the term “homosexuality”, because writers at
the time were using the medical term tongxinglian or tongxing’ai (a direct translation of
the English term “homosexuality”) in their writings, as they were focused on discussing
same-sex love as a pathological behavior. Historian Frank Dikötter, who examines over
350 publications produced in the early Republican period covering sexual matters, argues
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that tongxinglian was widely regarded as a “temporary aberration, a mental disease, or an
‘inversion’” (Dikötter 1995, 139). Dikötter argues that the concept of inversion—in
which, for example, a same-sex attracted man was regarded as being a woman trapped in
a male body—contributed to keep sexuality firmly linked to procreation, as this
representation emphasized heterosexism as a natural need (141). “Insisting that all desire
was by nature heterosexual, reducing masculinity and femininity to an expression of
sexuality, most biologizing theories represented ‘the homosexual’ as the very opposite of
‘manliness’,” Dikötter writes (141). The image of ‘the homosexual’ as a female mind in a
male body was central to Cheng Hao’s The Sexual Life of Mankind (1934), which also
included a list of the biological reversals that were thought to characterize same-sex
attracted men and women (see Table 2.1 on next page).
2.4.2 Same-sex love: An intermediate step for youth; abnormal for adults
In the eyes of some writers and scholars in China, sodomy among young males
was seen as a stage of development towards the ‘normal’ expression of sexual desire, and
was an acceptable behavior specific to certain situations (140). For example, Gui
Zhiliang, a famous gynecologist in the 1930s and 1940s, wrote that homosexuality was
an inevitable intermediate or preparatory stage on the path towards heterosexuality
(Dikötter 1995, 140; Chou 2000, 49). As Gui wrote in his 1936 book A Woman’s Life
(Nüren zhi yisheng), “the ‘normally’ developed person would ‘transit’ (guodu) through
homosexuality, but some would ‘get blocked’ (zu’ai) or ‘bogged down’ (tingzhi) in what
was described as a form of ‘abnormal homosexuality’ (bu putong de tongxing lian’ai)”
(Dikötter 1995,140). Only a small minority of youth was thought to have an innate
tendency towards homosexual intercourse, and, as with people with genetic mental
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Table 2.1 Cheng Hao’s list of the presumed biological reversals in male and female
homosexuals:
Man

Woman

Skeleton

Resembles mostly that of a
girl, particularly the pelvis

Similar in size and strength
to that of a man; the pelvis
is not very broad and has a
small gradient, the spine is
long and thin, the middle is
not curve

Skin

Soft and warm

Limbs

Relatively small

Pace

The step is short and slow,
like that of a girl
High-pitched

Voice
Chest

Facial hair
Character

Developed to that of a girl,
to the point of secreting
milk in the mammary
glands
None
Likes girl’s games,
activities and clothes

Similar to men
Gruff like men, structure
of the larynx similar to
men, weak laryngeal nodes
Flat, barely developed

Can sometimes grow
thickly like a man’s
Generally like a man, the
exact opposite of the male
homosexual

Emotions

Used to saying sweet
expressions of love, bashful
in presence of other men
Sex drive
Very feeble in relation to
Cold towards men,
women, to the point of
sensitive to the same sex
impotence: can develop
abnormal impulses when in
presence of the same sex
(H. Cheng 1934, 133-4, adapted from Dikötter 1995, 142).
disorders, it was believed to be impossible to correct them, according to Gui (140). Wang
Chengpin, another writer from this period argued that if homosexual tendencies were
allowed to develop into an addiction, then it would not even be possible for the ‘victim’
to be ‘rescued’ through marriage (140). Instead, the homosexual was thought to have
strayed from the right path, having turned his back on ‘normal’ (zheng) intercourse,
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‘inverted’ or ‘turned upside down’ (diandao) the natural order, and developed ‘abnormal’
desires (xingyu biantai) (140). “By calling homosexuality a ‘diseased state’ (bingtai) or a
‘metamorphosis’ (biantai), it was implied that a ‘normal’ heterosexual instinct was
originally present even in ‘abnormal’ bodies,” Dikötter writes (140). Much like
masturbation, adolescent homosexuality was portrayed as a socially acquired vice that
discipline had to overcome for the sake of the self, marriage, and the nation (140-1).
European scholars and reformers who were writing about both adolescent and
adult same-sex love had an impact on Chinese scholars during the Republican period.
The writings of British social reformers Edward Carpenter and Havelock Ellis helped
inform prevalent attitudes toward sexuality in China. Ellis, in particular provided the
groundwork that a good deal of Freudian psychology was based on (Carroll 2018, 107).
Their key works—such as Carpenter’s “Affection in Education” (Carpenter 1899) and
Ellis’s “The School-Friendships of Girls” (Ellis 1915)—shaped debates in China
throughout the 1920s and in later years over single-sex schooling versus coeducation as
well as the content and importance of sex education (Carroll 2018, 107). These essays
were published initially in Chinese in 1923 and 1925 respectively (107). Ellis espoused a
similar belief about same-sex love as Republican-era gynecologist Gui Zhiliang,
describing school-aged same-sex relations as a “love-fiction” that prepared students to
express affection in adult romantic and sexual relations with their spouses of the opposite
sex (107). Ellis was tolerant of youthful same-sex relations, but saw its continuance into
adulthood as a sign of developing mental disorders and asocial behavior (107). Ellis, and
those he influenced, such as Republican-era sociologist Pan Guangdan, emphatically
identified adult “inversion” as a psychological deficiency (107). Chou Wah-Shan writes
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that Pan’s translation of Ellis’s Psychology of Sex (1947) as well as his own introduction,
“Homosexual Examples in Chinese Literature,” are important because he represents the
first generation of Chinese scholars who studied tongxinglian from the perspective of
Western sexology (2000, 51). Pan was also one of many scholars during this period who
weighed in on a high-profile murder case in 1932, in which a 22-year-old woman
murdered her girlfriend, also 22 (Caroll 2018, 99). The two women had lived for a period
as dormitory roommates while both attending the National Hangzhou Art Academy—
making the case a touchstone for discussions of the potential problems created by samesex dorms in educational institutions as well as women’s supposed propensity for jealous
passions and even crime (100-1, 106-7, 116-9). While I noted at the beginning of this
chapter that the records and writings about same-sex love throughout most of China’s
history focused mostly on men and not women, same-sex relations between women did
begin to gain notice and notoriety during the Republican era. Public discussions of samesex relations at this time focused more on those between women than between men,
which reflected general social anxieties about the expansion of women’s presence and
increased autonomy in civil society (Carroll 2018, 100). Pan believed the case
demonstrated how problematic intractable same-sex love could be, and called on schools
and society as a whole to provide better supervision of students (such as knowing how
many times a week students masturbated) in order to identify and stop deviance before it
became so extreme that it ended in murder (115-6). Pan, who was also influenced by
Austro-German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing (author of the twelve-edition
Psychopathia Sexualis, a foundational study of sexual pathology), still judged same-sex
love as abnormal (115).
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It is significant to note that the early 20th century was the first time in Chinese
history that someone could be spoken of as being ‘homosexual’ or doing something that
was ‘homosexual’—with the term tongxinglian or tongxing’ai being used instead of
metaphorical language (Hinsch 1990, 169). The discourse drew from what was
happening in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, which Foucault describes as a
“discursive explosion” (Foucault 1978, 37). In the first volume of The History of
Sexuality, Foucault argues that this era was an “age of multiplication” in which multiple,
heterogeneous, “peripheral”, “unnatural” sexualities came to be the focus of attention
(37-39). Those outside of heterosexual monogamy were scrutinized; and of the six types
that Foucault draws attention to, one is the “homosexual” (38). He writes that there was a
shift from the act—the forbidden acts of sodomy, with the perpetrator being “nothing
more than the juridical subject of them”—to a person, a “species” (43). “The nineteenthcentury homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in
addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology with an indiscreet anatomy
and possibly a mysterious physiology” (43). While care must be taken not to map the
model of what was occurring in 18th and 19th-century Europe onto China in the early
twentieth century, the new discourse around sexuality in China resulted in homosexuality
being regarded as an essence rather than an act or tendency (one that was previously
generally tolerated, though in certain forms was punishable under the Qing law code; see
above) (Chou 2000, 51; Hinsch 1990, 169).
2.4.3 The selective appropriation of Western science
Dikötter writes that the modernizing discourses taking place in China during the
Republican period did not only come from the introduction of new Western ideas, but
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were also attributed to cultural reorientations taking place in China itself as long before as
the 17th and 18th centuries (Dikötter 1995, 180-1). “Modernizing discourses of sex were
not ‘hybrids’ of ‘Chinese’ and ‘Western’ ideas, nor can they be interpreted as some sort
of survival of ‘traditional’ cultural values underneath a veneer of ‘modern’ scientific
ideas,” he writes, stating that he is critical of what he calls the “‘Western impact –
Chinese response’ approach” (11-12). Instead, Dikötter borrows anthropologist David
Parkin’s term “latticed knowledge” to describe what emerged: a body of knowledge in
flux, characterized by interactions, overlaps, constant change and endless combinations
(12). Dikötter argues that sexual desire and procreation remained closely linked together
throughout history and into the 20th century in China. He writes that during the first half
of the 19th century in Europe, there emerged a new theoretical construction called
‘sexuality,’ which, together with new categories like ‘homosexuality’ and
‘heterosexuality’, closely connected the individual to the object of desire (63). One of the
consequences of this gradual appearance of a notion of sexuality was that sexuality
became detached from reproduction (63). Discourses no longer established strict
distinctions between procreative and nonprocreative sex, and sexuality also become
interpreted as an individual matter with the individual being the bearer of rights to selfexpression (64). However, he argues that no similar conception of ‘sexuality’ ever
emerged in China—sexual desire in China was not dissociated from procreation, but
remained firmly linked to it (64, 69). The Chinese discourse of desire demanded that
social subjects subordinate their drives to the needs of a higher collectivity (111). He
argues that for the reformers of this era, prostitution and sodomy represented the two
extreme forms of non-procreative sex that needed to be eliminated for the sake of the
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family and the nation (137). He writes that both forms of behavior were considered social
evils that took place outside the legitimate domain of conjugal sexuality and domestic
love (137). Dikötter argues that medical science was selectively appropriated by
modernizing elites in Republican China to solidify the extensive distinction between
procreative and nonprocreative sexual acts (139).
While intellectuals and modernizing elites in China during the Republican era
were reading and translating works by European writers—such as Havelock Ellis and
Richard von Krafft-Ebing—they had their own goals in mind and structured their
arguments accordingly. After being humiliated by Britain during the two Opium Wars
(1839-1842 and 1856-1860) and Japan during the Sino-Japanese War (1894), Chinese
intellectuals felt the need for the first time to completely transform traditional Chinese
civilization (Chou 2000, 43-4). Several popular movements critiquing traditional Chinese
culture were spawned during this time, such as the May Fourth Movement, and they
advocated for changes with the goal in mind of building a modern, strong nation (Zheng
2015, 39). Reformers such as Chen Duxiu (one of the founders of the Communist Party
of China in 1921) criticized Confucianism for promoting superficial ceremonies, lax
morality, feudalism, the caste system, and the oppression of women (Chou 2000, 44). He,
and others, attacked Chinese men as being weak and sick; Chen specifically described
Chinese men as lacking the strength to tie up a chicken and having bodies as delicate as
women’s (Zheng 2014, 39-40). Many reformers attributed national weakness and
backwardness to inadequacies among the population, including weak bodies and an
inadequate knowledge of human sexuality and reproduction (Chou 2000, 44; Dikötter
1995, 2). It was a time of strong anti-imperialist nationalism; many intellectuals did not
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believe in complete Westernization, but put intense faith in tools such as Western science
in order to achieve modernity and build a strong nation (Chou 2000, 44). Chou argues
that the Chinese appropriation of Western ideas was very selective, as Christian ideas
about sexuality as well as the duality of heterosexuality and homosexuality (which came
into existence in Western sexology) had never been very popular (49). The Confucian
marital system—which privileged reproduction and was not concerned if one practiced
same-sex love as long as one married and had children—was fertile ground for Western
sexology, Chou argues (47). Western sexology provided the discourses of biological
determinism that “heterosexualize” the Confucian marital-reproductive institution and
allowed for same-sex love to be pathologized “as a byproduct” (47, 49). “It was the
sexologist's pathologization of homosexuality rather than the Christian homophobic
attitude that was selectively and strategically adopted by Chinese intellectuals who had
their own sociopolitical agenda in mind,” Chou writes (49).
The Republican period in China was a major turning point in attitudes regarding
same-sex love. What for centuries had been tolerated and even embraced came to be
viewed as a deviant aberration that threatened heterosexual marriage and was the cause of
a weak nation. While some scholars place the blame solely on the importation of Western
sexology and medical knowledge, the situation is more complex, as described above.
Some shared concepts can clearly be found in texts by both Western writers and Chinese
reformers—such as the idea of same-sex love being a practice youth may temporarily
experience, but one that is ultimately aberrant and a pathological inversion if allowed to
continue into adulthood. Historian Frank Dikötter (1995) argues that it was the strong
link between sexual desire and reproduction in China that caused any idea of same-sex
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desire to be dismissed and viewed as a threat to the social responsibility of populating a
healthy nation. Furthermore, the modernizing elites who were importing and translating
Western sexology had their own goals in mind. In the course of their selective adoption
of foreign concepts, biological determinism and the pathologization of homosexuality
combined with traditional Chinese attitudes to heterosexualize the Confucian family and
marital system.
At least one of the people I interviewed was aware of the long history of how
same-sex desire was tolerated and even celebrated in poetry and other literature for much
of China’s history. In Chapter 3 I will introduce Master Lu, who has a temple dedicated
to helping tongzhi in Taiwan. Master Lu said that before the Qing Dynasty, marriage
between one man and one woman was not emphasized. A man could marry one woman,
or multiple women, and also have desire for other men, he said. Same-sex desire was
very normal, he added. He blames the change on influences from the Euro-American
world beginning in the Qing dynasty, and said that Western religion (i.e. Christianity)
emphasized that marriage should be between a husband and a wife. When I asked him if
many people in Taiwan are aware of this history, he answered no, unless they do some
research. Master Lu’s stories are indicative of how the long tradition of same-sex desire
in Chinese history has been largely forgotten in the contemporary age. “The homosexual
tradition is dead and virtually unknown, even among the educated,” Bret Hinsch writes
(Hinsch 1990, 163).
2.5 Tongzhi history from 1990s Taiwan until same-sex marriage
A politically engaged tongzhi community in Taiwan came into being in the 1990s
(Chou 2000; Simon 2004). Anthropologist Scott Simon argues that the formation of the
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tongzhi community in Taiwan took place in four progressive stages. First was the
appropriation of public space. Parks (especially those near train stations) had been
meeting spaces for tongzhi men, starting in the 1950s (75). Second was the establishment
of gay and lesbian commercial venues, which coincided with Taiwan’s capitalistic
growth (76). Third, entry into the political sphere was the next important step in identity
and community formation. He describes three historical incidents as mobilizing activists
and encouraging public discourse on same-sex love (79). This included then-Taipei
mayor Chen Shui-bian’s decision in 1995 to convert New Park—a popular cruising
ground for men—into a memorial for those who had died during a period of violent
unrest in the martial law period (79-80). University students formed a group to educate
the public about the tongzhi history of the park (Chou 2000, 164; Scott 2004, 80). Two
other incidents also led to increased activism, which I briefly mentioned in Chapter 1 in
my section on Taiwan’s political economy. One was a police raid on Changde Street
outside of New Park in 1997, in which 40-50 tongzhi men were rounded up by police
who checked their identity cards (80-1). The other was a 1998 raid on AG Gym, one of
the most popular gay establishments in Taipei, offering exercise equipment as well as a
sauna and private rooms to allow for intimacy (81). In the AG raid, two men (a
Taiwanese university student and a tourist from Macau who did not understand
Mandarin) were coerced by police into removing their towels and posing for a
photograph simulating anal sex (Simon 2004, 81). Over three hundred new and used
condoms were used as evidence by the police that AG was a male tongzhi sex club.
International human rights lawyers and gay activists fought against the charges and AG
eventually won a court case against police harassment (Simon 2004; J. C. Ho 2010, 552).
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Simon argues that these incidents contributed to a greater sense of tongzhi identity across
the island (2004, 82). Fourth, Simon writes that there was a creation of a publicly
recognized tongzhi community around the year 2000. He writes that major events
involved in this creation were Taipei’s commercial “Rainbow Community” (which began
with the opening of Taiwan’s first gay bookstore in 1999), Taipei City’s sponsorship of a
Gay and Lesbian Pride Festival in 2000, and the birth of the marriage rights movement
(82).
By the year 2000, same-sex marriage had become an item of pressing concern to
Taiwan’s budding tongzhi community. On October 22, 2000, four Christian lesbian
couples and one gay couple married publicly at Tong-Kwang Lighthouse Presbyterian
Church (Tongguang tongzhi zhanglao jiaohui, Taiwan’s first openly pro-tongzhi church)
and demanded that the state recognize same-sex marriage rights (Simon 2004, 85). In
2006, Democratic Political Party lawmaker Hsiao Bi-khim led an effort to legalize
marriage and child adoption for same-sex couples; that same year the Taiwan Pride
parade also focused on the marriage issue by staging wedding ceremonies for female
tongzhi couples (M. Ho 2019, 487). However, the proposal failed to make it on the
legislative agenda (487). The first advocacy organization for marriage equality, the
Taiwan Alliance to Promote Civil Partnership Rights (TAPCPR, Taiwan banlu quanyi
tuidong lianmeng) was formed in 2009, and they focused their efforts on promoting
same-sex marriage, civil partnerships, and multi-person families (487). In 2013, equal
right to marriage for same-sex couples (one of TAPCPR’s demands) gained sufficient
endorsement from lawmakers and was ready for its first reading in the legislature (487).
That same year, the countermovement opposing same-sex marriage began to grow. A
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group of Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist, and Yiguandao leaders joined together and
organized a large-scale rally in November (491). I will go into more details of the
countermovement in Chapter 4, when I examine a Buddhist nun’s responses to those
opposing same-sex marriage. In 2016, conservatives launched a new party, the Faith and
Hope League (FHL, xinxin xiwang lianmeng), partly with the goal of defeating the
attempt to legalize same-sex marriage (491). However, they failed to obtain a legislative
seat.
A third attempt to legalize same-sex marriage was launched in 2016, which was
quickly followed by a mass rally by conservative groups (many of which were led by
Christian churches and quasi-Christian ‘family values’ groups) (M. Ho 2019, 491). In
February 2017, the case of same-sex marriage was taken out of the legislative arena and
into the juridical, as the Constitutional Court made the decision to review the issue (492).
The Court, which had a number of liberal judges recently nominated by the DPP (M. Ho
2019, 496), ruled on May 24, 2017, that same-sex marriage was a constitutional right,
giving the Taiwanese government a two-year deadline to come up with a framework for
legalization. The quasi-Christian anti-same-sex marriage groups had enough influence to
create demand for three referendums held on November 24, 2018 regarding the rights of
tongzhi (M. Ho 2019, 499). All three ballot questions, which included the restriction of
the legal definition of marriage to one husband and one wife in the Civil Code, the
banning of same-sex education in junior high and elementary school, and a special law to
protect the rights of same-sex couples, won the majority of support (499). Therefore in
2019 the government did not change the Civil Code but instead proposed a special law
that allowed for same-sex marriage, following both the courts as well as the referendum
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result (Chin 2019, 2). Though the bill that was finally passed was the most progressive,
some scholars and activists have pointed out its limitations. The new legislation does not
offer full adoption rights, and same-sex marriages between Taiwanese and foreigners are
only recognized if the partner is from a country where same-sex marriage is legal (2).
2.6 Contemporary Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China: ‘Comrade’, 1s and 0s, T-Po, and
TB/G
The situation for same-sex attracted people in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in
contemporary times differs because of each region’s different history in the 20th century.
However, same-sex attracted people in Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong and other
Chinese-speaking communities share some common terminology. The first term is
tongzhi.
2.6.1 ‘Comrade’
Tongzhi, which means “comrade”, is the most popular contemporary Chinese
word used by same-sex attracted people, those who are transgender (kuaxingbie), and
others who are sexually and gender nonconforming. The first character tong means
‘same’, ‘alike’; and the second character zhi means ‘goal’, ‘spirit’, ‘occupation’ (Chou
2000, 1). Before it was appropriated by same-sex attracted people, the term was first used
in the Republican period, and adopted by both the Nationalist and Communist parties to
refer to those who were struggling for the nationalist or communist revolutions (1). One
of the most popular associations of the term is its use in a famous statement by Dr. SunYat Sen, leader of the 1911 Chinese Democratic Revolution to overthrow the last Chinese
monarchy, in which he urges tongzhi to continue to fight (1). Linguistic anthropologists
Andrew Wong and Qing Zhang (2001) translate the term in this usage as “followers”
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(262). During the Communist Revolution (1920s to 1949) the term acquired its political
and revolutionist connotations, Wong and Zhang argue (262). Initially it was an honorific
address reserved only for Chinese Communist Party members, symbolizing recruitment
into the Party (262-3). After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949,
tongzhi became the politically correct, polite, and neutral term to address everyone ,
replacing the terms that signaled differences in social status and class (262). The term has
largely fallen out of favor since the opening up of the market economy of China in 1978,
and previous address terms that were replaced by tongzhi (such as Miss xiaojie and Mr.
xiansheng) have since been revived (Chou 2000, 2; Wong and Zhang 2001, 263).
The term tongzhi was initially used in the Chinese title of the ‘First Hong Kong
Gay and Lesbian Film Festival’ in 1989 (xianggang diyi jie tongzhi dianying jie) (Chou
2000, 2; Wong and Zhang 2001, 264). The organizers decided to use tongzhi as the
Chinese translation of “gay and lesbian” because they wanted to use an indigenous term
for same-sex love instead of Western, English terms such as “gay,” “lesbian,” and
“queer” (Chou 2000, 2). The Chinese term for ‘homosexuality’ (tongxinglian) was
dropped because of its usage as a medical term denoting pathology (2).1 Since then, the
term tongzhi became widely adopted by same-sex attracted people and organizations in
Hong Kong, and its usage later spread to Taiwan, China, and other Chinese-speaking
parts of the world (Wong and Zhang 2001, 264). Hong Kong sociologist Chou Wah-shan,
whose work on what he calls “tongzhi theory” has helped popularize the term in Hong
Kong and Taiwan, praises the fluidity of the term in his writings (264). In Tongzhi:
Politics of Same-Sex Eroticism in Chinese Societies, he writes:
1

It should, however, be pointed out that the first character tong (
tongzhi (
) and tongxinglian (
).
60

) is the same in both

Unlike “homo” or “hetero,” tongzhi is not defined by the gender of one's erotic
object choice but connotes an entire range of alternative sexual practices and
sensitivities in a way that “lesbian,” “gay,” or “bisexual” does not. It rejects
essentialism and behaviourism, and it does not require counting the incidence of
same-sex sexual acts to qualify an individual tongzhi identity […] It achieves a
political contribution similar to “queer politics,” but whereas queer politics
confronts the mainstream by taking back a bigoted label, tongzhi harmonizes
social relationships by taking the most sacred title from the mainstream culture. It
is an indigenous strategy of proclaiming one’s sexual identity by appropriating
rather than denying one’s familial-cultural identity (Chou 2000, 3).
Chou also argues that the term helps to pluralize sexuality, as it refers to all forms of
sexual practice that have been marginalized by hegemonic heterosexuality (3). He also
writes that tongzhi represents a strong sentiment for integrating the sexual (legitimizing
same-sex love), cultural (reappropriating Chinese identity), and the political (sharing the
goals of combating heterosexism) (3). Wong and Zhang, who examine the use of the term
in the bimonthly tongzhi magazine G&L, argue that the use of tongzhi constitutes a
discourse of resistance (2001, 267). As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, samesex love was often associated with the elite over the course of Chinese history, and was
therefore viewed as decadent in the communist discourse (268). “Hence the use of
tóngzhì, a term so deeply rooted in the history of the Chinese communist revolution, as
the name for the alternative identity of gay and lesbian, is in itself, a daring and rebellious
act,” they write (268, tonal diacritics in original text).
2.6.2 ‘1s and 0s’
While tongzhi serves as an umbrella term for sexually and gender nonconforming
people in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other Chinese-speaking communities, there are
also other terms in use. Among same-sex attracted men, ‘1’ and ‘0’ are used (H.T. Huang
2011; Zheng 2015). 1, symbolizing the penis, is associated with the male role, while as 0,
symbolizing the vagina, is associated with the female role (Zheng 2015, 75). Newcomers
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to the community either choose their role or are assigned it during their first sexual
experience with someone who has already identified as a 0 or a 1 (75). Once this gender
role has been determined, tongzhi are disciplined—through gossip and critique—to fit
into it (75). Anthropologist Zheng Tiantian found that according to the men in her
research conducted in Dalian, China, the gender division of 1 and 0 emulates the
hegemonic gender roles in heterosexual relationships (78). 1 takes on the role of the
inserter, while as 0 assumes the role of the inserted receiver (78). Same-sex attracted men
usually call each other “wife” (laopo) or “husband” (laogong) in alignment with their
gender roles (78). Zheng also found that the 1s and 0s in her research invoked the theory
of yin and yang to describe their differences (78). Yin, or 0, signifies being negative, dark,
passive, wet, cold, and feminine; Yang, or 1, denotes being positive, bright, active, dry,
hot, and masculine (78). The same-sex attracted men in Zheng’s research believed it was
natural to have a union of 1 and 0 in a relationship, just as it is understood to be natural to
have a union of yin and yang in the universe (78). Zheng also found that it is the tongzhi
community that defines male and female behaviors and roles and uses these rules to
structure the identities of 1s and 0s (79-80). 0s may also adopt idealistic feminine
behaviors in the way they speak, dress, and act (80, 84). Zheng, who conducted fieldwork
in Dalian over the course of several months between 2005 and 2013, reports only finding
two men who identified as “0.5” and questioned the 1/0 system (7, 78). In her analysis of
the 1/0 system, Zheng argues that scholars must be careful not to make certain
assumptions about non-Western queer communities. She writes that Dennis Altman
(1996) has theorized that a global trend is taking place in which gender-based identities
are giving way to egalitarian Western sexual identities that are not focused on gender
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identities (76). However, the 1/0 system problematizes that argument, Zheng argues. For
rather than sharing a sexual identity based on a common sexual orientation, 1s and 0s
differ from each other as two different gender categories (77). “Gender difference is
pivotal” to the identities of tongzhi, she writes (191).
Evan, a Daoist follower from Taipei, told me in an interview that he used to be a 0
or a bottom, and then about five years ago changed to be a top or 1. Evan, 30, said he had
been feeling some pain by being a bottom, so he tried being a top, and after having a few
enjoyable experiences with it he then fully committed to this new role. However, he did
say that he wants more of a sense of security in a relationship, hinting that this specific
behavior is something that is not necessarily associated with being a top or a 1. As Zheng
noted in her study of tongzhi in Dalian in the PRC, 1s may be less likely to commit to
relationships and are expected to sleep around, whereas 0s are expected to be faithful,
dedicated, and understanding of 1’s probable promiscuity (Zheng 2015, 80, 84). Zheng
also discusses how many of the 0s she spoke to described the pain they felt in their sexual
experiences, and how it took them a long time to finally become accustomed to the
feeling of being a bottom and to eventually experience physical pleasure (79). Evan’s
experience shows that these categories and the expectations attached to the roles of 1s
and 0s are not always as fixed as Tiantian Zheng (2015) describes in the tongzhi
community in the PRC.
Lloyd, a member of the same Daoist temple as Evan (and who facilitated my
interview with Evan), said that the English words top, bottom, and vers (versatile) are
also used in the male same-sex attracted community in Taiwan. Lloyd described a
spectrum ranging from 100% bottom (always being a bottom), vers bottom (being a
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bottom “70 percent” of the time, and at other times a top), vers (50% of the time a
bottom, 50% being a top; bufen is also sometimes used), vers top, and 100% top. Lloyd
added that these 100% tops sometimes have sex with women, and said that 0s/bottoms
are the majority and tops are rare in the community. During this same interview, when I
asked Evan if he uses tongzhi or another term to describe himself, he answered in
English, with a chuckle: “I’m gay. I like boy[s]!” Wondering if he was translating the
term, I asked—and got clarification—that he does in fact prefer to use the English word
‘gay’ to describe himself. Lloyd too said he prefers to use the word ‘gay’ to describe
himself. This may reflect transnational flows of information, with the tongzhi community
in Taiwan being aware of LGBTQ discourses in Europe and North America, and
sometimes appropriating and reinterpreting LGBTQ terminology and ideas. Lloyd and
Evan have had different levels of exposure to the English language and to foreign
countries (Lloyd has traveled to the United States and Europe and is fluent in English;
Evan has limited English ability), but I would argue that their use of the English word
‘gay’ is a display of cosmopolitanism. I explore cosmopolitanism in Taiwan further in
Chapter 4, when I examine a Buddhist nun’s cosmopolitan display in a speech attacking
those who are against same-sex marriage.
2.6.3 T/Po, TB/G, and bufen or H
A similar binary exists among same-sex attracted women in Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and—in recent years—the PRC (Kam 2014). In Taiwan and the PRC, Female tongzhi
inclined to masculine gender performances call themselves T, while those who represent
themselves with normative femininity call themselves Po (Chou 2000; Y. Hu 2017; Kam
2014). More recently, there is also bufen or H for those who are neither T nor Po; they
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have no visible gender identification, and they may desire both T and Po or any other
subjects (Y. Hu 2017, 91; Kam 2014, 253). One can imagine T and Po as being the two
ends of a spectrum with bufen in the middle, with other hybridized subcategories and
subdivisions. One can also be bufen pian (“inclined towards”) T or bufen pain Po (Y. Hu
2017, 91). T masculinity can be subdivided further into “iron T” (tie T); “sissy T” (niang
T); and “cute and submissive T” (zhengtai T; or sometimes the original Japanese term
shouta is used) (Kam 2014, 253). For Po femininity, there is dominating Po (han Po),
“big sister Po” (yujie Po; or the original Japanese term onee), and many other
combinations (253). Among same-sex attracted women in Hong Kong, the masculine
gender role is referred to as TB, short for tomboy (Chou 2000, 214). The feminine
counterpart is called TBG, short for tomboy-girl (214). In these different Chinese
societies, some also choose to use non-gendered words to denote themselves as same-sex
attracted women, such as nütongzhi (literally “female” tongzhi), as well as lazi in Taiwan
and lala in China (derived from the English word “lesbian”) (Y. Hu 2017; Kam 2014).
According to anthropologist Antonia Chao, who conducted ethnographic
fieldwork on the Taiwanese lesbian community, the term T originated in Taiwan during
the 1960s Vietnam War, when the first gay bars (along with American-style restaurants
and bars) were opening in major cities (Chao 2000, 379). “During this time, lesbians
either with Western connections or an educational background that enabled them to speak
at least basic English, hung out with American GIs, while working-class lesbians came to
gay bars,” Chao writes (379). It was from either or both of these social locations that the
term T (short for the English word “tomboy”) came about (379). Po, its counterpart, is a
Mandarin word that usually functions as a suffix in expressions like waipo (“outside

65

grandmother”, meaning grandmother on the mother’s side) or laopo (“old lady”, meaning
wife) (379). However, T-Po identities only came more widely into formation when T bars
began to open in Taiwan in the mid-1980s (380). The emergence and popularization of
Westernized lesbian and feminist politics in Taiwan during the 1990s led to the T-Po
binary being critiqued as replicating and reinforcing gender and sexual binaries (Y. Hu
2017, 93). It was also regarded as being local and backward within the budding women’s
and tongzhi movements of the time (93). It was in this atmosphere that the categories of
lazi and nütongzhi were created to designate generic female same-sex desire (93).
Nevertheless, as Yu-Ying Hu writes in her study of how same-sex attracted women in
Taiwan choose to name their gender and sexual practices, T and Po continue to persist
(90, 105-6). Hu argues, however, that though T and Po remain powerful concepts and
identity labels, the meaning and categorical definition of T-Po continues to mutate in the
face of the challenge of new non-binary identity categories such as bufen and nütongzhi
(90).
One of the women I interviewed (Xiao’en, a 40-year-old Christian woman), told
me that the divisions of masculine T, feminine Po, or ambiguous H are not an appropriate
fit for her, because she is still interested in men, but hasn’t had the opportunity to explore
that dimension of her sexuality. She is not content with using the English term “bi”
either, because she doesn't feel like this term is quite enough to fully express who she is.
She told me she uses the word tongzhi to decribe herself, and said that it is better than the
word ‘queer’ (ku’er in Chinese) because it is so broad (kuan) and can include everyone
from transgender people to even allies of the tongzhi community. “I feel, in my opinion,
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tongzhi is a great word. It is a very broad one. It shows that many different sexual
identities are possible,” she said.
2.7 Conclusion
Today there are multiple terms in use by sexually and gender nonconforming
people in Taiwan and China—starting with tongzhi as an umbrella term, and then with
terminology differing and subdividing further within the male and female same-sex
attracted communities. In this chapter I covered the history of tongzhi identity in the
Chinese world, and in doing so provided a survey of the tolerance and intolerance
expressed towards same-sex love over the course of Chinese history. I began by looking
at some of the poetic metaphors used to describe same-sex eroticism in the early periods
of China’s history, when same-sex love was tolerated and widely accepted. I discussed
how attitudes may have begun to shift over time, with the introduction of the term jijian
(lit. “chicken lewdness”) for sodomy in the Tang Dynasty, a term that would later be used
in the Qing-era laws that punished nonconsensual sodomy as well as consensual sodomy.
I then examined how the medical term for “homosexuality” (tongxinglian or tongxing’ai)
came into being in the beginning of the 20th century in China, at a time when various
elites and intellectuals in China had the goal of modernizing the nation. In this section I
also examine the extent to which foreign sexology was to blame for same-sex love being
viewed as deviant. I conclude that some ideas were undoubtedly imported; however they
were also mapped onto existing concepts regarding sexuality and reproduction in China,
as well as the reformers’ own specific goals in the project of modernization. Finally, I
turned to the contemporary period and examine how same-sex love in China and Taiwan
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is described both in terms of fluidity and nonessentialism (i.e. tongzhi) as well as
gendered binaries (1s and 0s; T-Po).
It is evident that there is a long and rich history of same-sex love in China’s
history. Modern, ‘Western’ concepts of bisexuality and homosexuality cannot be applied
to this past. For, as long as a man got married and had progeny, he was free to explore his
desires with others of the same gender. However, the dynamic of these same-sex relations
often involved social differences—it was usually elite, older men that took the active role
in the sexual relation, and the passive, penetrated role was stigmatized. At the turn of the
20th century, as China was undergoing massive changes, Western sexology was imported.
It merged with the traditional Chinese focus on heterosexual marriage and progeny,
leading to a new stigmatization of same-sex love. Given this different history, it is also
important not to use the term LGBTQ to describe the same-sex attracted community in
Taiwan today, since the history of same-sex love in China and Taiwan through the ages
and into contemporary times differs from that experienced in Europe and North America.
That is why I consistently use the term tongzhi throughout my thesis.
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Chapter 3
Adopted by the Rabbit God: Filial Piety, Fictive Kinship, and Religious
Practices Among Daoist Believers

“There are three ways to be unfilial; to not have posterity is the greatest of them all.”
Mencius (c. 372—289 B.C.E)
In this chapter I will outline how the conception of the family in traditional
Chinese thought—and the fundamental concept of filial piety—can make it challenging
for parents and other relatives to accept a family member that has same-sex desires. I will
also examine how some have reinterpreted the concept of filial piety and kinship in order
to find support and acceptance. I link this reinterpretation of filial piety to the practices of
celibate clergy in Taiwan.
3.1 The family institution in Taiwan
In his thorough examination of a wide range of issues affecting tongzhi,
sociologist Chou Wah-shan makes some important points about the institution of the
family in Chinese culture. Family, Chou writes in Tongzhi: Politics of Same-sex
Eroticism in Chinese Societies, “is perceived as the most basic and profound social
institution” (Chou 2000, 253). He argues that this derives from traditional Confucian
concepts of the self and identity, which tend to be holistic and relational: No one is a
discrete, isolated being; rather an individual exists through and is defined by their
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relationship to others (20, 252). Confucianism defines five fundamental relationships,
which lay down the central defining roles for an individual: sovereign and subject, father
and son, elder and younger, husband and wife, and friend and friend (252). Chou argues
that all human relationships are constructed in hierarchical patterns, but Confucianism
also stresses harmony in those relationships (252-3). In this framework, guanxi (shared
reciprocity) becomes a crucial reference, as it is the proper guanxi between self and
others that defines and constitutes the sense of selfhood (253). This is why family is the
central social institution, Chou writes. “It has salience for each individual in terms of
emotional support, personal growth, economic bonds, and the entire sense of personal
selfhood,” he argues (253). In their examination of how Confucianism is a conceptual
framework for contemporary East Asian family life, Mijung Park and Catherine Chesla
argue that the family is the irreducible unit, rather than the individual (2007). In the
Confucian construct, both community and society are an extension of the family. A
person who does not do well within family relationships cannot do well in society (Park
and Chesla 2007, 305). This is why parents’ value as human beings is judged by how
well they perform as parents (306).
Within family relationships, filial piety is a central value (Chou 2000, 253). Being
filial to one’s family members, particularly to one’s parents, includes the imperative to
marry and continue the family line. Marriage in Chinese culture is traditionally regarded
as a transaction between two households instead of two individuals (23). Historically, the
basis of marriage and sex within marriage was not sexual desire or love, but the
obligation to produce heirs, preferably boys (23). “Traditional Chinese focus their sexual
concerns on marital procreation rather than different-sex pleasure,” Chou argues (23).
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The nature of this strong Taiwanese family institution can make it challenging for parents
to fully accept and support tongzhi. Chou argues that the traditional Chinese conception
of the relational self—and the primacy of family as the most basic social institution—
generate a set of challenges for tongzhi that are very different from their LGBTQ
counterparts in the Euro-American world (254). Though the tongzhi community in
Taiwan has experienced its share of harassment by police and harmful stereotyping in the
media, tongzhi have never been oppressed legally to the extent that they have in the
United States and former British Colonies, which have had sodomy laws derived from the
Judeo-Christian tradition (Simon 2004, 79). “The major problem for most tongzhi is not
state oppression, religious fundamentalism, or job discrimination but the family,
especially the parents,” Chou argues (254). This is because the problem for parents is not
only accepting that their child is tongzhi, but the shame of losing face for having a child
who does not get married (heterosexually) and have children to carry on the family name
(23, 254). The parents may also feel a loss of face with relatives, neighbors, and ancestors
(257). In a society where filial piety is of the utmost importance for being a person,
hurting one’s parents “could be the most terrible thing for a tongzhi to do,” Chou argues
(254). Chou explains that this is why almost every tongzhi he has encountered in Taiwan,
Hong Kong, and the PRC agree that the most painful part of coming out is dealing with
parents (254-5). He writes the concepts of ‘coming out’ and being ‘out and proud’ are
Euro-American constructs and can be culturally problematic for the Chinese world, as
being ‘out’ implies leaving one’s family, parents, and culture to become tongzhi (258-9).
Evan told me that his parents expect him to marry a wife and have children, and
this is why they have made several attempts to try and ‘cure’ him of his same-sex desire
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(see Chapter 1). Evan said that he has known that he was attracted to people of the same
gender ever since he was in the third grade. He said his parents found out about his
sexuality when, around 19 years old, he brought his boyfriend to his parents’ house (Evan
still currently lives with his parents). Evan told his father that his boyfriend was just a
friend, but his father spotted a hicky on Evan’s neck and figured it out. Evan said his
father was furious, and slapped him. After that, his family began trying to attempt to cure
him of his sexual orientation. They first brought him to a temple to the goddess Mazu in
Banqiao District of New Taipei City—the temple he had grown up going to with his
family. He saw a spirit medium (jitong) who said that Evan’s true soul was away from his
body, and that something dark and terrible had stuck to him instead. The medium
performed a ritual to try and recover Evan’s lost spirit. That did not change his sexuality,
so that was when they decided to take him to see a psychiatrist, as described in the
introduction of this thesis. He told me the doctor prescribed a psychotropic drug
(jingshenyao), and when I asked why, Evan answered that his parents needed the
psychiatrist to do something; otherwise they wouldn’t leave the hospital. This medication
of course did not change Evan, and so later his family took him back to the temple, still
attempting to cure him. He told me he felt utterly helpless throughout this whole process.
Anthropologist Scott Simon writes that the expectation on men in Taiwan to
marry and bear grandchildren for their parents is very intense, and can create a lot of guilt
for tongzhi men, partly because they don’t want their parents to lose face (2004, 72).
Drawing on his own ethnographic work in Taiwan, Simon writes that the cultural
expectations are so powerful that some gay men often feel the most pressure to marry
after they’ve come out to their parents (72). Evan said he would suffer if he had to marry
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a woman, because he only likes men. Though tongzhi men may feel pressure to have
children, Evan and Lloyd (who facilitated my two interviews with Evan) pointed out that
some would like to adopt children. These two members, as well as Master Lu, argued that
the current laws make the process of adoption very challenging for tongzhi. Evan said
that this was the next step (after the legalization of same-sex marriage) that needed to be
done to advance tongzhi rights in Taiwan.
Not all tongzhi have such negative experiences with their families, however.
Xiao’en, a 40-year-old Christian woman I introduced at the end of Chapter 2, told me that
both her mother and father are very accepting of her.1 Xiao’en does an extensive amount
of advocacy work, trying to bridge relations between Taiwan’s Christian community and
the tongzhi community. Xiao’en’s mother now joins her at some events (including
speaking on a panel with other Christian mothers of tongzhi), as shown in the 2016
documentary The Shepherds, which features Xiao’en and other members of the protongzhi Tong-Kwang Lighthouse Presbyterian Church. Lloyd, a 32-year-old project
manager in software development who lives in Taoyuan, told me in our interview that he
came out to his mother three years ago.2 He said that she had already guessed his sexual
identity and that she was accepting of it. He added that, while he was traveling in Japan
and same-sex marriage was passed into law, his mother shared the news with him and
sent him some related articles. “As a mother she intended to see her children got
company for the rest of their life…no matter the gender,” he said. Lloyd said he thinks
his father can probably guess that he is tongzhi, but he hasn’t talked to him about it.
Nevertheless, Lloyd admitted that having a parent who is accepting of their child being
1
2

Interview on August 13, 2020.
Interview on January 16, 2021.
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tongzhi is “not typical actually, because Taiwanese family [is] mostly very traditional.”
So, he said, even having just one supportive parent is very fortunate.
3.2 Brilliant Light Temple and the Rabbit God
In this section I will introduce Brilliant Light Temple, the Daoist temple where
Evan and Lloyd are members.3 I will also introduce one of the primary gods of the
temple: a Rabbit God who is a deification of a same-sex attracted man, and who serves
the needs of tongzhi worshippers. I will then introduce the head priest of the temple. He
chose to focus his work on supporting tongzhi because he saw that few other religious
traditions were putting any effort into working with this community. In later sections I
will discuss the kinship ties that have been created at this temple, as well as how both
priest and lay members are reinterpreting the cultural idea of filial piety.
Several members sought out and discovered the temple because they were
experiencing relationship difficulties. None of those I interviewed were Daoists before
coming to the temple, and when they sought out a temple for their needs they didn't have
any specific religious tradition in mind. This highlights the highly syncretic nature of
religious faith in Taiwan. People may visit Daoist and Buddhist temples for a range of
reasons, or may follow certain practices at different times. In 2010, while Evan was still
experiencing a lot of conflict with his family, he also experienced heartbreak that led him
to turn more to religion. After his boyfriend at the time had cheated on him and then left
him for the other person, Evan did some research to find a deity that could help him
through this time. Though Evan had previously gone to folk and Buddhist temples with
his family, he did not have any religious tradition in mind. This was the same with Lloyd,
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Brilliant Light is my own translation of the Chinese name of the temple, Weimingtang.
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who also did not grow up in a religious family, and sought out temples and religious
specialists to help him with his relationship woes. Lloyd found that some of the religious
options that he tried felt too business-like: he’d pay the religious specialist a fee and
provide a photograph of his partner, and then the specialist would give him information
about his partner that Lloyd did not find very useful. While religion in Taiwan is highly
syncretic, and people search out temples and specialists for their personal needs, religion
has also become a marketplace where priests, mediums, and other religious specialists
have seen ways to profit off demand (Moskowitz 1999, 166-170; Pas 2003). Through
their research, Lloyd and Evan came across a temple for the Rabbit God (Tu’er Shen).
This was Brilliant Light Temple (Weimingtang).

Figure 3.1: Daoist priest Master Lu, founder and head priest of Brilliant Light Temple in
New Taipei City, Taiwan. Photo courtesy Lu Weiming.
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This temple, which is currently located in a commercial building in Zhonghe
District in New Taipei City, is named after Daoist priest Lu Weiming, who first founded
the temple in 2007. Master Lu, 35, told me in an interview that Daoist priests tend to
choose a specific community or type of support they will offer, and depending on what
they choose to specialize in, they will accordingly select gods for their temples.4 He said
he decided to cater to the needs of tongzhi because few other religious leaders in any of
Taiwan’s religious traditions were concentrating their efforts on supporting this
community. A few months after founding Brilliant Light Temple, Lu summoned the
Rabbit God to the temple because he said this deity specifically supports tongzhi. This
was done by taking a plaque in which the full name of the deity was carved (Uncle
Rabbit God Hu Tianbao, Tu’er Shen Hu Tianbao Daye) and performing a ritual so that
the god would be summoned to the plaque.
The Rabbit God is the deification of a man named Hu Tianbao, who is featured in
a collection of supernatural stories titled What the Master Did Not Discuss (Zibuyu),
compiled by Qing Dynasty poet Yuan Mei (1716-1798) (Szonyi 1998, Vitiello 1992).
According to this story, the young Hu Tianbao admired the appearance of an official that
had just arrived in Fujian province on the Southeast coast of China (Szonyi 1998, 6;
Vitiello 1992, 362). After Hu spied on the official while he was on the toilet to see him
naked, the official had Hu killed (Szonyi 1998, 6). After a month Hu appeared in a dream
to a local man, explaining that though he had violated propriety and deserved to die, the
officials of the spirit world were not angry with him because he had not caused harm to
someone. Instead they made him into the Rabbit God (Tu’er Shen), charged with
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Interview on September 17, 2020.
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supervising the affairs of men who appreciate other men. Hu asked the man to erect a
temple for him (6-7). Szonyi argues that the cult of Hu Tianbao, largely centered in the
Fujian city of Fuzhou in the eighteenth century, was focused around the deity’s power to
grant the wishes of men who desired to have sexual intercourse with young men (1).
The word ‘rabbit’ (tuzi) or ‘little rabbit’ (tu’er) was another of the many terms
used to denote same-sex love in periods of China’s history, and has also been used as an
insult in contemporary times in the PRC (Szonyi 1998, 7; Vitiello 1992, 349-350). In the
first half of the twentieth century in the PRC, ‘rabbit’ could also refer to male prostitutes
(Kang 2009, 37). China scholars Michael Szonyi (1998) and Giovanni Vitiello (1992)
both note that, interestingly, the identical symbolic association between rabbits and samesex love also existed in ancient Rome, as described in scholarship by John Boswell
(1980). In Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality, Boswell argues that early
Christian theologians also drew on this symbolism of the rabbit in their prohibitions
against same-sex desire (Boswell 1980). He writes that these theologians drew on
erroneous ideas about the animal—that the rabbit is a hermaphrodite, and that it could
grow a new anal opening each year (this is quoted by Moses in the apocryphal Epistle of
Barnabas, likely composed in the first century CE) (137-8, 306). Though the symbol of
rabbits has sometimes been used to disparage same-sex love in China and elsewhere, the
gods in Yuan Mei’s story do not disapprove of same-sex love and willingly make Hu
Tianbao the Rabbit God to serve the needs of same-sex attracted men.
Master Lu did not point to any Daoists being disapproving of what his temple is
doing. In fact, it appears that the Daoist tradition he is a part of has publicly embraced his
work in promoting Daoism. According to Brilliant Light Temple’s website, Master Lu
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has received praise from the 64th leader (Celestial Master) of the Way of Orthodox Unity
tradition, even joining him on trips to the PRC to promote Daoism there. He believes it is
his mission to care for tongzhi, and he carries out that concern regardless of shifting
political winds or other wordly affairs such as harassment from anyone who opposes his
work. Master Lu told me,
As a priest, I hope that I can solve some of the problems that have been caused in
society, to reduce discrimination. To help more people live in the light with
themselves, because some tongzhi are not comfortable with themselves. They
should be encouraged, because they are unique. They are unique because god
made them for a special purpose.
However, Master Lu primarily does this through his work at the temple and spreading
Daoist teachings. To my knowledge, Master Lu did not publicly advocate for the
legalization of same-sex marriage, unlike Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei, who I focus on
in the next chapter, He did however indicate his support for it in an interview with the
Taipei Times, in which he said Daoism recognizes the union of two people of the same
gender, and that there is no reason why the state should not do the same (Yi 2007). When
I asked Master Lu what his reaction was to same-sex marriage being legalized in May
2019, he said that this was a matter of politics and not religion. He said that while
Taiwan’s government has made this step forward in tongzhi rights, it is something that
could always change: it is legalized now, but may become illegal later depending on what
a different political climate decides. No matter what the government does or doesn't do,
Master Lu said, “the care we provide for tongzhi remains the same.” This idea of
religious separation from the spheres of politics and society is also why he does not
comment on his own sexuality (see also Gold 2015), which is a theme I return to in the
final section of this chapter.
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The temple has received a significant amount of media attention, both in the
Chinese language and in the English language (for example, in the Taipei Times and
internationally in Reuters). Lloyd couldn’t remember exactly when he first heard of the
temple, but he said it was when he saw news about the Rabbit God either on TV or on
YouTube. For Evan, after his heartbreak, he specifically looked for a god that helps
tongzhi, and through a Google search he found Brilliant Light Temple. Even visited the
temple and felt warmly received. He found that Master Lu was able to give helpful advice
and guidance with the problems he was experiencing, and felt that he was being well
educated in the Daoist religion. For him, and other members, Brilliant Light Temple has
become another home.
3.3. Fictive Kinship at Brilliant Light Temple
Though it was heartbreak that first brought Evan, Lloyd, and others to Brilliant
Light Temple, it was the community they found there that made them stay and become
members and disciples of Master Lu. This section explores how members of the temple
have used religious frameworks and beliefs such as reincarnation to form fictive kin
bonds that provide them with emotional support. I argue they are also reinterpreting filial
piety through their rituals and devotion to deities they consider to be their adoptive
parents.
Though Chou (2000) argues that it is the nature of family that can make it
challenging for tongzhi to be accepted by their relatives, he emphasizes that family-kin
relations can also be used to accept tongzhi. Chou describes several ethnographic
examples in which a tongzhi son or daughter maintains a strong relationship with their
parents, and then introduces their partner into the family as a good friend (263). This
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relationship is then deepened through mundane practices such as shopping or playing
mahjong together (263). Finally, the tongzhi may use quasi-kin categories such as halfsister/brother to integrate the partner into the family (263). Chou describes this process as
“coming home,” and argues that it is more effective than trying to make a conceptual
argument about same-sex eroticism and having that discussion understood by family
members (263). Though there is a strong insider-outsider distinction based on familykinship categories, Chou argues, the boundary and composition of the Chinese familial
group are also fluid and elastic, potentially including those who are not biologically
related (265-7). “In all the successful cases of coming home, the partner is perceived by
the tongzhi’s parents through quasi-kin categories, which is a crucial indication that the
insider-outsider distinction has been broken,” Chou writes (267). Though the nature of
the family institution in Taiwan makes it challenging for parents to accept tongzhi, it is
arguably the very same family-kinship structure that could possibly be used—rather than
conceptual arguments and discussions—to accept tongzhi relationships as part of the
family.
Furthermore, tongzhi can turn to other people and communities outside of their
family to create a fictive kinship group. Andrew Wong and Qing Zhang (2001) examine
the use of Chinese kinship terms in their analysis of how readers and producers of the
tongzhi magazine G&L draw on linguistic resources to construct a collective tongzhi
identity. The authors discuss an advice column in which letters are addressed to “Auntie
Bear” (Xiong Dama)—portrayed as an old lady who has been through the ups and downs
of life and can provide advice, sympathy, and even ridicule; “expressing intimacy that
one typically experiences from an old, loving and caring auntie” (Wong and Zhang 2001,
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270). Dama literally means “elder mother”, and is a kinship term referring to the wife of
the father’s elder brother (i.e. “aunt”) (269). Wong and Zhang write that G&L Magazine
readers actively participate in the construction of the symbolic family through the use of
pen names that portray themselves as junior members of the family (270). More than half
the pen names they examined used either the structure of [adjective +] Xiao (little) + first
name (i.e. Xiao Ru, Little Ru), or [adjective +] reduplication of a single-character first
name—a structure usually used in nicknames for babies or young children (i.e. Haoqi
Baobao, Curious Precious) (41). The authors argue that through the use of this linguistic
resource, the magazine provides readers with an emotional shelter (41-2). “Members of
this symbolic family can count on each other when faced with relationship problems,
painful experiences in the process of coming out, and rejection of their blood family
when they acknowledge their same-sex desire” (42).
3.3.1 Fictive Kinship at Brilliant Light Temple: Symbolic Fathers
These kinds of fictive kin relations have been formed at Brilliant Light Temple,
between members, disciples and Master Lu, and between members and deities. Evan told
me that he has gone through the ritual process of becoming an “adopted son” (yizi) of the
Rabbit God (Tu’er Shen). Evan, who had been bringing many offerings of chocolate and
flowers to the Rabbit God, was one day asked by Master Lu if he wanted to become an
adopted son of the deity. Evan felt that the Rabbit God had been looking after him very
well, and felt that the temple could become another home for him. So he agreed, and,
with Master Lu’s guidance, Evan tossed divination blocks (jiaobei) to ask if the Rabbit
God would accept him as an adopted son. Evan received three successive positive
answers, which meant that the god agreed to accept him. Evan said that his dating life has
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improved since he became an adopted son of the deity. Previously, he told me, he usually
met ‘players’ and other men who weren’t very good to him. He says that since becoming
an adopted son of the Rabbit God, he has met men who treat him better, and that rather
than chasing after other men, they are attracted to him and are coming to him. He said
that even though it has not worked out with some of these men, who he felt strongly for,
Evan could tell that the Rabbit God had a hand in his relationships and was helping to
control those who came into his life.
Through the means of religious ritual, Evan has obtained a new, symbolic father
(the Rabbit God), following rejection from his own parents. Evan is devoted to his
adoptive father. He proudly displays his status on social media with the words ‘adopted
son of the Rabbit God’ (Tuye yizi; ‘Uncle Rabbit God’s adopted son) on his Facebook
page. In both our initial and follow-up interview he wore an amulet around his neck that
represents the Rabbit God, and said he has been wearing it for over 10 years. With this
amulet, his adoptive father is always with him, guiding his relationships. He said that to
him, the relationship he has with the Rabbit God is just like one between a biological
father and son. He feels protected and cared for by the Rabbit God. While his own father
may not regard him as being filial, Evan is being filial to his spiritual father.
People of all genders can be adopted by the Rabbit God: Lloyd said that the
Rabbit God currently has two adopted daughters who are female tongzhi; one is in
Kaohsiung and the other lives in Australia. Some at the temple are disciples of Master
Lu, but not adopted sons and daughters of the Rabbit God. Lloyd explained that if one
becomes a disciple of Master Lu first, then—since they are given protection and
assistance through that relationship—they cannot become adopted children of gods.
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Others, like Evan, become an ‘adopted child’ of a god, and then later choose to also
become a disciple. So it appears that the process only goes one way (if one is an adopted
child of a god, they can also be a disciple, but if one is already a disciple one cannot
become an adopted child). Through their devotion and worship, these adopted children
are being filial to their symbolic, spiritual parents.
Disciples also demonstrate obedience and reverence to Master Lu, who they
address as shifu, or “apprenticeship father”. Lloyd said that shifu implies a father-child
relationship. In Adeline Herrou’s ethnography of a small Daoist temple in Shaanxi,
China, she notes that the monastics used a range of kinship terms to refer to each other,
including “apprenticeship father” (for disciples to address their master) and terms like
elder brother, younger brother, uncle, father’s younger brother, and so forth (2013, 2145). All of these terms have the prefix “master” or “apprenticeship” before the defining
kinship term (215). Herrou writes that the monastics adopt the forms of reverential
behavior denoted by these kinship terms: “The duties of the disciple toward his master
resemble those of the son toward his father. The monastics say that they behave with
filial piety, and treat their master with due reverence and obedience” (217). Master Lu
has also become a symbolic father for the disciples of his temple. Evan, for example,
credits Master Lu’s advice and teaching for helping him through a difficult period in his
life when he was feeling suicidal. Like the temple in Herrou’s ethnography, members of
Brilliant Light Temple also address each other as “apprenticeship brothers/siblings”
(shixiong). Members of the temple have also practiced filial piety by participating in
rituals to improve the merit of their fellow disciples’ fathers and grandfathers who have
passed away. By improving their merit (i.e. adding to the merit they earned themselves
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through their own individual actions), the temple members hoped that these deceased
men could have a more favorable rebirth. In rituals such as these, Lloyd explained, they
have a ceremony every day of the week for seven weeks (a total of 49 days).
3.3.2 Fictive Kinship at Brilliant Light Temple: A Predestined, Symbolic Family
In addition to the creation of symbolic, adoptive parents for members, those at the
temple also have formed kinship bonds with each other, which they interpret through the
belief of reincarnation. As Evan continued to face challenges with his family, he began
spending even more time at Brilliant Light Temple. He calls the temple and its members
his family (jiaren), and told me he comes to the temple to be with his ‘family’ and to feel
comforted. This symbolic family also includes some who are heterosexual, like Olivia, a
22-year-old administrative assistant who also acts as a secretary for the temple. Though
not tongzhi herself, Olivia’s reason for first coming to Brilliant Light Temple was the
same as Evan and Lloyd: heartbreak. In an interview, Olivia said a male tongzhi friend
brought her to the temple after she broke up with her boyfriend, who had returned to his
home country of France.5 She said she was feeling anxious and insecure, but quickly felt
a sense of peace during her first experience in the temple. Visiting a temple because of
relationship troubles—or for almost any personal matter—is common practice in Taiwan.
Those seeking a good relationship pray to the matchmaking Daoist god ‘The Old Man
Under the Moon’ (Yue Xia Lao Ren). Evan, the tongzhi Daoist, had tried to seek help
from The Old Man Under the Moon before coming to Brilliant Light Temple. However,
as Lloyd explained during my interview with Evan, the Rabbit God is more suitable for
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Interview over Skype on October 31, 2020. Since Olivia was roughly as proficient in
English as I am in Chinese, the interview was done in a combination of English and
Mandarin.
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helping with tongzhi relationships because the Rabbit God was tongzhi himself when he
was the human man Hu Tianbao. Master Lu told the Taipei Times that he advises tongzhi
not to go to The Old Man Under the Moon because that deity may be confused by the
request and match the supplicant with someone from the opposite gender instead (Ho
2007). Likewise, this is why Olivia does not pray to the Rabbit God for her relationship
woes, but will instead pray to Mr. Sanshan Jiuhou, the other primary god at Brilliant
Light Temple.
Like Evan, Olivia said she experienced “miracles” in various aspects of her
personal life after visiting Brilliant Light Temple and praying to the gods in the temple.
Olivia told me the value of her stock investments increased, and also her ex-boyfriend
came back to Taiwan and they rekindled their relationship (and a few months after our
interview they got engaged). Lloyd, who said that he was more skeptical than Evan and
Olivia and took longer (a full year) before fully committing to being a disciple, also said
that miraculous happenings in both his professional and personal life finally convinced
him to become a Daoist. For example, he was going to be very late on delivering on a
project because a device he had ordered from overseas still had to be manufactured and it
was going to take a month or two to arrive. Suddenly, another client cancelled the order
on the same part and, since that device had already been made, it was sent to Lloyd
instead and he got it only one day late. In his personal life, his dating options have
expanded: the partner who had initially caused him trouble came back into his life and
has since been very good to him, and another tongzhi friend and he have become close.
Furthermore, the (heterosexual) wedding of one of his former army colleagues has been
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delayed, and to Lloyd even that person now seems to be a potential future partner (“I
have three choices now,” he told me, laughing).
The members of Brilliant Light Temple also feel a deep connection with each
other. Their kinship ties extend beyond just those that they have formed in this life—they
interpret the bonds as having existing in previous lives before their current reincarnated
state. The Chinese term used to refer to this kind of predestined relationship is yinyuan
(chains of cause and effect, or principal and secondary causes), and, more casually,
yuanfen. Yuanfen can be translated as “predestined affinity”, “fate”, or “pre-fated bond”
(see for example Moskowitz 2001; G. Fisher, From Comrades to Bodhisattvas, 2014).
The character (yuan) in both terms refers to “karmic destiny”: causes and conditions
make up the world as we experience it, and these are often determined by actions in
previous lifetimes (Farrer 2002, 197; G. Fisher, Comrades, 2014, 85). Though the term
has religious origins, it is frequently used by both religious and non-religious people in
Taiwan and China to refer to a wide range of relationships and feelings, not just between
two people, but also between a person and a thing or place, or between a person and a
deity (G. Fisher, Comrades, 2014, 85). The monastics in Herrou’s ethnography of a
Daoist temple in Shaanxi also cited pre-fated bonds as the reason they became clergy
(saying, for example, that they felt yuanfen with their master or with the temple, or that
they did not feel yuanfen with their parents) (2013, 121). Lloyd told me the concept of
pre-fated bonds explains why some—like Evan—felt a sense of familiarity when they
first came to the temple, while others may visit once or twice and never return again (that
is, they do not have a pre-fated bond with Master Lu and others at the temple). Lloyd
even suggested in our interview that perhaps he and others at the temple have participated
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in my research project and helped me so much because they owe a debt to me from a
previous life.
Pre-fated bonds also explain why Olivia, a straight woman, has become so
involved in a temple where the majority of disciples and members are tongzhi. When I
asked Olivia what made her become a Daoist and a disciple of Master Lu, she laughed at
first. Lloyd, who was facilitating the interview, broke into the conversation and said that,
because Olivia is heterosexual, he and others at the temple did not expect that Olivia
would go on to become a disciple and play such an important role at Brilliant Light
Temple (temple secretary). “Even she doesn’t really understand how this happened,”
Lloyd said. Olivia agreed, and said the process happened “just suddenly,” and expressed
that it felt like she had found “another home.” Lloyd offered an explanation based on the
Daoist belief in reincarnation, explaining that Olivia and the rest of the temple’s staff and
members were brought together because they had already forged connections in a
previous life:
It might be a past existence, and we were together in a certain group, many
centuries ago. We now get together again because we were together already. So
the connections and the relations keep us going to be together. This is from
religious view. So when Olivia come to here, no matter, it doesn’t matter which
instances urged Olivia to come to [Brilliant Light Temple], but when she saw this
place, she felt warmth, felt familiar, but no sudden reason why, how this
happened. And the people, and the Master Lu, and the friends in this temple, she
just found another home, because her past memory urged her, encourage her to be
here.
Olivia said she agreed with Lloyd’s explanation. She told me she specifically decided to
become a disciple after hearing a lesson that Master Lu gave about Laozi, the ancient
Chinese philosopher regarded as the founder of Daoism. Olivia said that the lesson
emphasized the importance of having a teacher, and this resonated with her. Master Lu’s
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teaching—and the feeling of peace and ‘home’ that she felt at Brilliant Light Temple—
led Olivia to become a disciple and member.
This non-biological family also supports each other, even performing rituals to
help members after death. My interview with Lloyd got pushed back from winter break
until mid-January 2021, and when we connected over Skype he told me the tragic reason
why: he and the other disciples had been busy performing rituals for a disciple who had
killed herself at the end of 2020. Lloyd explained that the 25-year-old woman, who was
also tongzhi, had long battled with depression. He said they were performing rituals (for
49 days) to help her merit, because, from the Daoist point of view, a disciple who takes
their own life has violated the first of the five precepts (no killing, no stealing, no sexual
misconduct, no false speech, and no taking of intoxicants). Lloyd explained that making a
vow to follow the five precepts is one of the first acts one does after becoming a disciple.
Breaking the precepts means losing the blessings and good fortune provided by the gods.
Lloyd said that those who kill themselves may become a ghost or go to a hell until they
pay off their debt, adding that Buddhism and Daoism have similar cosmologies of
multiple heavens and hells. However, Lloyd told me, the disciples had all been
performing rituals to help this woman’s future birth. These rituals included reading
scriptures, as well as buying 150 fish from a fish market and setting them free in the
river, dedicating the accumulated merit to her. “We have done our best for her. So we
will meet again in the future, in the very, very long future. We believe so. She got an
advantage from us. So when people owe each other, so people meet,” Lloyd said. The
kinship bonds between members of the temple transcend this world and this life, when
viewed through the lens of reincarnation and pre-fated bonds.
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In Europe and North America, those who are gay, lesbian, and gender
nonconforming have also formed these kinds of familial relationships. Kath Weston’s
pioneering ethnography Families We Choose (1991) examined how gay men and lesbians
in the San Francisco Bay Area have “chosen families”, with whom they apply kinship
terminology. In this work, and in another book chapter (Weston 1995), Weston critiques
the emphasis that society and scholars have put on blood and procreation for defining a
‘real’ family. She writes that the politics of defining kinship was especially relevant in
the United States in the 1980s, when sweeping cuts in government spending of social
services resulted in the categories of “blood” and “marriage” being increasingly used to
mediate how assistance was provided (Weston 1995, 105). It also had tangible effects for
the lives of gay and lesbian people in whether or not they could take time off for a
partner’s funeral, access a partner’s health-insurance plan, have hospital visitation
privileges, as well as joint adoption and property rights (99). However, Weston also notes
that some gay men and lesbians she spoke to agreed with the view held by some that
blood ties represent the only authentic form of kinship (1991, 35-6). One Latinx woman,
for example, told Weston, “my friends can be more important than my family, but that
doesn't mean they are my family. . . . ’Cause no matter what, they are just friends—they
don’t have your blood” (36, emphasis in original). Weston writes that those who disputed
the validity of chosen families were often people “whose notions of kinship were bound
up with their own sense of racial or ethnic identity” (36).
In a more recent study of kinship practices of LGBTQ people in Poland, the
authors note that, given the particular emphasis on the heteronormative concept of family
in that country, the need to use the term ‘family’ for fictive or chosen families may be
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politically driven (Mizielińska and Stasińska, 2018). Mizielińska and Stasińska write that
Poland is a family-centered nation in which marriage is regarded as a union reserved for
heterosexual couples and legitimized by the consitution and Catholic Church (2018, 984).
Similar to the Confucian societies of China and Taiwan, in Poland society is seen as
being composed of families or family-like groups, rather than individuals (984). The
authors write that participants in their multi-methods (quantitative and qualitative) study
emphasized that their non-heterosexual unions counted as being a family, which, they
argue, may be a political strategy to gain recongition and disrupt the heteronormative
notion prevalent in the public discourse (997). The authors also argue that the participants
in their study did not build families of choice seperately from their families of origin, but
instead tried to integrate them—actively creating a space for themselves and their
partners within familial settings (990, 998). LGBTQ Poles depended on their families of
origin for material support, and were also psychologically and emotionally attached to
them (998). The authors note that some families of origin cannot cut their LGBTQ
children off because they are dependent on their support (991). Central and Eastern
Europe have familialist social policies, in which elderly or ill parents are dependent on
the care of relatives (991) (this is very similar to the situation in Taiwan, as I described in
Chapter 1). The authors note that this situation can, paradoxically, become an opportunity
for the inclusion of non-heterosexual couples among the conservative family (991). They
note as well that there is not a clear division between chosen families and families of
origin, as described by Weston (1991), for example (991).
Similarly, the division between fictive kin and families of origin is not always
distinct in Taiwan either—one ‘family’ does not necessarily trump the other. Religious
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clergy who renounce family life and form fictive kin bonds still stress that their actions
are filial and ultimately benefit their parents and other blood relatives. I will explore this
further in the following section, as well as in Chapter 4. Furthermore, given the
Confucian emphasis on family, it is a challenge for tongzhi to embrace their sexual
identity if it means leaving their families of origin (Chou 2000, 258-9). It is also why
quasi-kin categories are sometimes used to integrate a tongzhi partner into one’s family.
Despite the pressure from Evan’s parents leading him to become suicidal, he remains
dedicated to them. He said that regardless of whether or not his parents accept his
sexuality, he will still be obedient to them. “I love my parents,” he told me. When I asked
him if he thought he would get married one day (now that same-sex marriage is legal), he
said yes, but then quickly added: “But I want my family to accept and support me.” If one
can still be filial to one’s biological parents, and be accepted by them, that is desirable.
3.4 Celibate Clergy and Their Characterization as ‘Rootless Rascals’
As evident in Evan’s story described in the opening of this thesis, filial piety can
create a lot of hardship for tongzhi, who are accused of disobedience if they do not marry
heterosexually and bear children to continue the family line. I have described how
tongzhi (and non-tongzhi) members of Brilliant Light Temple have reinterpreted filial
piety through devotion and reverence to Master Lu and the Rabbit God. Master Lu
however, may have something in common with the tongzhi that visit his temple—they are
both unfilial in the traditional Confucian sense. Master Lu, unlike some Daoist priests in
Taiwan, is celibate. He told me he could not discuss anything further than that, because a
Daoist priest should personally be above worldly matters such as sexuality. By being
celibate, Master Lu is not marrying and having children of his own. As I discussed in
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Chapter 2, religious celibacy, and being outside of the Confucian norm, has at some
historical moments led to Daoist priests and Buddhists monks being depicted as deviant.
Historian Matthew Sommer, who examines legal cases focused on regulating sexuality
during the Qing dynasty, notes that male Buddhist and Daoist clergy—along with local
toughs, migrants, and single men without prospects—were regarded as “rootless rascals”
that stood outside the family-based social and moral order (2002, 68-9). In fact, Sommer
notes, the clergy were seen as the very personification of the rootless rascal and all the
dangers he represented, with both Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties (1644-1911)
making repeated efforts to regulate the way clergy behaved (71). “By taking vows of
celibacy, abstaining from marriage, and living apart from their natal families, these men
stood outside the mainstream family order in the most basic ways,” Sommer writes (71).
This tension continues to the present day. In Herrou’s ethnography of a Shaanxi
Daoist temple (which is part of a monastic Daoist tradition), those who left their families
to become clerics found it to be a painful decision (2013, 137). Herrou writes that the
men in her research struggled because they were viewed as betraying their patrilineage:
Although they think of Daoist monastics as wise and respectable and of the Daoist
way as admirable, few Chinese actually wish such a destiny for their son or
daughter. They prefer that their children take up a profession that may be less
honorable but provides better comfort in life, leaves the family organization
intact, and helps with the continuation of the group (2013, 138).
However, Herrou notes that the Daoist monastics in Shaanxi have found ways to
reinterpret filial piety. Though the clerics assert that their original parents are of no
concern to them anymore, they nevertheless suggest that the “virtuous and meritorious
acts” they perform in the course of their monastic life will benefit their parents (2013,
227). It is believed that if they can excel enough in their practice to attain immortality,
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then they will give their parents a great advantage as well (227). Therefore, the filial piety
of monastics is often called “great filial piety” (daxiao) as it connects to celestial powers
(227). It is unlike the “little filial piety” (xiaoxiao) that is limited to one’s parents (227).
Being unfilial is a major tension that tongzhi in Taiwan experience, as I discussed
above in the case of Evan, who faces pressure from his parents to get married (to a
woman) and bear children. Master Lu has taken a nontraditional life path for a young
man in Taiwan, and this may give him more understanding of the tongzhi (especially
male tongzhi, which appear to make up the majority of tongzhi devotees) who come to his
temple. He too is partaking in the fictive kin network at Brilliant Light Temple. This
tension is potentially also felt by Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei, and may relate to her
vocal support for tongzhi and same-sex marriage; an issue I explore in the next chapter
(Chapter 4).
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined how the nature of the family institution in Taiwan
makes it challenging for some tongzhi to be accepted and supported by their families.
This has been the experience of Evan, one of the members of Brilliant Light Temple. I
have argued that he and other members of the temple have formed kinship bonds, which
they interpret through the lens of reincarnation—members and the temple priest may
have all met in a previous life. Members of the temple have also become adopted sons
and daughters of deities at the temple. Since they are not filial to their biological families
in the traditional sense, I argued that they are being filial through their religious practices
and devotion. This mirrors the practices of celibate clergy in Taiwan, who have long been
considered unfilial in the Confucian sense, and have been chastised by society because of
it. In the following chapter I will continue this discussion, focusing on a Buddhist nun
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who has personally been acute to some of the stigma surrounding celibate clergy in
Taiwan.
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Chapter 4
The ‘God of War’ and her Fierce Words: Buddhist Nun Shih Chao
Hwei’s Support of Tongzhi Rights
“In this spring of my life, despite the tears shed by my parents, I shaved my head, put on
robes, renounced my home, and became a homeless monk”
Siddhartha Gautama Buddha (Majjhima-nikāya, I, 163)
On November 24, 2016, roughly two and a half years before same-sex marriage
was legalized in Taiwan, Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei spoke at a public hearing on the
issue. In this hearing, organized by Taiwan’s legislature, Shih gave an impassioned
speech in support of same-sex marriage, and in the following days media reported her
statements and other Taiwanese religious leaders gathered to refute her statements (UP
Media 2016a, 2016b). One Buddhist leader stated that Shih does “not represent the
Buddhist community” (UP Media 2016b). This was not the first time that Shih was
outspoken on social issues, and neither was it the first time her statements proved to be
controversial with the Buddhist establishment. Independent, feminist scholar-nun Shih
has taken an activist approach to a wide range of social issues, arguing against nuclear
energy and hunting, and arguing for increased animal rights and improved measures for
environmental protection. She received worldwide media attention when she officiated a
wedding for a Buddhist lesbian couple in Taiwan in 2012. Her activism and candor on
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these issues differs from the approach taken by other monastics in Taiwan, such as Cheng
Yen, the famed leader of the Tzu Chi Foundation (W. Cheng 2017; DeVido 2010).1

Figure 4.1 Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei.
Photo courtesy Shih Chao Hwei.
This chapter will examine the argumentative strategies Shih deployed to support
same-sex marriage in the speech she gave to the Taiwanese legislature, by focusing on
four statements that were quoted by media outlets and discussed online by people in
Taiwan and in Hong Kong. In these excerpts, Shih questions the nature of family, as well
1

Both Cheng Yen and Shih Chao Hwei were influenced by the teachings of Buddhist
modernizer Yinshun, and both belong to the tradition of Humanistic or socially engaged
Buddhism. Lee and Han (2016) argue that Cheng Yen embodies the compassionate
mother ideal, whereas Shih embodies the moral activist.
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as the core concept of filial piety, which expects people to marry and bear children. Shih
poses questions to her opponents to force them to address the illogical reasoning they are
using, portrays her opponents negatively, and also deploys repetition and rapid pacing to
emphasize her points. In the final section of this chapter I will explore how Shih’s
critiques of family are connected to how Buddhist monks and nuns have themselves been
criticized by society for being unfilial. I argue that Buddhists like Shih have negotiated
and reinterpreted family expectations to be more inclusive and cosmopolitan, and that
this is something tongzhi have done as well. In this last section, I draw from a semistructured interview I did with Shih. Shih has earned significant fame because of her
support for issues like same-sex marriage, as well as attracted controversy, when, for
example, at an academic conference in 2001 she publicly ripped up a copy of the “Eight
Special Rules” that uphold the subordination of nuns to monks (for example that even a
very senior nun has to bow to a novice monk) (DeVido 2010, 107; Lee and Han 2016,
67-9). She has a large following on Facebook, with hundreds of people commenting
every time she posts. Since she also works as a professor and is a prolific writer, she is
busy and in high demand—which is perhaps why it was only after several months of
reaching out to her that we were eventually able to set up an interview. Since this was my
final interview, and I had already written Chapter 3, many of my questions were focused
on the connections between tongzhi experiences and family expectations. I also indicate
below when I directly asked about some of these issues.
4.1 Shih Chao Hwei and her Humanistic Buddhist Activism
Shih, 64, is the founder of the Hongshi Buddhist Institute (a Buddhist monastery
and college in Taoyuan), as well as a professor in the Department of Religious Studies
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and Cultural Studies at Hsuan Chuang University. Shih’s family is from Guangdong
province, and they fled to Burma during the rise of communism in China (Lieblich 2020).
Shih was born in Yangon, Myanmar in 1957, and then moved to Taiwan with her family
in 1965. While studying Chinese literature at National Taiwan Normal University, she
attended a summer camp designed to attract students to Mahāyāna Buddhism, and
decided to become a nun (Lieblich 2020).2 She studied Buddhism under the mentorship
of famous Chinese monk Yinshun (1906-2005), who, along with other monks, came to
Taiwan after the defeat of the Nationalist government in China in 1949 (DeVido 2010,
14-5, 102). Yinshun and his mentor Taixu are considered to be the major reformers of
20th-century Chinese Buddhism, arguing that one taking the bodhisattva path (see
footnote) should undertake efforts to benefit humanity, and advocating for serving society
in order to create a Pure Land on earth (99). Shih was influenced by these ideas, and
became a tireless worker for a number of social causes. She and her colleagues at the
Hongshi Buddhist Institute (which she founded in 1998) have published many works on
Buddhist ethics with regard to issues such as abortion, stem cell research, euthanasia,
suicide, the death penalty, organ transplants, animal and environmental rights, and
indigenous Taiwanese hunting practices (102-3). However, Elise Anne DeVido points out
that, unlike some of the other monastics in the tradition of ‘Engaged’ or ‘Humanistic
Buddhism’ (renjian fojiao), Shih is a radical activist and feminist and one of the only
2

Mahāyāna Buddhism is the dominant form of Buddhism in Taiwan (and East Asia
generally). Mahāyāna, which means ‘Great Vehicle’, is one of two main branches of
Buddhism, the other being Theravāda (the oldest existing school, which is practiced in
Thailand and other parts of Southeast Asia). Unlike the Theravāda tradition, Mahāyāna
generally holds that pursuing only individual release from suffering (i.e. nirvana) is an
inferior aspiration; instead the superior path is that of the bodhisattva. The bodhisattva
could reach nirvana, but chooses to remain in the cycle of death and rebirth to liberate all
sentient beings from this same cycle (Mitchell 2008).
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monastics who is willing to engage in issues that are political (103). Shih claims her
views cannot be categorized as either “left” or “right” (Chen and Chen 2018). She
believes that Buddhists should be concerned with politics—and work to raise the public’s
consciousness on issues and lobby to change laws if necessary—but they should not
become directly involved with the political administration or run for office (DeVido
2010, 105). Shih has long supported tongzhi rights, including through writing about
tongzhi rights and the issue of same-sex marriage over the years in her Institute’s
bimonthly magazine Hongshi Newsletter (Hongshi Tongxun)—with issues fully or
partially devoted to the subject in 2019, 2018, 2016, 2012 and 2006. Shih’s support for
tongzhi rights comes from her view of Buddhist compassion. She argues that the central
theme of Buddhist doctrine is that all beings should be able to abandon suffering and
obtain happiness (Shih 2016). Therefore, it is wrong for society to discriminate against
tongzhi people, and equal marriage rights can grant happiness and less suffering.
Hsiao-Lan Hu (2016) and Chengpang Lee and Ling Han (2016) have discussed
Shih’s support for tongzhi rights, through some of her writings as well as her officiating a
Buddhist lesbian wedding in 2012, but neither work has examined her more recent
support for equal marriage rights. None of these sources focuses closely on Shih’s verbal
discourses, nor employs a pragmatic analysis. It is important to examine her speech at the
legislature hearing because this event represents one of Shih’s most prominent and
political acts of support for equal marriage rights, and because it was an event that was
extensively covered in the media. Since Shih often speaks out publicly on a range of
social issues, it is important that attention is given to her verbal discourse—specifically
how she constructs her arguments.
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4.2. Background and Methods
I will be looking at the speech Shih Chao Hwei gave on November 24, 2016, at a
public hearing to discuss same-sex marriage, organized by the Legislative Yuan
(Taiwan’s legislature). I have selected four points that she makes over the course of her
speech, which was just over 8 minutes in length. I have chosen these four examples
because they were quoted in media in Taiwan (UP Media 2016a) and Hong Kong (Chen
and Chen 2018; Stand News 2017). Two of these articles—in UP Media and Stand
News—published parts of all four examples I am using. The article that appeared in Stand
News (a Hong Kong independent, not-for-profit online news website), was about Shih’s
attendance at an event in Hong Kong on January 22, 2017 in which she spoke to local
tongzhi organizations. To give the reader background on Shih, this feature article
discussed Shih’s speech at the legislative hearing (which would have been just a few
months prior) and described the words of her speech as powerful and impressive
(kengqiang) (Stand News 2017). It was at this point in the article that parts of each of the
four examples I have using were highlighted in the article in a grey text box that stood
out from the rest of the text (see figure 4.2 on next page).3 The four excerpts I have
chosen touch on a range of themes. One of the excerpts downplays the supposed
differences between heterosexual and non-heterosexual (tongzhi) individuals. Two of the
excerpts call into question hegemonic, heteronormative ideas of what constitutes a
family. The remaining excerpt relates to the fear of the prevalence of homosexuality
increasing once same-sex marriage is allowed.

3

My examples are longer than the ones used in the Stand News article, because they
include some of the sentences spoken by Shih before the ones reproduced in the article.
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Figure 4.2: Screenshot of Stand News article, with grey text box
between main text of article and YouTube video of Shih's speech.
I have produced a line-by-line transcription based on video of Shih’s speech
(Yvon Lin 2016), which I also compared with a transcription that was made by a student
organization and published in Hongshi Institute’s magazine (Shih 2016). The
organization’s transcriptions edited out some repetitive words and phrases in Shih’s
speech, but I included those in my transcription. My transcription also captures Shih’s
pauses as well as other elements of her delivery.4 The translation is my own, with some
reference to an English translation in the Taiwan Gazette (Chen and Chen 2018). The left
side is the English translation, and the right side is the Chinese written out using pinyin
(the traditional characters can be found in Appendix B). I have followed sociolinguistic
4

The four examples are spread out over the course of Shih’s speech (of 8 minutes and 14
seconds). Because I did not transcribe the entire speech the line numbers continue from
one example into the other, but this is not to suggest that these separate examples were
spoken right after each other, as they were not. They were however spoken temporally in
this order.
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conventions (see Chun 2001 for example) in my transcription, as well as taken the liberty
of underlining words to indicate which parts of Shih’s speech were quoted in media.
These are the conventions I use:
((comment))
bold
(number)
CAPITALS
underline

transcriber’s description of speech quality
emphasis signaled by increased pitch or amplitude
seconds of silence, for a pause
increased volume
parts of excerpts quoted in other media

4.3 Analysis
This first example occurs in Shih’s speech after she had been speaking at some
length about her interpretation of Buddhism as it relates to non-heterosexual relationships
and ethics. She also specifically mentions how Christian leaders and organizations that
are against same-sex marriage have used the concept of family values to try and sway
public opinion, because, as Shih argues, if they had used Christian reasoning it would not
have resonated with the larger (predominantly non-Christian) public. Ke-hsien Huang
(2017) argues that the organizations and NGOs that publicly rallied against same-sex
marriage in Taiwan learned to downplay their Christian identity and instead use the
secular rhetoric deployed by the global Christian Right campaign against gay rights
movements. Specifically, he writes, these groups focused on “advocating the positive
values of protecting family institutions and caring first for children, rather than the
negative approach of opposing gay rights, which may be condemned as discriminatory”
(122). Huang also argues that Christian leaders were behind the formation of a group
called the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family (Taiwan zongjiao
tuanti aihu jiating dalianmeng), which consisted of leaders representing Buddhism, the
Unity/Yiguandao sect and the Chinese Confucian-Mencius Association (123-4). The
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spokesperson from this group said in a press conference in 2014 that same-sex marriage
would destroy Chinese traditional culture, eliminate filial piety, as well as collapse the
order of human relations (124). It is this notion of family values that Shih is arguing
against in the first excerpt.
4.3.1 Example 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

To say it honestly and bluntly
the value of family has never been
absolute
the value of family has never been
absolute
I must say it again
in other words
whether in Europe or
in
in
India
from an early time there have been
many of what are called homeless
people
and they have created the most
glorious civilizations in human society
And
These individuals did not necessarily
have a position in a family
including the Buddha among them
and including many wandering
monks.
Therefore
for you to continuously require that
everyone enter the family

17 based on this single value that is also
defined by you
18 this is actually
19 I really feel it is a bit obsessivecompulsive

103

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Na laoshi bu keqi de shuo
jia de jiazhi xianglai jiu bushi
wuxian shang gang
jia de jiazhí xianglai jiu bushi
wuxian shang gang
wo bixu yao zai zheyang shuo
ye jiushi shuo
zai ouzhou ye hao,
zai
zai
yindu ye hao
zao jiu yijing you xuduo suowei de
homeless ((Shih uses the English
word here))
erqie tamen chuangzaole renlei
shehui zui canlan de wenming,
Name
zhexie ren bujian deyi jia wei
gangwei baokuole fotuo zai nei

14 baokuole xuduo de you fang seng
15 Name yinci ne
16 Yi danyi de jiazhi zai yaoqiu suoyou
de ren dou shi yao jinru dao zhege
jia
17 erqie zhege jia haishi yao you ni lai
dingyi de
18 na zhege qishi shi
19 wo zhen de juede youdian qiangpo
zheng

In this example Shih uses Buddhism to critique a widespread conception of family. She
argues that the idea of what constitutes a family has never been absolute, and repeats this
statement twice (lines 2-3), stating she must “say it again” (4), describing what she is
doing to emphasis her point. She increases her pitch in lines 15-16, to address and mock a
distal ‘you’ of the ‘family values’ groups mentioned above. Her increased pitch also
signifies her displeasure at those who “continuously” promote a narrow view of the
family—a perspective she describes as “obsessive-compulsive” (line 19). This is one
construal of a pathological and parochial personhood limited to thinking only of a narrow
notion of family, which she immediately contrasts with individuals from around the globe
who chose alternative paths to the benefit of entire societies and not just a single family.
Specifically, she uses the example of the Buddha as well as wandering monks to illustrate
how people who have renounced family life have made great achievements. In many
ways Buddhism is seemingly incompatible with Confucian notions of filial piety, which
dominate Taiwan to this day. However, filial piety can be reinterpreted, argues Simon
Scott, an anthropologist who researches Taiwan (2004). In his discussion of gay men and
filial piety, Scott argues that many celibate Buddhist monks and nuns emphasize that
their Buddhist practices (such as chanting and other rituals to help their dead ancestors
enter the Pure Land) are filial, even when they reject marriage and rearing children (73). I
will explore this Buddhist interpretation of filial piety in more detail in the last section of
this chapter. Finally, the Stand News and UP Media only quoted the last part of this
excerpt (see underlined); arguably because this is where Shih accuses her opponents of
being “obsessive-compulsive” (line 19). The use of this description is another example of
how Shih sets up contrasting and dueling figures of personhood: one may be filial in the
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narrow traditional sense, but adhering to such a limited view borders on the pathological,
she argues. Instead, the alternate path Shih constructs for her audience is that of
admirable “homeless” individuals (line 10).
Shih’s code-switch into English with the word “homeless” may also be a socioindexical rhetorical device to display a sense of cosmopolitanism and to appeal to a wider
audience who might align in mocking the parochial narrow-minded figure disparaged
above. Cosmopolitanism can be understood as the appreciation of ideas, things, and
beings “from many places”, as well as the casting off of a parochial mindset (Tsing 2005,
121, 126). In Taiwan, English words and phrases are frequently seen in print and
television advertisements, interspersed in Mandarin pop songs, and also appear (often
with spelling and/or grammatical errors) on items such as t-shirts, sweaters, and students’
stationary cases. This use of English is often cosmopolitan.5 According to a study by JiaLing Hsu (2008), copywriters who mix English words into larger Mandarin text generally
agree that the use of English conveys the following socio-psychological effects to the
audience about the advertised product: internationalism, metropolitan orientation,
authenticity, urban experience, the trendy taste of the younger generation, and is
attention-grabbing (159). Drawing on surveys of both English-literate and illiterate
readers, Hsu argues that the use of English in advertisements is “overwhelmingly
popular” in Taiwan, even among monolingual Chinese speakers (180). For them, the use
of English words and phrases alongside Chinese words indexed themes such as
‘internationalism and standardization’ and ‘American and English culture’ (173-7). One
5

Cosmopolitanism may also explain why Evan and Lloyd of Brilliant Light Temple (see
Chapter 3) told me they like to use the English word ‘gay’ to describe their sexual
identity. They were showing themselves to be globally minded.
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copywriter Hsu interviewed (who wrote ad copy that was fragmentary, ungrammatical,
and filled with misspellings) said that it is the English form rather than the English
context that communicates to the target audience, and therefore English accuracy is
outside the concern of copywriters (161). Shih’s use of English in this speech may been
attention-grabbing—similar to how she used “obsessive-compulsive” (line 19) to
describe her opponents, and goes on to discuss combining sperm and eggs (see example
3, line 31), something her audience may not have expected a Buddhist nun to discuss.
Shih designed her speech to be quoted and disseminated in the media, which it was (as
evident in the articles I mention above). As I describe later, her speech resonated with the
media and public.
Shih’s cosmopolitan display may also have been intended to contest the global
leanings of her opponents. Scholars and observers in Taiwan have pointed out how the
conservative organizations and NGOs that fought against the legalization of same-sex
marriage were affiliated with global Christian organizations (Cole 2017; K. Huang 2017;
J. Ho 2010). As I described above, Ke-hsien Huang (2017) described how the groups
campaigning against the legalization of same-sex marriage adopted the rhetoric deployed
by the global Christian right campaign against gay rights movements. Huang argues that,
in the face of criticism, the Christian-led League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring
for Family “appealed to the West” to confirm they were on the right path (130). He writes
that they translated, edited, and spread foreign news stories that were not favorable to
LGBTQ rights, in an attempt to convince their supporters that they are truly on the side of
global progress (131). Some of the churches that campaigned against same-sex marriage
also received tactical support from anti-LGBTQ Christian organizations in the United
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States, as well as from the extreme-right group MassResistance (Cole 2017). Therefore,
in using an English word, Shih is also combatting the cosmopolitan influences of her
opponents: these quasi-Christian organizations may have global connections, but Shih
and her tradition of Taiwanese Humanistic Buddhism are also globally minded. She is
casting off any charge of parochialism (Tsing 2005, 121). Also, by not choosing a
referent for denoting homelessness in the Chinese language, she avoids the socialindexical chain of assumptions that would be connected to that referent. It is interesting
to note that Shih may not have realized the negative connotation that the word ‘homeless’
could have for native English speakers. However, like the copywriter in the study by Hsu
(2008), Shih is not concerned with English accuracy, but with being cosmopolitan—one
aspect of her multi-pronged strategy to combat her opponents, which I will expand on in
section 4.4 of this chapter.
After this excerpt, Shih continues discussing ideas of family and tradition,
responding to some of the main themes that her opponents have used (see K. Huang
2017).
4.3.2 Example 2
20 In all of Taiwan
21 because of alarmist talk many people
have been swept up as a consequence
22 for example saying that if you have
same-sex marriage then heterosexual
people will become homosexual
23 so WILL YOU?
24 if you aren’t why are you worrying?
25 Crazy
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20 Quan taiwan
21 bian de yinwei weiyansongting
henduo ren bei juan jin dao zhege
gong ye (2)
22 Piru shuo ni ruguo youle tongzhi
hunyin yixing lian zhe jiu hui
biancheng tongxinglian
23 na NI HUI MA?
24 ni bu hui ni weisheme danxin ni?
25 qiguai

Here Shih dismisses the fear that same-sex marriage will lead to more people becoming
homosexual. This dismissal is pragmatically packaged in the metalanguage of “alarmist
talk” (line 21), which is construed as illogical and irrational, yet nonetheless powerful as
it draws other people into that mindset. In line 23, she raises her voice to emphatically
ask, “Will you (turn gay)?” This is a response to groups like the one mentioned above
(the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family), which stated that samesex marriage would collapse the order of human relations (K. Huang 2017, 124).
Here too Shih addresses her opponents who say society will collapse (through the
legalization of same-sex marriage), by arguing that throughout time marriage hasn’t
always consisted of one man and woman. In previous eras, men in China could have
many wives, she said in her speech just prior to this excerpt, adding that the concept of
family is not a fixed, stable construct (and in previous times in Chinese history, same-sex
love was also widely accepted; a topic I explored in Chapter 2). Attitudes to same-sex
love have long been linked to fears of imperial decline, as Jeffrey Weeks writes in his
examination of sexual life in Britain from the 1800s to the present (Weeks 2012, 133). In
this framework, the family is seen as being vitally important to the security of the nation.
This is not unlike much of the scholarly discourse in China on sexuality and same-sex
love in particular at the dawn of the 20th century, in which same-sex love came to be
viewed as a threat to heterosexual marriage and the cause of a weak nation (see Chapter
2). Shih’s opponents draw on a heteronormative notion of family as the base of society,
while same-sex love is seen as threatening the structure of society itself.
This, again, is all framed by Shih as ‘alarmist talk.’ Her emphatic question in line
23 provides a pragmatic bookend to contain its further spread while also pointing out the
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flawed thinking in her opponents. Shih quickly moves on to ask her detractors why they
are worrying. “Crazy” (line 25) is her evaluation of the typified persona responsible for
the alarmist talk, and is quickly spoken (before Shih moves on in her speech, without
missing a beat). Once again, it is the last part of this excerpt (see underlined) that Stand
News and UP Media quoted. Both these lines involve the construction of a
characterological personhood that is illogical and parochial, in contrast to the logical and
cosmopolitan Shih. I will revisit Shih’s use of figure producing language in section 4.4.
Shih continues in her speech and quotes someone else who discusses how
children leave their parents when they grow up, and start families of their own.
4.3.3 Example 3
26 So
27 if it is said that family must ((rapid
speech))
28 be regulated so that its existence is to
serve the purpose of producing the
next generation
((rapid speech))
29 in that case may I ask, are people
who are infertile also swept aside by
you? ((rapid speech))
30 The family has many, many
functions, please everyone, don't
think it’s all just for ((rapid speech))

26
27

31 combining a sperm and an egg okay?

31

28

29
30

Yushi ne
ruguo shuo yiding yao ba jia ((rapid
speech))
guifan wei zhishi weile yunyu xia
yidai er cunzai ((rapid speech))
name wo qingwen, bu yun zheng de
ren shi bushi ye bei ni sao daole?
((rapid speech))
jiating de gongneng feichang
feichang de duo, qing gewei buyao
renwei dou shi weile ((rapid
speech))
jingzi gen luanzi de jiehe hao ma?

Here Shih, who spoke fairly rapidly throughout her speech, spoke at an even faster rate, a
verbal crescendo to signal that she was nearing the end of her speech and was making her
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final concluding points.6 As in example 1, she critiques her opponents’ narrow views of
‘family’; in this instance, discussing the purpose of family. The underlined section (lines
30-1) are those quoted by Stand News, UP Media and the Taiwan Gazette. Shih contests
the assumption that procreation (and having progeny, another important Confucian
belief) is the only function of family. In the Taiwan Gazette (Chen and Chen 2018), the
writers highlight this quote as an example of how Shih shocked the audience at the public
hearing.7 As seen in excerpts 1 and 3, Shih may be personally acute to the stigma about
nonconformity to hegemonic ideas of family because, as a celibate monastic, she has not
married and is going against (or, reinterpreting) Confucian notions of filial piety. I will
explore this further in the final section of this chapter.
Next, as Shih reaches the conclusion of her speech, she discusses stereotypes of
tongzhi.
4.3.4 Example 4
32 Just now I once again heard the
absurd statement that said ((rapid fire
speech))
33 you tongzhi often change sexual
partners ((rapid speech))
34 Hello ((rapid speech))
35 Isn’t it that because he doesn't want
to change sexual partners often that
he wants
((rapid speech))
36 wants
37 wants
38 to get married? ((softer voice))

32
33
34
35

36
37
38

6

Gangcai wo you tingdao yige hen
huangmiu de xiaoxi shuo ((rapid fire
speech))
nimen tongzhi jingchang huan xing
banlü ((rapid speech))
wei ((rapid speech))
ta bu jiushi yin wei buxiang yao
jingchang huan xing banlü suoyi yao
((rapid speech))
yao
yao
jiehun ma? ((softer voice))

After having interviewed Shih myself, and I can say that she was speaking particularly
fast during her speech (compared to her normal speed of conversing); she was clearly
impassioned.
7
The video I was using was only focused on Shih the whole time, so I was unable to see
expressions on the faces of audience members, and could not make out any audible sound
from them either.
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39 Why should one not help them
achieve this?
40 Furthermore
41 there are also many people of the
opposite sex who often change sexual
partners you know?
42 therefore should we order that
heterosexuals not be permitted to
marry?
43 I think before we speak of these
things
44 shouldn’t our logical reasoning be
rearranged some?

39
40
41

na weishenme bu you chengrenzhimei
ne?
erqie
yixing yeyou henduo ren jingchang
huan xing banlü ma

42

yinci you jiao yixinglianzhe bu zhun
jiehun ma?

43

wo juede women shi bushi zai jiang
zhexie shiqing yiqian
women de luojj sikao shi bushi keyi
zai chongxin zhengli yixia?

44

In this excerpt Shih again speaks very quickly, but then slows down as she seemingly
stutters over the word yao (to want, to wish/desire), getting quiet when she asks the
question about getting married (line 38). Here she questions the logic of her opponents
(and the underlined portion is that which was quoted in Stand Times and UP Media), and
calls for their logical reasoning to be rearranged (line 44). The logic Shih uses both points
out the flawed thinking of her opponents, but also possibly indicates some of her own
moral values. Her argument presupposes the following: 1) Changing sexual partners often
is immoral; and 2) Marriage encourages moral behavior (because it means committing to
one partner and not frequently changing partners). Therefore her implicatures are that 1)
Tongzhi are not immoral, for they want to marry, and because they are not the only ones
frequently changing partners—some heterosexual people do this as well. 2) Those who
want to prevent tongzhi from marrying are being illogical, because they are accusing
tongzhi of immortality while not supporting tongzhi’s desired moral lifestyle.
When interviewing Shih, she did not seem concerned with the morality of
marriage, so I believe she was instead trying to get her opponents to question their own
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assumptions and logic (and perhaps even trying to find common ground with them).8
Shih told me that Buddhism does not make any moral judgments on same-sex love. Like
she stated at the beginning of the speech examined in this chapter, Shih told me as well
that Buddhism sees desire as being instinctual and not wrong as long as it doesn’t hurt
others. Also, there is no difference between heterosexual or homosexual desire. However,
Shih said, excessive desire can lead to suffering (this is the second of the four noble
truths taught by the Buddha). She said that Buddhism believes desire can eventually
make one numb to what one experiences, and lead one to seek out more stimulation or
variety—and that this can happen for both straight and tongzhi couples. Therefore,
marriage can be a way to control desire, but it is not the only way, Shih said. However,
she added, “if we have marriage for heterosexual people, why not have it for tongzhi as
well?” Shih’s promotion of marriage is not based on moral principle, but on the Buddhist
idea of compassion—compassion to ease the suffering (caused by excessive desire) that
others experience. I will explore this notion of compassion later in this chapter.
Shih told me that while the anti-tongzhi groups argued that tongzhi are more
promiscuous than those who are straight, she sees no evidence to support that. She said
that tongzhi who are not committed in their relationships are acting this way because of
larger systemic discrimination and lack of societal support. Anthropologist Tiantian
Zheng’s ethnography of tongzhi men in Dalian, China, describes how social stigma, the
threat of police raids, and the secretive nature of same-sex relationships has led many
men to engage in risky sexual practices (Zheng 2015). Zheng writes that in order to
survive in society many of these tongzhi lead a double life, having wives or girlfriends
8

Interview on February 12, 2021.
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while also seeking out random sexual encounters to temporarily satisfy their needs (2015,
167). While some did form romantic relationships, social and cultural pressures usually
made these unions hard to sustain (167). As a result, tongzhi men engaged in
underground, risky behaviors in places such as bathhouses, or public parks and toilets—
where they were so frightened by possible police patrols that they were in too much of a
hurry to put on condoms (167). Shih told me that the anti-tongzhi groups (which she also
said were mostly Christian organizations) were being hypocritical, because if they think
tongzhi are promiscuous then they should allow them to get married (the same argument
she made above in example 4). She said that the opinion that some Christian churches
have that tongzhi should stop their desire for people of the same gender does not make
sense (from the perspective of Buddhism in which desire is instinctual) because these
Christians wouldn’t be able to switch off their heterosexual desires either. For Shih,
Christians’ lack of support for same-sex marriage is completely illogical. Shih believes
that having support from society and government—namely in terms of same-sex
marriage—can cause less suffering for tongzhi, which is why she has made active efforts
to support it.
4.4 Argumentative Strategies to Question ‘Family’
In the excerpts I examined, Shih questions heteronormative ideas of what
constitutes a family, and what the function of the family is. She does this in part by
portraying her opponents as illogical through metapragmatic display. In his ethnography
of Navajo poetry, linguistic anthropologist Anthony K. Webster examines the reportive
metapragmatic devices used in a short story about boarding school experiences by Navajo
poet Laura Tohe (Webster 2015). Webster argues that Tohe creates a contrast in the story
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“So I Blow Smoke in Her Face” between the metapragmatic terms ‘tell’ on one hand, and
‘tease’ and ‘joke’ on the other (2015, 44). He writes that her use of the verb ‘tell’
functions as a directive or monologic critique: for example, the narrator (a Navajo girl)
‘tells’ two Chicano boys to drop her and her cousin off, stating that they are government
property (45, 48). The use of the verbs ‘tease’ and ‘joke’ however, create a mark of social
intimacy between Navajos, Webster argues (45). He writes that metapragmatic forms can
aid in the construction of characterological images—one recognizes characters as playful
or serious by the metapragmatic terms used for them (for example, ‘jokes’ versus
‘explains’) (41). Through her use of metapragmatic forms, “Tohe constructs an image of
the boarding school as a place where Navajos are silenced and humiliated, but also a
place where at times they assert their own voices and challenge the boarding-school
regimes,” Webster argues (44). Similarly, Shih also uses terms to create patterns of
affective social relations—specifically describing her opponents negatively through the
use of meta-cognitive construals. Those who obsess over family are being “obsessivecompulsive” (line 19); those who worry about increased rates of homosexuality are
“crazy” (line 25). She is responding to those who are contributing to the “alarmist talk”
(line 21) spreading around Taiwan, from people who make “absurd statement[s]” (line
32) such as the claim that tongzhi frequently change sexual partners. In this speech Shih
is directly addressing the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family and
others who subscribe to a heterosexual, Confucian idea of ‘family’—that family is
between a man and a woman, and involves giving birth biologically to a child. Shih uses
metapragmatic strategies to place all those who agree with this narrow conception of
family into a faction and personhood she decries as illogical. Included in this faction—
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holding the same views about family—are potentially some of the legislators listening to
her speech, as well as some members of the public (either attending the speech in-person
or hearing/reading it through media transmission). This ‘illogical’ faction is referred to
with the second-person pronoun “you” (lines 16, 17, 24, 29). However, if members of
this faction were to think before speaking (line 43) and rearrange their logical reasoning
(line 44), they could become part of the collective “we” that, like Shih, is logical and
ethical.
Furthermore, by paraphrasing some of the things her opponents have said (rates of
homosexuality will increase; family’s purpose is producing the next generation; tongzhi
rapidly change partners) and then stepping into direct address (i.e. line 23 “So will
you?”), Shih puts their logic on display and invites those who hear or read her speech to
decide their next step—more specifically, their footing vis-à-vis these discursively
figured political positions (Goffman 1981). In the essay “Footing,” Erving Goffman
(1981) introduces his concept of the same name by examining a newspaper article
describing an interaction between Nixon (the U.S. president at the time) and female
White House journalist Helen Thomas in which the president comments on Thomas’
wearing of slacks (124-5). Goffman writes that through the president’s comments,
Thomas was forced from her occupational capacity into a “sexual, domestic one,” and
argues that underlying this incident is the assumption that a woman must always be ready
to change ground, or have the ground changed for her (125). For Goffman, this is an
example of a change in footing, “the alignment we take up to ourselves and others present
as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of an utterance” (128). In
his essay Goffman also defines three different aspects of the speaker: the author (who has
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selected the sentiments and words expressing them), the principal (person responsible for
the message), and the animator—the “individual active in the role of utterance
production” (144). Shih animates the words of her opponents, and then characterizes
them as illogical both through metapragmatic display and through her use of direct
address, asking questions to point out her opponents’ illogical thinking. By doing so, she
also invites her audience (legislators and the general public) to decide whether they want
to be irrational like her opponents or follow her footing and take her rational, progressive,
globally minded path that recognizes tongzhi rights.
Shih also uses other strategies. She appears to question the rigidity of her
opponent’s heterosexuality (lines 23-4). Her use of questioning (lines 23, 31, 38, 42, 44)
forces her opponents to confront themselves and the arguments and assumptions they are
making. In line 31, her question to her opponents to consider the role of families going
beyond just combining eggs and sperm ends with “okay?” (ma). In the final excerpt she
uses wei (a question word akin to “hello”) with emphasis when bringing up (and
subsequently dismissing) the argument that tongzhi are promiscuous. These phatic forms
(Jakobson 1960, 355-6) are part of her strategy of questioning; they serve to direct and
focus attention as well as underline her points. Another poetic technique she uses to
emphasize her argument is repetition. As stated previously, she deliberately repeats her
claim that “the value of family has never been absolute” (lines 3-4). In the other excerpt
(example 3) dealing with family, she states that the family has “many, many functions”
(line 30). Shih draws on a variety of ideas and issues—Buddhas and traveling monks,
sexual partners and marriage, egg and sperm, infertility—to argue for a broader definition
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of family and to downplay the differences between heterosexual and non-heterosexual
people. I will return to this rethinking of the family in the final section of this chapter.
Ultimately, these pragmatic-poetic strategies, often exploited in political speech,
seem to have resonated with the media and the public. The excerpts I have chosen were
quoted in both Taiwanese and Hong Kong media, and, according to Stand News, were
widely discussed by netizens in the Chinese-speaking world (Stand News 2017). These
same netizens nicknamed Shih “the god of war” (zhanshen). UP Media (2016a) described
Shih as “fierce” in the headline and body of their article, evoking military imagery. It is
possible that the rapid-fire delivery of her speech—as she neared her conclusion—
contributed to this characterization. It is important to examine Shih’s methodology of
verbal discourse, because it is a part of her radical activism on ongoing social issues in
Taiwan. Shih takes the arguments used in anti-tongzhi discourse and exposes their logical
fallacies and limiting, hegemonic perspectives. This approach is informed by Buddhist
doctrine—both the Buddhist perspective on family and ethics, as well as the Buddhist call
to be compassionate and support all who are suffering. For Shih, this includes tongzhi.
4.5 Shih Chao Hwei, Celibate Monks and Nuns, and Filial Piety
In this section I will explain how Buddhist monks and nuns have long had to
defend their decision to leave their families, not marry, and not have children. I will
examine how Shih herself has negotiated family responsibilities. Shih also questions the
very nature of family—especially Confucian ideas and heteronormative expectations of
family—and in doing so defends both tongzhi as well as her own chosen path as a
monastic.
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Questioning her opponents’ idea of family—in which marriage serves the purpose
of bearing offspring—was a major theme in Shih’s speech. Shih may be especially acute
to the stigma attached to those who do not conform to this view of family because monks
and nuns are unfilial from a Confucian perspective. When Buddhism spread to China
from India around the first century C.E., it encountered resistance and was attacked by
the Chinese (especially by Confucian scholars) for being antithetical to filial piety, the
fundamental organizing principle of Chinese society (Chandler 2004; Hinsch 2002;
Mitchell 2008). The word used to describe becoming a monk or a nun is chujia, which
literally means to “leave home”. Buddhism stressed individual salvation and encouraged
the devout to leave their homes and become celibate, devoting their energy to religious
practice instead. Shaving one’s head was also regarded as unfilial because Confucius
believed hair was a gift from one’s parents (Hinsch 2002, 53). Monks were accused of
failing in their responsibility to care for parents, and—even worse—to produce sons to
continue the patriline (Chandler 2004, 238). Historian Bret Hinsch writes that women
were also on the front lines of this battle between native family values and imported
Buddhist ideals:
When a woman became a nun, from the traditional filial viewpoint she committed
a terrible wrong. By removing herself from family life, she would no longer be in
a position to take care of parents who became ill or destitute. She would not
provide children to carry on a prospective husband’s family line…she had
violated the fundamental principle of filial piety that held together China’s
patrilineal kinship system—a principle that Confucian rhetoric canonized as
supreme virtue. She might easily be seen as an ungrateful failure by refusing to
adhere to the expected roles of daughter, wife, and mother (Hinsch 2002, 53).
Shih Chao Hwei is very much aware of the longstanding criticism of monks and nuns for
being unfilial. She mentioned that this hostility was expressed in literary work by Han
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Yu, a Tang dynasty writer and government official, who wrote that monks and nuns are
not fully human because they do not bear children.
Stuart Chandler (2004) writes that contentious feelings towards monks and nuns
continue to this day. In his book on Buddha’s Light Mountain (Foguangshan), one of the
major Humanistic Buddhist organizations in Taiwan, Chandler writes that monastics find
Chinese New Year to be an especially difficult holiday for them, because this is normally
a time when people return home to reaffirm familial affection (Chandler 2004, 238).
Also, Chandler writes, some of the public who visit these temples during this time “either
unintentionally or sometimes even maliciously remind the clerics of their failure to fulfill
this minimal act of filial respect” (238). Chandler also writes that there is an ongoing
suspicion that Buddhist masters scheme to lure young people away from their parents.
This impression was confirmed when a monk from another major Taiwanese monastic
order tonsured 158 new disciples without their parents’ consent in September 1996, after
they had initially gone to the monastery to join a short-term retreat (238). News coverage
showed images of shocked and grieving parents flocking to the monastery to try and
retrieve their sons and daughters, and editorials condemned the pressure techniques used
to “brainwash” the young people and expressed concerns over the rising popularity of
youth in Taiwan entering monastic life (239). Chandler writes that because of incidents
such as these, the founding master of Buddha’s Light Mountain has taken pains to
emphasize that Buddhist monasticism is not contrary to filial piety (239).
Through Shih’s questioning of the hegemonic Confucian concept of family, she is
defending both Buddhist clergy like herself as well as tongzhi. In my interview with Shih
she challenged the assumptions, values, and expectations placed around ‘family’ (as she
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did in her speech), as well as the Confucian emphasis on filial piety in Taiwan’s culture.
As I described in the previous chapter, Confucian ideas have shaped the view in Chinese
culture that family (and not the individual) is the irreducible unit and the most basic
social institution (Chou 2000; Park and Chesla 2007). Buddhism is generally
individualistic. It stresses individual liberation: through meditation and other practices
one aims to break out of the cycle of rebirth and become a buddha or bodhisattva
(Mitchell 2008). Therefore when Shih questions the notion of family to defend tongzhi
against those who oppose same-sex marriage, she also defends the individualistic path of
becoming a cleric and the individualistic nature of Buddhism in general. She does this by
using the examples of Siddhartha Gautama Buddha (who she also referred to in her
speech; see example 1) and Jesus of Nazareth. Siddhartha Gautama Buddha left his wife
and son to undertake his spiritual quest, and Jesus of Nazareth did not marry or have any
children. Both wandered in their spiritual journeys and also traveled and spread their
teachings, hence Shih’s use of the English word “homeless” in her speech (line 10).
Jesus’ and the Buddha’s lives offend Confucian sensibilities, yet they are the founders of
major world religions and have positively impacted many people’s lives. Shih defends
the individualism of monks and nuns by referring to those like the Buddha and other
wandering monks who have “created the most glorious civilizations on earth” (line 11 in
excerpt 1 above). She said she specifically criticized the concept of family put forth by
groups like the League of Taiwanese Religious Groups Caring for Family because she
said they influenced a lot of Buddhist monks and nuns into thinking that same-sex
marriage was wrong. “If monks and nuns are saying that family is the only value in this
life, then aren’t you contradicting yourself?” Shih asked rhetorically during our
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interview. Since clerics also do not marry and bear children, they are also not following
traditional Chinese familial obligations—so criticizing tongzhi for failing to do so is
illogical and contradictory in Shih’s view.
The pressure of filial piety not only negatively impacts tongzhi, as I described in
Chapter 3, but also affects others who cannot fulfill the filial responsibility to bear
progeny—such as monks, nuns, and those who cannot have children because of certain
health conditions. Infertile women in both China and Taiwan describe the shame they feel
because of not being able to bear children (particularly for their in-laws), and the pressure
they experience to try infertility treatments that may not always be successful (Cheng et
al. 2018; Yao et al. 2018). In her speech, Shih questioned why her opponents also want to
“sweep aside” (line 29) these people. In our interview, Shih also mentioned heterosexual
couples and individuals who are unable to bear children as an example of those who
experience significant stress because of the expectations of filial piety. Shih spoke of
this—drawing links between infertile people, clergy, and tongzhi—when I asked if she
saw parallels between Buddhist clergy and tongzhi. I asked, given that monks, nuns, and
tongzhi are not filial in the sense of marrying (or marrying heterosexually) and bearing
children, if they face some of the same pressures and whether or not this has given her
some insight into the experiences of tongzhi. She said there are some “subtle similarities”
between them:
When a Buddhist nun announces that she does not marry, that means she does not
want to have offspring. She does not want to share the burden of continuing the
family with her partner. That is his business, not hers. As for tongzhi, without
artificial reproduction or adopting children that are not blood relatives, they also
need to cope with their parents’ demand, which is to continue the family lineage.
[…] I think we need to be reflective about why we put such emphasis on having
offspring, in Confucian ideology.
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Shih said that it is her compassion for the suffering of others that leads to her support for
tongzhi. However, her chosen path as a nun has also given her insight into the struggles
tongzhi have when they cannot be filial in the Confucian sense by providing offspring
(Chou 2000). She and other clergy have also had to fight back against Confucian
ideology.
Buddhists have long had to defend themselves against the charge that they are
unfilial, and Shih too has taken up the strategy of stating that her practice of Buddhism is
not inimical to filial piety. Some of the earliest Buddhist works in Chinese, such as the
Treatise on the Disposing of Error (Mouzi lihuo lun) of late 2nd century CE, made efforts
to refute the charge that Buddhist doctrine was unfilial (Hinsch 2002, 50). In
contemporary times, monks and nuns of Taiwan’s Buddha Light Mountain have
emphasized how they revere their parents by guiding them to appreciate and learn from
Buddhist teachings, and the monastery allows clergy to take extended leave if their
parents fall ill (Chandler 2004, 240-2). Shih also uses Buddhist framing to explain why
she would still prioritize her family. She does this through her understanding of
compassion (cibei). Compassion is a core component of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which
regards the ‘bodhisattva path’ as superior to the path in which one who becomes an arhat
(one who achieves nirvana and disappears from the cycle of rebirth at the end of their
lifetime) (Mitchell 2008). In the ‘bodhisattva path’, one perfects oneself over many eons
in order to become a Buddha, and during this time compassionately helps others gain
enlightenment (Mitchell 2008, 103-6). Humanistic Buddhism (renjian fojiao)—the
tradition to which Shih and her mentor Yinshun belong—sees the compassionate action
of the bodhisattva as providing a role model for how to solve worldly problems and
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reduce suffering (Pacey 2005). Compassion for others, which is one of the reasons Shih
supports tongzhi rights, also affects her negotiation of her familial responsibilities while
being a monastic. During the time she was still a novice nun at a small monastery in New
Taipei City, Shih’s younger sister was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and their mother
needed help finding medical care for her (Lieblich 2020). Her Buddhist master told her
she had to choose between the monastery and her family, arguing that her first
responsibility was to attain personal enlightenment. After struggling over whether to
leave her master, she decided to go (Lieblich 2020). She moved with her family to a lay
Buddhist community in southern Taiwan, and it was here that she found Master Yinshun
and continued her learning. “If you want to develop compassion for everyone, then you
start with the people that are closest with you. So, whenever my family is suffering, I will
choose my family over what I’m doing right now,” Shih told me. Shih interprets
obligations to her family through the bodhisattva notion of compassion.
Tongzhi can also reinterpret their filial obligations. As I explored in the previous
chapter, members of the Daoist Brilliant Light Temple have become adopted children of
Daoist gods, and they show filial piety through their devotion to their spiritual parents.
Temple members have also been filial through ritual action in which they’ve improved
the merit of disciples’ fathers and grandfathers who have passed away. From my
interviews, it also seemed like having a family that includes children is important to
tongzhi. Almost all the tongzhi I interviewed, as well as Daoist priest Master Lu and
Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei said that the next step in tongzhi rights in Taiwan (given
that same-sex marriage has been legalized) is making adoption easier for tongzhi couples.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I examined Shih Chao Hwei’s support for tongzhi and how she
critiques and reinterprets the concept of family and filial piety. I first made a pragmaticpoetic analysis—drawing upon techniques used in ethnographical approaches to political
speech events—of excerpts of a speech Shih gave at a public hearing in support of samesex marriage in 2016. I examined how Shih critiqued her opponents’ ideas of what
constitutes a family, and how she also questioned the Confucian notion which views
marriage as being primarily for the purpose of bearing children. I also argued that Shih
challenges and dismisses her opponents and their logic through the use of strategies such
as phatic poetic forms including repetition and rapid pacing, rhetorical questions using
constructed dialogue, and negative characterizations via metapramatic construal. I then
continue the discussion of Shih’s critique of family and filial piety, drawing from my
interview with her. I argue that, like many Buddhists have had to do, Shih has had to
defend herself against those who criticize monks and nuns for being unfilial. I argue that
this is not unlike the challenge tongzhi encounter, in which they also have to face
criticism from family members who will only fully accept them if they bear children. I
conclude by arguing that both tongzhi and Buddhist clerics like Shih find ways to
negotiate and reinterpret their family responsibilities. For Shih, it is choosing to not fully
isolate herself from her family, as some Buddhist clergy would. For the tongzhi I have
interviewed for my project, they enact filial piety through devotion to gods, rituals to help
the merit of disciples’ deceased fathers and grandfathers, and their desire to have children
through adoption.

124

Chapter 5
Conclusion
Daoist Master Weiming Lu and Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei come from
different religious traditions, but they have both made serving the needs of tongzhi in
Taiwan a core part of their work. While they do that in part through religious guidance
and advocating for equal rights, many of the tongzhi that seek their counsel on an
individual basis complain not of political or legal discrimination, but instead lament the
struggles that they experience with their families of origin. Shih has facilitated
conversations between some of her tongzhi students and their families who were
“shocked and angry” when they learned of their children’s sexual orientation.
Taiwan’s Confucian-inspired culture means that the family is strictly defined,
with expected roles for each member. Given the nature of the family institution, and the
belief that children need to marry and bear children to fulfill the expectation of filial
piety, it can be challenging for some parents to accept tongzhi family members. In the
previous pages, I drew on scholarship describing the familial pressure that tongzhi face,
as well as fictive kin studies, in order to argue that tongzhi at the Daoist Brilliant Light
Temple in Taiwan have created their own fictive kin network through the use of religious
frameworks. These relations—with deities, Master Lu, and peers—provide members with
emotional and social support. I argue that, through their negotiation of familial
obligations and filial piety, religious tongzhi are not unlike celibate clergy such as Master

125

Lu and Shih Chao Hwei, who are also outside of the Confucian norm by not marrying
and bearing children. Celibate monks, nuns, and priests have long had to defend their
chosen path and argue that their religious work is in fact filial. The same Confucian
pressure to marry and bear children acts on clergy as well as tongzhi, and this may
motivate at least some of the support that Shih and Master Lu give to tongzhi.
In my thesis I examined how Shih challenged the anti-same-sex marriage groups’
heteronormative view of family by portraying these groups as illogical, narrow-minded,
and parochial—in contrast to progressives like herself who she argues are enlightened
and cosmopolitan. Through this argument in support of tongzhi, Shih was also justifying
her own chosen path as a monastic. Both tongzhi and clergy in Taiwan have found ways
to negotiate and reinterpret their family responsibilities. To my knowledge, this
connection between tongzhi and religious clergy in Taiwan has not been made before.
This thesis also addressed a gap in the literature, as little scholarship has been done on the
intersection of tongzhi with Daoism and Buddhism.
Buddhism, Daoism, and a variety of folk religious beliefs and practices were
brought to Taiwan with the immigrants who crossed the Taiwan Strait to come to the
island from China starting in the 1600s, as well as introduced by Daoist and Buddhist
missionaries. While these religious traditions were repressed in China during the Maoist
era, for much of Taiwan’s history they were given the freedom to thrive and innovate. It
is for this reason that Taiwan has become a source of information on Chinese religious
practices: when some communities in China began to revive their religious practices
starting in the 1980s, they could look to temples of the same gods in Taiwan as well as
other connections across the Strait to restore and reinvent their traditions (Overmyer
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2003). Therefore, Taiwan is arguably not on the periphery of Chinese religious practices,
but is the very center. It is the complete religious freedom that Taiwan has today, as well
as its democratic rights, which have made it possible for Buddhist nun Shih Chao Hwei to
speak in front of the Taiwanese legislature to passionately call for same-sex marriage. It
is also why Brilliant Light Temple—a Daoist temple focused on openly supporting
tongzhi—can exist as well as be featured in both Taiwanese and international media
reports. I believe it would be very difficult for this temple to exist in China, and that if it
did, it would be underground and not publicized (given the stigma facing tongzhi in the
PRC; see Zheng 2015). This thesis resituates Taiwan as the center of Chinese religion.
While I have chosen to focus on the topic of how tongzhi and religious clergy
navigate and reinterpret family bonds and familial obligations, there are other themes that
are apparent in my research. One is the role of patriarchy for both the tongzhi community
in Taiwan and LGBTQ communities in the Euro-North American world. In Chapters 1
and 2 I stated that I was choosing to use the term tongzhi throughout my thesis because
the tongzhi community in Taiwan has its own unique facets and historical trajectory that
differ from that of the LGBTQ communities in Europe and North America. Therefore, I
argued, tongzhi is a more appropriate umbrella term than LGBTQ for this community.
However, despite their different histories, the LGBTQ community in North America and
the tongzhi community are both affected by patriarchy. The pressure that tongzhi face is
patriarchal. They are to expected to marry heterosexually, and heterosexual marriage is
for the purpose of producing heirs, preferably boys through whom the family name is
continued. Stigma against LGBTQ in North America often has a basis in patriarchy as
well: some men use homophobic jokes and slurs to assert their heterosexual masculinity
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and adherence to patriarchal gender norms (which reflects a preference for male
dominance, female submission, and hetero-cis-normativity) (Cameron 1997; Worthen
2020). The social pressure that tongzhi in Taiwan and LGBTQ people in North America
experience is often connected to a desire to preserve the patriarchy.
As I described in Chapter 2, there are a range of terms used in Taiwan by people
who are same-sex attracted: there is tongzhi, the English terms ‘LGBTQ’ and ‘gay’, as
well as gendered binary terms such as 1 and 0 and T and Po. One may use one term over
another for a strategic political purpose. For example, one may use LGBTQ to align
themselves with the global queer community. Or, for the organizers of the ‘First Hong
Kong Gay and Lesbian Film Festival’ in 1989, using tongzhi as the Chinese language
translation of ‘gay and lesbian’ was a conscious effort to use an indigenous term for
same-sex love instead of a Western term (and using the Chinese term for ‘homosexuality’
was not feasible because of its negative connotations as a medical term connoting a
pathology). Linguistic anthropologists Andrew Wong and Qing Zhang argue that the use
of the term tongzhi by bimonthly tongzhi magazine G&L constitutes a discourse of
resistance—namely reappropriating a term deeply rooted in the history of the Chinese
communist revolution to describe a non-heteronormative sexual identity is an act of
rebellion (2001, 267-8). Xiao’en, a 40-year-old Christian tongzhi woman (see Chapters 2
and 4), chooses to use the term tongzhi because she said it is so broad—it can describe
someone like her who is not sure if she is only attracted to women—and inclusive of a
range of sexual identities. This is not unlike the description of the term by pioneering
‘tongzhi theorist’ Chou Wah-shan, who argues that the term “rejects essentialism” and
can refer to all forms of sexual practice that have been marginalized by hegemonic
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heterosexism (2000, 3). The term tongzhi evokes the fluid conception of sexuality that
prevailed for much of China’s history.
There are other terms in use that are more gendered, such as 1 and 0 among samesex attracted men (with 1s being associated with masculinity and 0s with femininity) and
the masculine T and feminine Po identities among same-sex attracted women. These
terms indicate an essentialism that didn’t previously exist in the imperial Chinese view of
sexuality. While scholarship by anthropologist Zheng Tiantian (2015) suggests these
gendered binaries are fairly rigid (one becomes a 1 or 0 and then is disciplined to stay in
that role, for example), my research suggests these categories aren’t as fixed, as least not
in Taiwan. Lloyd of Brilliant Light Temple described a whole spectrum that exists
between tops and bottoms. His fellow temple member Evan said he decided to go from
being a 0 to a 1 several years ago, and said that though he now enjoys being a 1, he also
displays some behavior that is more associated with being a 0. For Evan, using 1 and 0
may be more for the purpose of specifically describing the sexual role he takes in his
relationships, for both he and Lloyd told me that they prefer to use the English word
‘gay’ to describe themselves. This appears to be a cosmopolitan display. Like Buddhist
nun Shih Chao Hwei’s use of English in her speech to the Taiwanese legislature, Evan
and Lloyd’s use of the English term ‘gay’ may be a strategy to show themselves as
globally minded in contrast to those who oppose tongzhi rights (who are portrayed as
parochial and illogical by Shih, as I described in Chapter 4).
The various terms for sexual orientation in use in Taiwan—some of which are in
English, some of which are in Chinese; ranging from a fluid conception of sexuality to
one that is more essential and gendered—can sometimes be used simultaneously by the

129

same person. Though there are reasons to see these terms as having their own unique
histories and demarcated meanings, there is sometimes overlap: patriarchy often plays a
role in the lives of both those who identify as LGBTQ and tongzhi. As I explored in this
thesis, regardless of the term one may use, in Taiwan the main source of conflict for those
who are same-sex attracted comes from the family—because of heteronormative
expectations to marry, bear children, and continue the family line.
Finally, while I examine how the symbolic family formed among worshippers at
Brilliant Light Temple provides emotional support and allows members to navigate
familial responsibilities, it should be acknowledged that being a family also involves
quotidian forms of support. Parents feed, clothe, and shelter their children, and family
members take care of each other when someone is sick and help out with tasks and
errands. Research on fictive kin networks has shown that these communities do often
fulfill the same tasks. In Eric Shaw’s (2008) study of three different kinship groups
(Haitian immigrants, Christian fundamentalists, and gang members), he notes that
nonrelated members of these communities helped each other with everyday tasks and
problems. Shaw writes that new immigrants to a Haitian community in New England
relied on fictive kin for help with the immigration process and with food, shelter, and
transportation when they first arrived (2008). In a different fictive kin community—that
of gang members—individuals helped each other with small tasks such as providing
transportation as well as larger concerns (such as bringing someone with a broken arm to
a hospital) (2008). Shaw writes that helping members with “trivial” needs is often
commonplace and expected—and that this same type of help is evident in the fictive kin
communities he studied.
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Ultimately, I argued that members of Brilliant Light Temple are receiving
substantial emotional support and care (an equally important function of family) through
the fictive kin network they have created. I have made the new argument that clergy in
Taiwan like Master Lu and Shih Chao Hwei are not unlike the tongzhi they serve—for as
celibate priests, monks, and nuns, they are also outside of the heteronormative Confucian
social order. I have demonstrated that through religious frameworks, both celibate clergy
and tongzhi reinterpet family obligations and can therefore see themselves as being filial.
Evan, who has had many struggles with his family, hopes that they too will see him as
being filial—and that one day they will love him and accept him for who he is.
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Appendix A
Glossary
Table A.1 Glossary of Chinese Terms
Pinyin
baoshou

Characters (Traditional)

English meaning
Conservative

binghuan

Illness, disease

bufen

Term used among same-sex
attracted women in Taiwan
and PRC denoting neither
masculine T or feminine Po;
no visible gender
identification

Cheng yen (pinyin:
Zhengyan)

Famous nun in Taiwan who
leads the Tzu Chi
Foundation

chong

To favor, term used in
homoerotic writing to refer
to how emperors had male
‘favorites’

chujia

To renounce and become a
monk or nun (literally
“leave home”)

cibei

Benevolence

Ciji jijin hui

Tzu Chi Foundation;
international NGO based in
Taiwan

Daodejing

A fundamental text for both
philosophical and religious
Daoism, traditionally
attributed to Laozi
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dan

Type of female role in
traditional opera that came
to be associated with boy
actors; term also
synonymous with catamite

Dong Xian

Male favorite of Emperor Ai

duanxiu

‘(Passion of the) cut sleeve’;
a term denoting same-sex
love in early Chinese history

Duanxiu pian

The Cut Sleeve; anthology
of homoerotic short stories
and anecdotes with stories
chronologically arranged
from 5th century up to 19th
century

fentao

‘Divided peach’, metaphor
referring to same-sex love

Foguangshan

Buddha’s Light Mountain;
one of the major Humanistic
Buddhist organizations in
Taiwan

H

Term used among same-sex
attracted women in Taiwan
and PRC denoting neither
masculine T or feminine Po;
no visible gender
identification; see also bufen

Hongshi Tongxun

Hongshi Newsletter

Hu Tianbao

Name of a person who
became deified into a god in
Qing Dynasty China

Hongshi Tongxun

Hongshi Newsletter
(newsletter of the Hongshi
Institute)

jiaobei

‘Moon blocks’—a pair of
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mussel-shaped objects used
for divination
jiaren

One’s family, or a family
member

jijian

Literally ‘chicken
lewdness’; connotation in
English is ‘sodomy’

jingshenyao

Psychotropic drugs

jitong

Spirit medium

kengqiang

Impressive, resounding

kuan

Broad

lala

Term for ‘lesbian’ used in
PRC

Laozi (alternate spelling:
Lao Tzu)

Semi-legendary Chinese
philosopher, traditionally
credited with writing the
Daodejing

lazi

Term for ‘lesbian’ used in
Taiwan

Lu Weiming

Name of Daoist priest in
New Taipei City who runs a
temple dedicated to Tu’er
Shen

Mazu

Mazu—the name of a sea
goddess widely worshipped
in Taiwan and SE China
coast

Mouzi lihuo lun

Treatise on the Disposing of
Error; one of the earliest
Buddhist works in Chinese,
dating to the late 2nd
Century CE

nütongzhi

Term used among same-sex
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attracted women in Chinese
societies; literally ‘female’
tongzhi
Po

Female tongzhi inclined to
feminine gender
performances; ‘femme’

Quanguo zongjiao da
lianmeng fan hunyin
pinggqan

National Religious Alliance
Against Marriage Equality

renjian fojiao

Buddhism for the human
world/realm (or ‘Engaged’
Buddhism)

Sanshan Jiuhou
xiansheng

Mr. Sanshan Jiuhou; Daoist
deity (other main god at
Weimingtang temple, in
addition to the Rabbit God)

shifu

Apprenticeship father; term
used by Daoist disciples to
address their master. Also
used as a term of respect for
a monk or nun. See also
shixiong

Shih Chao Hwei (in
pinyin: Shi Zhao Hui)

Name for a Buddhist
independent scholar-nun
and activist

shixiong

Apprenticeship
brother/sibling. Term used
among Daoist disciples
and/or temple members to
address each other

T

Female tongzhi inclined to
masculine gender
performances; ‘butch’

Taiwan banlu quanyi
tuidong lianmeng

Taiwan Alliance to Promote
Civil Partnership Rights
(TAPCPR)
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Taiwan zongjiao tuanti
aihu jiating dalianmeng

Alliance of Taiwanese
Religious Groups Caring for
Family

Taixu

Name of a modernist
Buddhist monk (1890-1947
who reformed Chinese
Buddhism. Mentor to
Yinshun

Tong fanjing she

‘Child-Brahman Abode’, the
first tongzhi Buddhist group
in Taiwan (see Yang 2005)

Tongguang tongzhi
zhanglao jiaohui

Tong-Kwang Lighthouse
Presbyterian Church; first
openly pro-tongzhi church
in Taiwan; opened in Taipei
in 1996

tongzhi

Most popular contemporary
word used in Taiwan,
China, and Hong Kong by
same-sex attracted people,
those who are transgender,
and others who are sexually
and gender nonconforming.
Literally ‘comrade’; roughly
equivalent to LGBTQ

tongxing’ai

Translation of English word
‘homosexuality’

tongxinglian

Translation of English word
‘homosexuality’

tongzhi

LGBTQ (lit: comrade)

tu’er

‘Little' rabbit’

Tu’er Shen

Name of a Chinese rabbit
god

Tuye yizi

Uncle Rabbit God’s adopted
son
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tuzi

Rabbit

Weimingtang

Name of Daoist temple
devoted to the Rabbit God;
named after head priest
Master Lu (see entries for
Tu’er Shen and Lu
Weiming); I have translated
it as ‘Brilliant Light
Temple’

Xia yidai xingfu lianmeng

Alliance For The Next
Generation's Happiness

xiao

Filial piety; some monastics
divide this into “great filial
piety” (daxiao
),
connected to celestial
powers and the state, and
“little filial piety” (xiaoxiao
) that is limited to one’s
parents

xiao

Little/small; can be used
with a first name to mean
“Little so-and-so”

Xiao’en

Name of Christian tongzhi
woman interviewed for this
thesis

Xinxin xiwang lianmeng

Faith and Hope League
(FHL)
“Auntie Bear”, a person to
whom letters to tongzhi
magazine G&L could be
addressed. Dama literally
means “elder mother”, and
is a kinship term referring to
the wife of the father’s elder
brother (i.e. “aunt”).

Xiong Dama

Yinshun

Name of a Chinese monk
(1906-2005) who, along
with his mentor Taixu,
reformed Chinese
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Buddhism. Was a mentor to
Shih Chao Hwei.
yizi

Adopted son

yuanfen

Term used to refer to a
predestined relationship; can
also be translated as “fateful
coincidences”, “predestined
affinity”, or “pre-fated
bond”.

Yuan Mei

Qing Dynasty poet and
scholar (1716-1798)

Yue Xia Lao Ren

‘The Old Man Under the
Moon’; Name of a Chinese
matchmaking god
responsible for love and
marriage

yutao

Half-eaten peach/part of a
peach that is not eaten;
metaphor for same-sex love

Zhengyi Dao

Way of Orthodox Unity
(Daoist movement)

Zibuyu

What the Master Would Not
Discuss, a collection of
supernatural stories by Qing
Dynasty writer Yuan Mei
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Appendix B
Excerpts from Shih Chao Hwei’s Speech (In Traditional Chinese
Characters)
1.

h

l
l

h
2.

m

3.

4.

h

h

o
e

o
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o
h

h
h
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s

